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1 
EXTERNALITIES AND THE COMMON OWNER 
Madison Condon* 
Abstract: Due to the embrace of modern portfolio theory, most of the stock market is 
controlled by institutional investors holding broadly diversified economy-mirroring portfolios. 
Recent scholarship has revealed the anti-competitive incentives that arise when a firm’s largest 
shareholders own similarly sized stakes in the firm’s industry competitors. This Article 
expands the consideration of the effects of common ownership from the industry level to the 
market portfolio level and argues that diversified investors should rationally be motivated to 
internalize intra-portfolio negative externalities. This portfolio perspective can explain the 
increasing climate change related activism of institutional investors, who have applied 
coordinated shareholder power to pressure fossil fuel producers into substantially reducing 
greenhouse gas emissions. 
While institutional investors have protested their ability to influence firm-level supply and 
pricing decisions in the service of muting competition, they are more willing to advertise their 
role in seeking emissions reduction commitments, even admitting they are for the benefit of 
portfolio returns. These commitments, however, affect product supply and imply market power 
in much the same way, and provide further evidence that institutional investors are able to 
influence managerial decisions at the firm level for the benefit of their broader portfolio. This 
insight requires amendment of the traditional view that diversified investors are “rationally 
reticent” and lack the incentive to engage in monitoring of firm behavior. It additionally 
challenges a fundamental norm of corporate governance law: the theory of shareholder 
primacy rests on the premise that shareholders homogeneously seek to maximize corporate 
profits and share value. This Article shows that in certain circumstances a majority of minority 
shareholders may direct the firm away from a profit-maximizing objective. 
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INTRODUCTION 
In December 2018, Royal Dutch Shell announced that it was setting 
emissions reduction targets, aiming to reduce its net carbon footprint 
(including emissions from the sale of its products) 20% by 2035, and 50% 
by 2050.1 According to The Wall Street Journal, Shell executives were 
initially opposed to these goals—the CEO had described them as “onerous 
and cumbersome” just six months before—but they eventually capitulated 
“to months of investor pressure.”2 The announcement was jointly made 
with Climate Action 100+, a coalition made up of more than 360 
institutional investors that control $34 trillion in assets, or 40% of global 
GDP.3 In a press release, Climate Action 100+ stated that its success at 
                                                   
1. Press Release, Joint Statement Between Institutional Investors on Behalf of Climate Action 100+ 
and Royal Dutch Shell Plc (Shell) (Dec. 3, 2018) [hereinafter Shell Emissions Commitment], 
https://www.shell.com/media/news-and-media-releases/2018/joint-statement-between-institutional-
investors-on-behalf-of-climate-action-and-shell.html [https://perma.cc/2HE8-KH2A]. 
2. Sarah Kent, Shell to Link Carbon Emissions Targets to Executive Pay, WALL ST. J. (Dec. 3, 
2018),  https://www.wsj.com/articles/shell-to-link-carbon-emissions-targets-to-executives-pay-
1543843441 [https://perma.cc/7HRL-32FB]. 
3. GDP (current US$), World Bank national accounts data and OECD National Accounts data 
files,  WORLD  BANK,  https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.CD 
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Shell “demonstrates the power of collective global investor engagement” 
and that the coalition planned to “use the commitment to raise the bar for 
the oil and gas industry as a whole.”4 Shortly thereafter, investors filed 
shareholder proposals for the 2019 proxy season seeking similar 
emissions targets from Exxon Mobil, Chevron, and BP.5 
The climate activism of Shell’s investors presents two paradoxes for 
scholars of corporate governance. First, much of the theory behind the law 
of corporate governance rests on the assumption that shareholders’ 
rational self-interest drives them to exercise their governance rights with 
the singular goal of maximizing corporate value.6 But voluntary emissions 
reduction is at odds with the aim of profit maximization.7 Pollution 
regulation is “supposed” to be the exclusive realm of government actors, 
not the investment community.8 And second, broadly diversified investors 
are typically described as poor monitors of corporate behavior, lacking the 
incentive and capacity to exercise their shareholder power to discipline 
management.9 Because engagement is costly and they own only a small 
                                                   
[https://perma.cc/6PB4-MMAD] (listing world GDP as $80.951 trillion in 2017). Since the December 
2018 announcement, several more institutional investors have joined the coalition. Ranks now stand 
at more than 450 investors controlling more than $40 trillion. Frequently Asked Questions, CLIMATE 
ACTION 100+, https://climateaction100.wordpress.com/faq/ [https://perma.cc/WM7P-XCQ6].  
4. Press Release, Climate Action 100+, Shell Announces Comprehensive Carbon Emissions 
Reductions Commitment with Climate Action 100+ Investors (Dec. 3, 2018) [hereinafter Press 
Release, Shell], https://www.ceres.org/news-center/press-releases/shell-announces-comprehensive-
carbon-emissions-reductions-commitment [https://perma.cc/F36Z-FZKV]. 
5. Ed Crooks, Investors Push Exxon to List Emissions Targets in Annual Reports, FIN. TIMES (Dec. 
16, 2018), https://www.ft.com/content/ba611d60-0152-11e9-99df-6183d3002ee1[https://perma. 
cc/D7WB-X257]; Jennifer Hiller & Shadia Nasralla, Five Oil Majors Face 2019 Climate Target 
Pressure by Investors, REUTERS (Dec. 19, 2018), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-chevron-
shareholders-resolution/five-oil-majors-face-2019-climate-target-pressure-by-investors-
idUSKBN1OI14V [https://perma.cc/Z2BF-U5VD]. 
6. See, e.g., FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF 
CORPORATE LAW 69–70 (1991) (arguing that shareholders homogenously desire the firm to maximize 
profits); Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, End of History for Corporate Law, 89 GEO. L.J. 439, 
441 (2001) (arguing that a company’s share valuation provides “the principal measure of its 
shareholders’ interests”); Roberta Romano, Metapolitics and Corporate Law Reform, 36 STAN. L. 
REV. 923, 961 (1984) (arguing “profit maximization is the only goal for which we can at least 
theoretically posit shareholder unanimity”). 
7. See, e.g., Michael C. Jensen, Value Maximization, Stakeholder Theory, and the Corporate 
Objective Function, 14 J. APP. CORP. FIN. 8, 16 (2001) (arguing that the regulation of externalities “is 
the legitimate domain of the government in its rule-setting function” and that “[c]ompanies that try to 
[voluntarily internalize externalities] will be eliminated by competitors that choose not to be so 
civic  minded”). 
8. See, e.g., id.; Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 6, at 442 (“[T]he most efficacious legal 
mechanisms for protecting the interests of nonshareholder constituencies . . . lie outside of 
corporate  law.”). 
9. See, e.g., Lucian Bebchuk et al., The Agency Problems of Institutional Investors, 31 J. ECON. 
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share of each company, they are “rationally reticent” to spend resources 
overseeing individual firm management.10 
This paradoxical behavior is in fact quite widespread. Shell’s 
commitment is just one example of the growing trend of institutional 
investor activism related to climate change. In recent proxy seasons, 
shareholders have filed proposals seeking a range of climate change 
related outcomes, including disclosure of climate risk, suspension of 
lobbying efforts to fight carbon regulation, and commitments to clear 
emissions reduction targets.11 Each type of proposal has received growing 
shareholder support, and in 2017 and 2018 the world’s largest asset 
managers joined in votes against the advice of the boards of five major 
energy companies, successfully passing climate resolutions with majority 
support.12 Several dozen other resolutions have been withdrawn prior to 
voting due to board acquiescence to shareholder demands.13 
Beyond shareholder resolutions, institutional investors have applied 
pressure to corporate management using a variety of means: private 
conversations, public declarations, dissent over executive compensation, 
and votes against re-electing noncompliant board members.14 These 
                                                   
PERSP. 89, 103 (2017) (arguing that investment managers have “limited economic incentive . . . to 
generate governance gains in portfolios companies”); Edward B. Rock, Institutional Investors in 
Corporate Governance 12 (University of Pennsylvania, Working Paper No. 1458, Jul. 21, 2015) 
[hereinafter Rock, Institutional Investors in Corporate Governance] (explaining that the “traditional 
passivity” of institutional investors in corporate governance can be explained by insufficient 
incentives); Edward B. Rock, The Logic and (Uncertain) Significance of Institutional Shareholder 
Activism, 79 GEO. L. J. 445, 472 (1991) [hereinafter Rock, The Logic and (Uncertain) Significance] 
(arguing that “it is not rational for any individual money manager to assume the burden of 
disciplining” management). 
10. Ronald J. Gilson & Jeffrey N. Gordon, The Agency Costs of Agency Capitalism: Activist 
Investors and the Revaluation of Governance Rights, 113 COLUM.  L. REV. 863, 867 (2013). 
11. See infra section I.B. 
12. James Copland & Margaret O’Keefe, Climate Change Proposals Break Through, PROXY 
MONITOR (2017), http://www.proxymonitor.org/Forms/2017Finding1.aspx [https://perma.cc/HL2E-
K6Y8]; Shirley Westcott, Surprises from the 2018 Proxy Season, HARV. L. SCH. F. CORP. 
GOVERNANCE. & FIN. REG. (June 27, 2018), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2018/06/27/surprises-
from-the-2018-proxy-season/ [https://perma.cc/E9GK-6HBH]. 
13. This and following voting data obtained by searching CERES, Engagement Tracker, available 
at: https://engagements.ceres.org/ [https://perma.cc/N482-EAEW] [hereinafter CERES, Engagement 
Tracker]. In 2017, twenty-six climate-related resolutions were withdrawn after a commitment was 
reached and twelve were withdrawn when the companies agreed to begin dialogue on the issue. Id. 
(search year field “2017,” status field “Withdrawn: Commitment,” and ESG field “Environment,” 
producing twenty-six results, from which two not specific to climate may be eliminated). In 2018, 
thirty-three climate-related resolutions were withdrawn after commitments and six were withdrawn 
as a part of beginning dialogue. Id. (same search in 2018, producing thirty-nine results, from which 
six not specific to climate may be eliminated). 
14. See infra section II.A. 
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investors have enormous stakes in the companies they are targeting, 
ensuring that managers pay attention to their demands. At Exxon’s 2017 
annual meeting the company’s largest shareholder, BlackRock, voted 
against the re-election of two board members in protest of a “non-
engagement” policy that precluded directors from talking to shareholders 
about the company’s strategic response to climate change.15 Following the 
vote, Exxon announced that it had reconsidered its opposition to climate 
risk disclosure, and further, was renouncing its non-engagement policy, 
permitting directors to meet with shareholders going forward.16 
This Article argues that this paradoxical behavior can be explained by 
revising traditional corporate governance theory to account for 
institutional investors’ motivations at a portfolio rather than a firm level. 
This insight draws from the recent “economic blockbuster” that has 
attracted the attention of scholars and regulators alike: evidence that the 
rapid rise of massive institutional shareholders has decreased market 
competition.17 A growing number of empirical studies show that in 
concentrated industries, where many of the key players are owned by the 
same large shareholders, common ownership leads to anti-competitive 
price increases.18 That is, the increasing prevalence of institutional 
investors owning sizable shares of competing firms has resulted in these 
firms behaving more like oligopolies. These findings suggest that 
diversified shareholders are able to influence corporate managers into 
making firm-level decisions for the benefit of the broader 
investment  portfolio. 
A true portfolio maximizing strategy should look not just across firms, 
but across industries. If diversified investors prioritize industry-wide 
                                                   
15. Press Release, BlackRock, Supporting a Shareholder Proposal Following Extensive 
Management Engagement (May 31, 2017), https://www.blackrock.com/corporate/en-br/literature 
/press-release/blk-vote-bulletin-exxon-may-2017.pdf [https://perma.cc/6W3N-WUMM]. At the time 
of writing, BlackRock has slipped to second largest shareholder, holding 6.3% of Exxon, while 
Vanguard holds 7.8%. Andrew R. Sorkin, BlackRock’s Message: Contribute to Society, or Risk 
Losing Our Support, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 15, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/01/15/business/de
albook/blackrock-laurence-fink-letter.html (last visited Jan. 11, 2020). 
16. Sorkin, supra note 15. 
17. Einer Elhauge, Horizontal Shareholding, 129 HARV. L. REV. 1267, 1267 (2016); see also Eric 
A. Posner, Fiona M. Scott Morton, & E. Glen Weyl, A Proposal to Limit the Anticompetitive Power 
of Institutional Investors, 81 ANTITRUST L. J. 669, 675 (2017). 
18. See, e.g., José Azar, Martin Schmalz & Isabel Tecu, Anticompetitive Effects of Common 
Ownership, 73 J. FIN. 1513, 1550 (2018); José Azar, Sahil Raina, & Martin Schmalz, Ultimate 
Ownership and Bank Competition 25 (May 4, 2019), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstra
ct_id=2710252 [https://perma.cc/5XVK-BDY3]; Jin Xie & Joseph Gerakos, Institutional Cross-
Holdings and Generic Entry in the Pharmaceutical Industry (Tuck Sch. of Business Working Paper 
No. 3285161, 2018), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3285161 [https://perma.cc/U8Q5-YG96]. 
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profit over firm-specific profit, they should also prioritize economy-wide 
profit over industry-specific profit. If a subset of firms in a portfolio 
impose costs on the broader portfolio through the generation of negative 
externalities, a portfolio-wide owner should be motivated to curtail those 
externalities at the source.19 A rational owner would use its power to 
internalize externalities so long as its share of the costs to the externality-
creating firms are lower than the benefits that accrue to the entire portfolio 
from the elimination of the externality. 
Accordingly, this Article argues that institutional investors’ climate 
activism is motivated by their desire to mitigate climate change risks and 
damages to their economy-mirroring portfolios. Unchecked emissions 
contribute to an increase in global average temperature that is predicted to 
have a devastating effect on the world economy.20 One large asset 
manager predicts that we are headed to a world of 4°C of warming, and 
that “global economic losses could build to $23 trillion over the next 80 
years; equal to permanent damage three to four times the scale of the 2008 
Global Financial Crisis, and continuing to escalate.”21 The institutional 
investors most active on corporate climate engagement have massive 
portfolios broadly diversified across the entire economy. As “universal 
owners,”22 it is in their financial self-interest to take action to reduce 
global emissions, including those generated by the publicly traded fossil 
fuel companies in which they invest. 
While the concept of a “universal owner” was initially raised in the 
1980s and 1990s,23 this Article links that theory with recent empirical 
studies on the anti-competitive effects of common ownership and argues 
that that these studies provide proof of the portfolio-wide perspective 
required for the internalization of corporate externalities. The literature on 
common ownership to date has focused on its measured or predicted 
                                                   
19. Robert G. Hansen & John R. Lott Jr., Externalities and Corporate Objectives in a World with 
Diversified Shareholder/Consumers, 31 J. FIN. & QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS 43, 47–49 (1996); Roger 
H. Gordon, Do Publicly Traded Corporations Act in the Public Interest? (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. 
Research, Working Paper No. 3303, 1990).  
20. See infra section I.C, summarizing the literature on projections of global climate damages.  
21. Schroders Climate Dashboard Points to Four Degree Rise - Despite Increase in Carbon Prices, 
SCHRODERS (Oct. 19, 2018), https://www.schroders.com/en/au/institutions/insights/investment-
insights/schroders-climate-dashboard-points-to-four-degree-rise—despite-increase-in-carbon-prices/ 
[https://perma.cc/NE73-78JJ].  
22. ROBERT MONKS & NELL MINOW, WATCHING THE WATCHERS: CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN 
THE 21ST CENTURY 121 (1996); see also JAMES HAWLEY & ANDREW WILLIAMS, THE RISE OF 
FIDUCIARY CAPITALISM: HOW INSTITUTIONAL INVESTORS CAN MAKE AMERICA MORE 
DEMOCRATIC 3–5, 170–72 (2000); Hansen & Lott, supra note 19.  
23. See MONKS, supra note 22, at 121.  
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impacts on competition and labor demand, but discussion of its impacts 
on inter-firm externalities has been limited.24 This is the first Article to 
systematically examine institutional investor activism on environmental 
issues using the economic incentives of common ownership as 
a  framework. 
In response to inquiry over common ownership’s anti-competitive 
effects, institutional investors have been careful to deny their ability to 
have any control over product pricing decisions.25 However, they are 
considerably more willing to advertise their success persuading 
companies to commit to environmental and social objectives.26 This 
Article shows that these objectives can have a direct relationship to 
product supply and pricing, disputing institutional investors’ general 
claims to powerlessness. Further, in the climate context, some institutional 
investors have admitted that the motivation for their firm-specific 
interventions originates from their portfolio perspective. A group of 
seventy-four investors controlling $4.5 trillion in assets recently outlined 
their expectation that portfolio companies refrain from lobbying against 
carbon regulation, in service to “the long-term value in our portfolios 
across all sectors and asset classes.”27 This Article contributes to the 
ongoing debate over common ownership by identifying the causal 
mechanisms by which institutional investors influence corporate directors 
                                                   
24. An exception is two recent papers that examine one positive externality that results from 
common ownership: investment in innovation. Ángel L. López & Xavier Vives, Overlapping 
Ownership, R&D Spillovers, and Antitrust Policy, 127 J. POL. ECON. 2394, 2396 (2019); Miguel 
Antón, Florian Ederer, Mireia Giné, & Martin Schmalz, Innovation: The Bright Side of 
CommonOwnership? (Working Paper June 21, 2018), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstr
act_id=3099578 [https://perma.cc/GXT3-QQUL]. 
25. See, e.g., Comments from Kenneth A. Bertsch, Council of Institutional Investors, Regarding 
FTC  Hearing #8: Competition and Consumer Protection 4 (Dec. 6, 2018), https://www.ftc.gov/syst
em/files/documents/public_comments/2018/12/ftc-2018-0107-d-0003-163746.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/4GSX-L4D8] (arguing that there is “no convincing evidence yet on a mechanism” 
by which common ownership causes anti-competitive behavior); see infra section  II.A. 
26. See, e.g., Press Release, Office of the New York State Comptroller, DiNapoli Presses Worst 
Greenhouse Gas Emitters to Meet Paris Climate Agreement Goals (Apr. 3, 2018), 
https://www.osc.state.ny.us/press/releases/apr18/040318.htm [https://perma.cc/M9SE-ZD8J]. 
27. PRINCIPLES FOR RESPONSIBLE INV. (PRI), CONVERGING ON CLIMATE LOBBYING 8 (2018), 
https://www.unpri.org/download?ac=4707 [https://perma.cc/2LW7-X6JG] (emphasis added) 
(citing  INVESTOR EXPECTATIONS ON CORPORATE CLIMATE LOBBYING, https://www.unpri.org/Upl
oads/i/k/t/Investor-Expectations-on-Corporate-Climate-Lobbying_en-
GB.pdf [https://perma.cc/4J36-LDJT]). This same text has been sent by individual investors directly 
to targeted energy companies. See THE CHURCH OF ENGLAND, EUROPEAN INVESTOR EXPECTATIONS 
ON  CORPORATE  LOBBYING  ON  CLIMATE CHANGE (Oct. 2018), https://www.churchofengland.org/
sites/default/files/2018-10/Investor.Expectations.Climate.Lobbying.Oct_.2018.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/5JGF-35QM]. 
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into deviating from profit-maximizing objectives.28 
This exploration of the externality internalizing effect of diversified 
ownership adds to the growing understanding of the net welfare effects of 
common ownership.29 The socially desirable diminution of harmful 
externalities must be weighed against the pernicious effects of investor 
market power, like monopoly pricing and monopsony wages. Beyond a 
mere tallying of positive and negative economic outcomes, the role of 
investor as private regulator should raise concerns about the compatibility 
of concentrated corporate control with democratic society—concerns 
dating back at least as far back as Adolf Berle and Gardiner Means.30 Self-
regulation of externalities through direct contraction of supply brings the 
market back into efficiency in much the same way as a Pigouvian tax—a 
key difference being that no revenue is lost to the government, and instead 
remains within the portfolio.31 
These welfare effects must be understood in order to craft corporate 
law’s response to common ownership. The norm of shareholder 
primacy,32 and the related theoretical justification for shareholder voting 
rights,33 are founded on the premise that shareholders uniformly desire 
share-value maximization. This Article, however, shows that diversified 
shareholder interests can diverge from both the interests of concentrated 
shareholders and the objective of maximizing share price. In questioning 
a key assumption underlying the norm of shareholder primacy, this Article 
                                                   
28. This is responsive to those claims by skeptics of the common ownership empirical findings who 
doubt investors’ ability to influence firm-level product decisions and point in particular to the lack of 
specific evidence on causal pathways between investor influence and managerial decisions. See 
Daniel P. O’Brien & Keith Waehrer, The Competitive Effects of Common Ownership: We Know Less 
Than We Think, 81 ANTITRUST L.J. 729, 761–64 (2017); infra section II.A (addressing those claims).  
29. See Scott Hemphill & Marcel Kahan, The Strategies of Anticompetitive Common Ownership 7 
(NYU Law & Econ. Research Paper No. 18-29, Nov. 2019), 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3210373  [https://perma.cc/932P-4NWS] 
(arguing that the welfare effects of common ownership are ambiguous); cf. Posner et al., supra note 
17, at 717–21 (arguing that limiting common ownership would lead to positive social welfare effects 
that outweigh the loss of diversification benefits to investors). 
30. Adolf Berle, Implications of the Corporate Revolution in Economic Theory, in ADOLF BERLE 
& GARDINER MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY xxxviii (Harcourt, 
Brace and World rev. ed. 1968); see also Zephyr Teachout & Lina Khan, Market Structure and 
Political Law: A Taxonomy of Power 9 DUKE J. CONST. L. & PUB. POL’Y 37, 56 (2014). 
31. See infra section III.B. 
32. See, e.g., Lucian Bebchuk, The Case for Increasing Shareholder Power, 118 HARV. L. REV. 
833, 908 (2005) (arguing that increasing managerial accountability to shareholders would “enhance 
shareholder value”). 
33. Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Voting in Corporate Law, 26 J.L. & ECON. 395, 403 
(1983) (arguing that shareholders, as “the residual claimants to the firm’s income” have the best 
incentives to direct the firm toward maximizing profits). 
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compels the reassessment of a substantial body of scholarship and 
jurisprudence.34 Further, while intra-shareholder conflicts of interest have 
been contemplated elsewhere, most scholars have argued that managers 
should prioritize diversified shareholder interests because they are better 
aligned with the goal of increasing social welfare.35 The proponents of this 
mandate, however, ignore diversified investor incentives to reduce inter-
firm costs, and fail to consider the net welfare effects of common 
ownership.36 This insight further undermines the efficiency-based 
rationale for shareholder primacy’s ultimate service to social welfare 
welfare  maximization.37 
The Article proceeds as follows. Part I explains the theoretical and 
empirical literature that suggests diversified investors seek to maximize 
profits at the portfolio, rather than firm, level and explains how this 
portfolio perspective can be extended to explain why institutional 
investors seek to internalize harmful climate-change externalities. Not 
only does investor climate action diminish future climate damages, it also 
reduces the systemic climate risks that cannot be diversified away. Part I 
                                                   
34. See, e.g., Grant Hayden & Matthew Bodie, Arrow’s Theorem and the Exclusive Shareholder 
Franchise, 62 VAND. L. REV. 1217, 1218 n.1 (2009) (“Shareholder primacy is generally viewed as 
the normative foundation for modern corporate law theory.”); infra section III.B. Most academic 
arguments against the shareholder primacy norm focus on the interests of the corporation’s 
stakeholders beyond shareholders, or on shareholders’ ability to effectively oversee corporate 
management, rather than the underlying assumption that shareholders seek maximization of share 
value. See, e.g., Lynn A. Stout, The Toxic Side Effects of Shareholder Primacy, 161 U. PA. L. REV. 
2003, 2015–16 (2013) (describing shareholder primacy’s toxic effect on other stakeholder interests); 
William W. Bratton & Michael L. Wachter, The Case Against Shareholder Empowerment, 158 U. 
PA. L. REV. 653, 696–703 (2010) (arguing that shareholders are poor monitors of management due to 
insurmountable information asymmetries). 
35.  RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW, 370–71, 380 (3d ed. 1986); Richard A. 
Booth, Stockholders, Stakeholders, and Bagholders (or How Investor Diversification Affects 
Fiduciary Duty), 53 BUS. LAW. 429, 434 (1998) (summarizing literature and concluding that “[m]ost 
scholars” advocate that “management should manage with the interests of diversified stockholders in 
mind” (citing EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 6, at 25–30, 339–40)); Henry T.C. Hu, Risk, 
Time, and Fiduciary Principles in Corporate Investment, 38 UCLA L. REV. 27, 350 (1990); cf. Iman 
Anabtawi, Some Skepticism About Increasing Shareholder Power, 53 UCLA L. REV. 561, 583–85 
(2006) (noting that the interests of diversified and undiversified shareholders may diverge when 
considering the case of inter-firm externalities but providing no examples). 
36. Others have similarly argued that shareholder welfare is not adequately measured by share price 
alone. Oliver Hart and Luigi Zingales also posit that shareholders might desire externality-
internalization, but in their model, this interest stems from shareholders’ altruistic personal desires as 
members of society, not because they themselves are harmed by negative externalities. Oliver Hart & 
Luigi Zingales, Companies Should Maximize Shareholder Welfare Not Market Value, 2 J.L. FIN. 
ACCT. 247, 266–67 (2017); see also Einer Elhauge, Sacrificing Corporate Profits in the Public 
Interest, 80 N.Y.U. L. REV. 733, 791 (2005). 
37. See Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 6, at 441 (arguing that “there is convergence on a 
consensus that . . . aggregate social welfare . . . [is best achieved by making] corporate managers 
strongly accountable to shareholder interests and . . . only to those interests”); cf. Milton Friedman, 
The Social Responsibility of Business Is to Increase Profits, N.Y. TIMES MAG. (Sept. 13, 1970). 
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then breaks shareholder climate interventions into three categories of 
outcomes sought: (1) emissions reduction goals, (2) cessation of anti-
carbon regulation lobbying, and (3) climate risk disclosure. To be 
consistent with the externality internalizing theory, each of these 
objectives must result in reduced emissions levels beyond those that 
would have been achieved by profit-seeking managers responding to 
regulatory and market forces. Thus, each objective is assessed as to its 
(1) likelihood to reduce emissions and (2) legitimacy of firm-specific 
purpose. Next, a rough cost-benefit analysis is presented to demonstrate 
that the firm-specific marginal emissions reductions sought can 
significantly reduce predicted portfolio climate damages—enough so that 
the devaluation of the fossil fuel stock is outweighed by portfolio benefits. 
Part II applies this account of climate activism to the broader common 
ownership debate, arguing that it provides clear evidence of diversified 
shareholder power to influence managerial motives at the product level. It 
argues that institutional investors, contrary to traditional assumptions of 
investor passivity, have both the incentive and the capacity to serve as 
monitors of corporate behavior, so long as returns are justified at the 
portfolio level. Finally, Part III considers how this externality-
internalizing account of investor objectives is at odds with the claim that 
managers face no conflict when attempting to serve the interests of the 
corporation, its shareholders, and its market valuation. While a normative 
solution to this challenge to shareholder primacy is beyond the scope of 
this Article, it contemplates initial implications of diversified investor 
economy-wide control, including ambiguous net welfare effects and the 
concern that the market power to self-regulate operates as a form of 
unaccountable private governance.  
I. INSTITUTIONAL INVESTORS’ 
EXTERNALITY  INTERNALIZATION 
Just six shareholders control 24% of Exxon Mobil, the world’s largest 
publicly owned originator of greenhouse gases, responsible for 1.2% of 
annual global emissions.38 These same six shareholders also control 26% 
                                                   
38. The shareholders are BlackRock, Vanguard, State Street, Northern Trust, Bank of America, and 
Capital Research Global Investors. Ownership data taken from Morningstar tables on “Major Shareholders” 
for XOM as of Feb. 4, 2020, MORNINGSTAR https://www.morningstar.com/ (last visited Feb. 4, 2020); DR. 
PAUL GRIFFIN, THE CARBON MAJORS REPORT 2017, CDP (2017) [hereinafter CDP REPORT], 
https://b8f65cb373b1b7b15fec70d8ead6ced550b4d987d7c03fcdd1d.ssl.cf3.rackcdn.com/cms/reports/doc
uments/000/002/327/original/Carbon-Majors-Report-2017.pdf [https://perma.cc/LL2E-UKSX] (discussing 
XOM emissions data). These shareholders are each investment managers holding the assets for the benefit 
of underlying beneficiaries, so they “own” the shares insofar as the shares are listed in their name and they 
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of Chevron, responsible for 0.8% of emissions.39 They also hold similarly 
sized-stakes in two of the world’s biggest food and beverage 
conglomerates, PepsiCo and General Mills—companies highly exposed 
to the negative impacts of climate change: temperature rise, extreme 
weather events, drought, and decreased labor productivity, to name a 
few.40 The question arises: when exercising their sizable shareholder 
power over the boards of fossil fuel companies, do massive investors 
consider the impact of climate change on their broader portfolio? Would 
it make any difference? 
The financial world is increasingly aware of the danger climate change 
poses to business operations.41 In the World Economic Forum’s 2019 
Global Risk Perception Survey, business leaders ranked “extreme weather 
events” and “failure of climate change adaptation and mitigation” as the 
greatest risks in the next ten years.42 Climate-related risks, from forest 
fires, to increased rates of disease, to decreased efficiency in the electric 
grid, so broadly effect the economy, they are “systemic” and cannot be 
diversified away.43 Institutional investors know that the climate threat to 
their assets is generated by companies within their own portfolios, over 
                                                   
retain the right to vote the shares. 
39. Morningstar tables on “Major Shareholders” for CVX as of Jan. 13, 2020, MORNINGSTAR, 
https://www.morningstar.com/ (last visited Jan. 13, 2020); CDP REPORT, supra note 38. 
40. See, e.g., Feeding Ourselves Thirsty: Tracking Food Company Progress Toward a Water-
Smart Future, CERES (Sept. 7, 2017), https://feedingourselvesthirsty.ceres.org/ 
[https://perma.cc/DLU6-85RC] (finding that the world’s largest food companies are already 
experiencing losses from extreme weather events and reporting that $198 billion in agricultural 
revenue is at risk from changing precipitation patterns). The six shareholders hold 24% of PepsiCo 
and 25% of General Mills. Morningstar tables on “Major Shareholders” for PEP and GIS as of Feb 
4, 2020, MORNINGSTAR, https://www.morningstar.com/ (last visited Feb. 4, 2020). 
41. See, e.g., RISKY BUSINESS, THE ECONOMIC RISKS OF CLIMATE CHANGE IN THE UNITED  
STATES (2014), https://riskybusiness.org/site/assets/uploads/2015/09/RiskyBusiness_Report_WEB_
09_08_14.pdf [https://perma.cc/8FRD-UQMD]. 
42. WORLD ECON. F., THE GLOBAL RISKS REPORT 2019, 5 (2019) http://www3.weforum. 
org/docs/WEF_Global_Risks_Report_2019.pdf [https://perma.cc/A2YV-MTP5]. 
43. Modern portfolio theory identifies two types of financial risk: (1) economy-wide, systematic 
risk, and (2) firm-specific, idiosyncratic risk. Investors can diversify away firm-specific risk by 
investing across the economy. Systematic risk, however, cannot be eliminated through diversification 
because its effects are felt economy-wide. See RICHARD A. BREALEY, STEWART C. MYERS & 
FRANKLIN ALLEN, PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE FINANCE 168–70 (10th ed. 2011); INST. FOR 
SUSTAINABILITY LEADERSHIP, UNIV. OF CAMBRIDGE, UNHEDGEABLE RISK: HOW CLIMATE CHANGE 
SENTIMENT IMPACTS INVESTMENT (2015), https://www.cisl.cam.ac.uk/resources/publication-
pdfs/unhedgeable-risk.pdf [https://perma.cc/9L6K-E8E4]; Stefano Battison et al., A Climate Stress-
Test of the Financial System, 7 NATURE CLIMATE CHANGE 283, 288 (2017) (performing a network 
analysis of the financial sector’s exposure to climate-related risk and concluding that “financial 
actors’ portfolios are both interdependent and largely exposed to the outcome of the climate policy 
cycle”); Steven L. Schwarcz, Systemic Risk, 97 GEO. L.J. 193, 200 (2008). 
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which they themselves exercise shareholder power. One investor group 
recently tabulated a list of 100 public companies responsible for two-
thirds of all industrial greenhouse gas emissions through their operations 
and product sales.44 
Recently, institutional investors have been increasing their 
engagements with portfolio companies on environmental issues, and 
empirical work finds that the presence of institutional share ownership 
significantly increases portfolio firms’ environmental performance.45 A 
study examining the private dialogues undertaken by just one relatively 
small institutional investor found that the engagements significantly 
increased target companies’ climate risk disclosure and decreased levels 
of emissions.46 Investor activism on environmental and social issues is 
typically attributed to two causes. Investment managers are either: 
(1) imposing “social norms” on portfolio corporations47 in a way that 
decreases firm profits; or (2) promoting firm-specific profits through a 
business strategy somehow overlooked by firm managers, like regulatory 
preparedness.48 This Article proposes a third explanation: that institutional 
investors are pursuing profit maximizing objectives unrelated to any 
personal moral agenda, but this profit maximization is directed at the 
portfolio, rather than firm level. Investors address negative externalities 
at their source, minimizing harms to their broader portfolio. 
A. Portfolio-Maximizing Objective of Common Owners 
The term “institutional investor” can refer to a variety of different types 
of organizations. There are asset management companies, like BlackRock 
and Fidelity, that manage investments on behalf of widely dispersed retail 
                                                   
44. Focus List of Companies, CLIMATE ACTION 100+, https://climateaction100. 
wordpress.com/companies/ [https://perma.cc/8M6G-XCFD]. 
45. Alexander Dyck et al., Do Institutional Investors Drive Corporate Social Responsibility? 
International Evidence, 131 J. FIN. ECON. 693, 694 (2018).  
46. William Rees & Tatiana Rodionova, Investor Engagement to Mitigate Climate Change: 
Evidence from an Experiment with Mid-Cap Companies 23 (Working Paper Jan. 2017), 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2904553 [https://perma.cc/222A-WFH9] 
(finding that behind-the-scenes engagements undertaken by resulted in a 15–20% likelihood of 
improved climate risk disclosure and 17–18% likelihood of improved emissions performance).  
47. These social norms can either be the investment manager’s own personal beliefs, or those 
imputed to her underlying beneficiaries. Id.; see also Elhauge, supra note 36, at 755. 
48. See, e.g., JOHN BYRD & ELIZABETH COOPERMAN, SHAREHOLDER ACTIVISM FOR STRANDED 
ASSET RISK: AN ANALYSIS OF INVESTOR REACTIONS FOR FOSSIL FUEL COMPANIES (2017), 
https://corporate-sustainability.org/wp-content/uploads/Shareholder-Activism.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/TH2J-RTS3] (arguing that shareholder resolutions related to carbon risks draw 
investor attention to the possibility of mis-valuation and the risk of stranded assets).  
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investors for a profit. These can be either publicly or privately held. There 
are mutual funds that are investor-owned, like Vanguard. There are public 
employee pension funds like The California Public Employees’ 
Retirement System (CalPERS), and the New York State Common 
Retirement Fund. There are insurance companies that collect and invest 
premiums from their customers, using the returns to pay out claims, like 
AXA. Finally, there are sovereign wealth funds, like Norway’s Norges 
Bank Investment Management (NBIM), the largest in the world.49 
In recent years, institutional investor equity ownership has reached 
unprecedentedly massive proportions. This growth can be attributed, in 
part, to capital market innovations that enabled individuals to place their 
investments in the hands of intermediary money managers for a low fee.50 
Because broad diversification reduces risk, and because in an efficient 
market it is difficult to consistently pick stocks that result in gains relative 
to the market, retail investors increasingly turn their savings over to 
institutions that manage large funds with few employees. In 1950, 
institutions owned 6.1% of total equities, in 1980 they owned 28.4%, in 
2009 they owned 50.6%.51 By 2017, their ownership share of the broad-
market Russell 3000 index (which represents about 98% of all U.S. 
equities) had grown to 78%.52 
Due to the embrace of modern portfolio theory,53 most of these 
institutions diversify their public equity assets broadly across the stock 
market. At the extreme are index funds, which passively match portfolios 
to an index, but the majority of all institutional investors can be classified 
as “quasi-indexers,” meaning they hold a broadly diversified portfolio 
with low turnover.54 Matthew Backus and his coauthors have found that 
over the last four decades the typical investor portfolio has increasingly 
                                                   
49. Sovereign wealth funds are government-owned investment funds that invest state resources in 
global financial assets. Information on Norway’s fund can be found at https://www.nbim.no/ 
[https://perma.cc/48PZ-W9M7]. 
50. Gilson & Gordon, supra note 10, at 884–86. 
51. Id. at 874. 
52. Charles McGrath, 80% of Equity Market Cap Held by Institutions, PENSIONS & INVESTMENTS 
(Apr. 25, 2017), https://www.pionline.com/article/20170425/INTERACTIVE/170429926/80-of-
equity-market-cap-held-by-institutions [https://perma.cc/9NZC-99PA].  
53. Modern portfolio theory holds that investors can maximize their return, given a desired amount 
of risk, by diversifying their portfolios. See Harry Markowitz, Portfolio Selection, 7 J. FIN. 77, 
79  (1952).  
54. Brian J. Bushee, Identifying and Attracting the Right Investors: Evidence on the Behavior of 
Institutional Investors, 16 J. APPLIED CORP. FIN. 28, 29–31 (2004) (finding that from 1983–2002, 
61% of institutional shareholders were quasi-indexers, defined as those firms which “tend to make 
buy-and-hold investments in a broad set of companies and trade only when there is a major change in 
a given firm”). The percentage of “quasi-indexing” investors has increased since this time.  
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grown to mirror the “market portfolio” on an asset weighted basis.55 As 
institutional investors weight their portfolios to resemble the market, they 
are also progressively mirroring one another’s portfolios. 
This trend means that investors not only hold diverse stakes across the 
economy, but also within industries. By 2014, there was a 90% chance 
that any two competing firms within an industry shared a large common 
stockholder (larger than 5% stake)—up from a 16% chance in 1994.56 
Noting the beginnings of this trend in the 1980s and 1990s, business and 
finance scholars theorized that diversification might change a 
traditional—and fundamental—assumption of corporate law: shareholder 
desire for firm-specific profit maximization.57 These scholars developed 
models to predict how diversified investor incentives might change 
“conventional conclusions about corporate behavior.”58 These theoretical 
models predicted that as market-wide investor diversification increased, 
individual firms would direct their objectives to joint, rather than firm-
specific, profit maximization. Because large institutional investors are 
diversified across an entire industry, they are not incentivized to maximize 
one firm’s profits at the expense of another’s. Indeed, the Chairman of the 
Board of Vanguard, Bill McNabb, has confirmed that the fund is 
“indifferent, for example, about how shares of Coke performed vs. 
Pepsi  last quarter.”59 
Recently, this body of literature has attracted new interest, as empirical 
studies on the market-effects of concentrated ownership have emerged 
that support the theoretical conclusion that diversified investors are able 
to maximize their portfolio returns by influencing choices made at the 
firm level. In 2014, a trio of economists published a study showing that 
key players in the airline industry compete less with one another as a result 
                                                   
55. Matthew Backus, Christopher Conlon & Michael Sinkinson, Common Ownership in America: 
1980-2017, at 22–23 (NBER Working Paper No. 25454, 2019). 
56. Einer Elhauge, How Horizontal Shareholding Harms Our Economy – and Why Antitrust Law 
Can Fix It 10 (Working Paper, Aug. 2019), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=32
93822 [https://perma.cc/5DZ5-54GY] (citing José Azar, Portfolio Diversification, Market Power, 
and the Theory of the Firm 2 fig.2 (Working Paper, Mar. 2017), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.
cfm?abstract_id=3293822 [https://perma.cc/HPP8-P6NY]). 
57. Gordon, supra note 19, at 17, 21; see also Julio J. Rotemberg, Financial Transaction Costs and 
Industrial Performance 16 (Mass. Inst. of Tech. Alfred P. Sloan Sch. of Mgmt., Working Paper No. 
1554–84, Apr. 1984). 
58. Gordon, supra note 19, at ii. 
59. Bill McNabb, The Ultimate Long-Term Investors, VANGUARD BLOG INSTITUTIONAL 
INV’RS (July 6, 2017), https://www.vanguard.nl/portal/site/institutional/nl/en/articles/research-and-
commentary/topical-insights/ultimate-long-term-investors  [https://perma.cc/ZR6Q-H9PF]. 
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of being all partially owned by the same institutional investors.60 In a two-
year window, the same seven shareholders who controlled 60% of United 
Airlines’s stock also had large ownership shares in United’s competitors: 
Delta, JetBlue, and Southwest. Overall, from 2001 to 2013, large 
diversified investors controlled 77% of all airlines operating in the 
average domestic flight route.61 The study found that this common 
ownership resulted in ticket prices three to seven percent higher than they 
would otherwise have been.62 
Similar effects have been found in the banking and pharmaceutical 
industries. One study of retail banking revealed that changes in the 
concentration of common ownership of banks are positively correlated 
with increases in account fees charged, and negatively correlated with 
deposit rates paid.63 Further evidence suggests that common ownership 
results in portfolio maximizing behavior, at the expense of some 
individual firms in a portfolio: banks give larger loans, with lower interest 
rates, to firms with which it shares a common owner.64 While this 
relationship benefits the commonly owned firms, the commonly owned 
banks collect lower profits.65 Common ownership has also been found to 
affect the chances that a generic drug manufacturer successfully 
challenges a brand-name incumbent’s monopoly status.66 
These industry-specific studies have prompted some initial 
consideration of the economy-wide anti-competitive effects of common 
ownership. Backus and his coauthors have suggested common ownership 
as an explanation for the significant increase in average markups (of price 
relative to marginal cost) by publicly traded firms in recent decades.67 
                                                   
60. Azar, Schmalz & Tecu, supra note 18, at 1514–17. 
61. Elhauge, supra note 17, at 1267. 
62. Azar, Schmalz & Tecu, supra note 18, at 1517. 
63. Azar, Raina & Schmalz, supra note 18, at 1551. 
64. Waldo Ojeda, Common Ownership in the Loan Market 6 (Working Paper, Jan. 31, 2018), 
http://waldotekampa.me/files/JMP.pdf [https://perma.cc/3HTJ-37T5]. 
65. Id. 
66. See Melisa Newham, Jo Seldeslachts & Albert Banal-Estañol, Common Ownership and Market 
Entry:  Evidence  from  the  Pharmaceutical  Industry 21 (Econ. Working Paper Series, May 2018), 
http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:upf:upfgen:1612&r=law [https://perma.cc/64R6-HMKY] (finding that 
a one standard deviation increase in common ownership decreases the probability of generic entry by 
9–13%); Xie & Gerakosz, supra note 18, at 11, 22 (finding that overlapping ownership increased the 
chances that the brand and generic reach a settlement agreement, often resulting in the brand paying 
the generic to stay out of the market, a.k.a. “pay for delay”). 
67. Backus et al., supra note 55, at 30–32 (citing Jan De Loecker & Jan Eeckhout, The Rise of 
Market Power and the Macroeconomic Implications (NBER Working Paper No. 23687, Aug. 2017), 
https://www.nber.org/papers/w23687.pdf [https://perma.cc/9VRT-TT8R] (finding that average 
markups rise from 21% in 1980 to 61% in 2017 across all sectors of the publicly traded economy)). 
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Others have observed that common ownership could theoretically explain 
why labor share has declined relative to capital share, as firms acting 
jointly could generate monopsony wage effects just as they generate 
monopoly price effects.68 Thus, common ownership could be implicated 
in the problem of rising inequality.69 
A true portfolio-wide investment strategy should look not just across 
firms, but across industries. If large diversified investors indeed prioritize 
industry-wide profit over firm-specific profit, they should also prioritize 
economy-wide profit over industry-specific profit. An owner whose 
portfolio success tracks the entire market should be motivated to curtail 
the negative externalities generated by some of the firms in its portfolio if 
the owner’s share of the cost of internalizing the externality are lower than 
its share of the benefits that accrue to the entire portfolio from the 
elimination of the externality.70 
The body of theoretical finance literature that modeled the impact of 
diversification on competition also contemplated this externality-
internalizing result. Robert Hansen and John Lott drew attention to the 
role a large pension fund claimed to play in pressuring portfolio firms to 
settle costly inter-firm litigation.71 Jon Harford first argued this theory of 
diversified investor incentives could explain why firms undertake 
voluntary pollution control measures in the absence of mandatory 
regulation.72 Harford, however, focused on relatively localized 
externalities, like the release of toxic chemicals, and neither connected 
their voluntary reduction with portfolio-wide returns nor demonstrated 
how they were unexplained by market pressures.73 Further, Harford did 
not explain the causal relationship between shareholder ownership and 
                                                   
68. Azar, supra note 56, at 2 (observing that corporate profits doubled as a share of GDP between 
2000 and 2010). 
69. Elhauge, supra note 17, at 1281–301; Elhauge, supra note 56, at 12.  
70. I am not proposing that investors are motivated by anything other than the bottom line. I am 
not arguing, for example, that institutional investors are motivated to counter societally harmful 
externalities that are not directly linked to diminished profits. Cf. Einer Elhauge, Sacrificing 
Corporate Profits, supra note 35, at 738. 
71. Hansen & Lott, supra note 19, at 47 (relaying a speech given by a TIAA-CREF executive in 
which it was claimed that the pension fund pushed for a quick resolution of two inter-firm lawsuits: 
Pennzoil v. Texaco and Apple v. Microsoft).  
72. Jon D. Harford, Firm Ownership Patterns and Motives for Voluntary Pollution Control, 18 
MANAGERIAL DECISION ECON. 421, 422 (1997); see also HAWLEY & WILLIAMS, supra, note 22, at 
23 (using the term “fiduciary capitalism” to argue that because the economy-mirroring portfolio of an 
institutional investor bears the costs of externalities, its “returns would be directly enhanced by a 
proper treatment of the externality in the first place”). 
73. Harford, supra note 72, at 422. 
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corporate decisions impacting levels of pollutions.74 At the time these 
predictions were made, institutional ownership had not ballooned into 
what it is today. CalPERS, which was suggested as an example of an 
economy-wide investor with externality-internalizing interests, controlled 
$85 billion in assets at the time, a little more than 2% of what 
BlackRock  controls today.75 
B. Reduction of Systemic Climate Risks 
Investor’s actions aim not only to reduce climate damages, but also to 
reduce the systemic risks of climate change to which their portfolios are 
exposed. Modern portfolio theory identifies two types of financial risk: 
economy-wide, systematic risk, and firm-specific, unsystematic risk.76 
Investors can diversify away firm-specific risk by investing across the 
economy. Systemic risk, however, cannot be eliminated through 
diversification because its effects are felt economy-wide.77 The three 
types of climate-change related risks—transition risk, physical risk, and 
liability risk—so broadly affect the economy, they are considered 
systemic risks.78 One study, for example, found that 53% of portfolio 
value is “unhedgeable” from climate change-related risk.79 
Traditionally, systemic risks have been thought to be a factor beyond 
the control of investment managers.80 They affect the market return, 
                                                   
74. Id. 
75. Hansen & Lott, supra note 19, at 48; CPI Investment Calculator, 
http://www.in2013dollars.com/us/inflation/1997?amount=85 (discussing how $85 billion in 1997 is 
$136 billion today and 38% of the $344.8 billion CalPERS now controls). 
76. See RICHARD A. BREALEY, STEWART C. MYERS & FRANKLIN ALLEN, PRINCIPLES OF 
CORPORATE FINANCE 168–70 (10th ed. 2011). 
77. Schwarcz , supra note 43, at 200 (“To the extent systemic risk affects markets, however, it is 
positively correlated with the markets and cannot be diversified away.”). 
78. See UNIV. OF CAMBRIDGE INST. FOR SUSTAINABILITY LEADERSHIP, UNHEDGEABLE RISK: HOW 
CLIMATE CHANGE SENTIMENT IMPACTS INVESTMENTS 28 (2015) [hereinafter UNIV. OF CAMBRIDGE, 
UNHEDGEABLE RISK], https://www.cisl.cam.ac.uk/resources/publication-pdfs/unhedgeable-risk.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/FS72-HBUS] (showing, through modeling, that “it is possible to cut the maximal 
loss potential by up to 47 percent” through hedging). See also European Systemic Risk Board, Too 
Late, Too Sudden: Transition to a Low-Carbon Economy and Systemic Risk 9 (ESRB ASC Report 
No. 6, Feb. 2016) (finding that climate transition impacts on financial institutions “could generate 
contagion in the broader financial system by interacting with other financial frictions”); Battiston et 
al., supra, note 43, at 288; Written Testimony of Alicia Seiger, “Examining the Macroeconomic 
Impacts of a Changing Climate,” Prepared for the U.S. House of Representatives, Comm. on Financial 
Services, Subcommittee on Nat’l Security, International Development and Monetary Pol’y 2–3 (Sept. 
11, 2019), https://www.congress.gov/116/meeting/house/109911/witnesses/HHRG-116-BA10-
Wstate-SeigerA-20190911.pdf [https://perma.cc/N74P-KCJG]. 
79. UNIV. OF CAMBRIDGE, UNHEDGEABLE RISK, supra note 78, at 6, 21.  
80. But see Frederick H. Alexander, The Benefit Stance: Responsible Ownership in the Twenty-
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which is taken as a given that passive funds simply match and active funds 
try to beat. Most systemic risks, like the Federal Reserve’s change in 
interest rates, cannot be influenced by the choices made by investors—
they must passively ride them out as market-wide fluctuations. Climate 
risk, however, is substantially generated by the publicly traded companies 
within institutional investors’ own portfolios. In this way, climate risk is 
an example of a systemic risk over which institutional investors can 
uniquely exercise control. For indexers and quasi-indexers whose 
investment strategy is to match the market (i.e., achieve beta rather than 
spend resources on generating alpha), this ability to influence the market 
beta itself is unprecedented. This uniqueness can explain why institutional 
investors have taken on the role of proactive overseers of management 
and undertaken many of the climate-related corporate engagements 
discussed in the following section. 
The literature to date on the externality-internalizing incentives of 
institutional investors has been primarily theoretical, and largely 
forgotten.81 This Article is the first to (1) document just how shareholders 
are influencing corporate choices to reduce externalities and (2) provide 
the economic rationale for why they do so, showing that firm-specific 
profit losses are outweighed by portfolio gains. These arguments follow 
in sections C and D. 
C. Shareholder Activism for Climate Change Mitigation 
Investor activism related to climate change seeks a wide range of 
outcomes from a broad array of public companies. In 2017, shareholders 
asked financial institutions to stop funding high-carbon projects, retailers 
to commit to using more renewable energy, and restaurant chains to report 
on deforestation in their supply chain.82 This Article focuses particularly 
on investor targeting of high emissions industries, like fossil fuel 
production and mining, and on campaigns that seek outcomes directly 
related to emissions reductions. 
                                                   
First Century, 36 OXFORD REV. ECON. POL’Y 6 (forthcoming Apr. 2020) (arguing precisely that large 
diversified investors can influence beta through ESG activity).  
81. With the exception of Antón et al., supra note 24, and López & Vives, supra note 24, two 
empirical studies on the positive innovation externalities that arise from common ownership. 
82. CVS  HEALTH,  REPORT  ON  RENEWABLE  ENERGY GOALS (2017), 
https://engagements.ceres.org/ceres_engagementdetailpage?recID=a0l12000005PW7cAAG [https://perma.cc
/4A9L-J3UF]; BANK OF AMERICA CORP., LIMIT HIGH CARBON FINANCING (2017), 
https://engagements.ceres.org/ceres_engagementdetailpage?recID=a0l1H00000CixCKQAZ 
[https://perma.cc/2KLJ-YCNP]; MCDONALD’S CORP., REPORT ON SUPPLY CHAIN DEFORESTATION IMPACTS 
(2017), https://engagements.ceres.org/ceres_engagementdetailpage?recID=a0l1H00000C4UpjQAF 
[https://perma.cc/3XKE-H7A8]. 
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For these outcomes to be characterized as internalizing negative 
climate externalities, they must result in emissions reductions beyond 
those that would have been achieved by profit-seeking managers 
responding to regulatory and market forces. Diversified shareholders must 
be forcing firms to forgo profit at the expense of share value 
maximization. Said in another way, there must be a conflict of interest 
between the diversified shareholders and those shareholders with a 
concentrated stake in the targeted fossil fuel company. However, for a 
variety of reasons, shareholders might characterize their interventions as 
for the benefit of the individual firm on which they are exerting pressure. 
Section 1 outlines the three categories of climate change outcomes sought 
by shareholders and highlights recent significant achievements in securing 
changes in corporate behavior. Section 2 discusses the extent to which 
each outcome legitimately serves a firm-specific profit-maximizing 
purpose. Section 3 assesses each of these outcomes’ impact on actual 
emissions levels. 
1. Outcomes Sought from Portfolio Companies 
Investor climate activism targeting fossil fuel companies can be 
grouped into three main categories of outcomes sought: (1)  commitment 
to emissions reduction targets; (2) discontinuance of political spending 
related to opposing greenhouse gas regulations; and (3) disclosure of 
climate risk (typically in the form of “two degree scenario analysis”). 
a. Emissions Reduction Targets 
In December 2017, a group of institutional investors joined together in 
an initiative called Climate Action 100+, asking their peers to sign a 
pledge committing their shareholder power to pressuring the companies 
in which they invest to adopt long-term emissions reduction targets.83 By 
the 2019 proxy season, 360 institutional investors had signed the pledge, 
controlling a combined $34 trillion in assets.84 Membership includes three 
of the world’s ten largest pension funds (those belonging to Japan, the 
Netherlands, and California) and twenty of the top fifty largest non-
pension institutional investors, including PIMCO, Northern Trust, HSBC, 
and BNP Paribas.85 Each of these investors have publicly agreed to seek 
                                                   
83. About Us, CLIMATE ACTION 100+, https://climateaction100.wordpress.com/about-us/ 
[https://perma.cc/QFB5-B7AV]. 
84. Investors, CLIMATE ACTION 100+, https://climateaction100.wordpress.com/investors/ 
[https://perma.cc/ZBS9-43CR]. 
85. THINKING AHEAD INSTITUTE, PENSIONS & INVESTMENTS - YEAR ENDED 2017 (2018), 
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commitments from the “boards and senior management” of their portfolio 
companies to “[t]ake action to reduce greenhouse gas emissions across 
their value chain.”86 In early 2020, both BlackRock and JPMorgan made 
headlines by joining the investor coalition, which had previously lacked 
membership from most U.S.-based non-pension institutional investors.87 
The unveiling of Climate Action 100+’s agenda included the release of 
a list of 100 public companies that the group intended to prioritize for 
corporate engagement. The list was comprised of those companies that 
had the highest levels of emissions from their own operations as well as 
the sale of their products, accounting for two-thirds of all industrial 
greenhouse gas emissions.88 The investor group’s reported strategy was to 
focus on behind-the-scenes engagement with target companies, using 
“private, not public, proposals.”89 Certain investors were tasked as “leads 
for engaging with specific individual companies” on the list.90 
In December 2018, the shareholder group announced a significant 
victory. Royal Dutch Shell issued a joint statement in partnership with 
Climate Action 100+, announcing its intent to reduce its total emissions 
impact 20% by 2035, and 50% by 2050.91 These emissions reductions 
targets are not limited to the company’s own emissions, but include the 
greenhouse gases released from the sale of its fossil fuel products. Shell 
intends to link the achievement of these emissions reduction goals directly 
to metrics determining executive compensation.92 
                                                   
https://www.thinkingaheadinstitute.org/en/Library/Public/Research-and-
Ideas/2018/09/P_I_300_2018_research_paper [https://perma.cc/9YKY-QG99]. 
86. Frequently Asked Questions, CLIMATE ACTION 100+, 
https://climateaction100.wordpress.com/faq/ [https://perma.cc/P93E-EH3T]. 
87. Dieter Holger & Maitane Sardon, BlackRock Joins World’s Largest Investor Group on Climate 
Change, WALL STREET J. (Jan. 9, 2020), https://www.wsj.com/articles/blackrock-joins-worlds-
largest-investor-group-on-climate-change-11578594349 [https://perma.cc/AJ4B-6L6Y]; Alastair 
Marsh, JPMorgan Asset Management Joins Investor Climate Campaign, BLOOMBERG GREEN (Feb. 
25, 2020), https://www.bloomberg.com/amp/news/articles/2020-02-25/jpmorgan-asset-
management-joins-investor-climate-campaign [https://perma.cc/E78W-A9GK]. 
88. Climate Action 100+, CERES, https://www.ceres.org/initiatives/climate-action-100 
[https://perma.cc/E4X7-54BM]. 
89. Lewis Braham, Climate Change: Big Investors Bring Big Clout to the Debate, BARRON’S (Apr. 
27, 2018) https://www.barrons.com/articles/big-investors-bring-big-clout-to-climate-battle-
1524838935 [https://perma.cc/V7YF-PLYA]. 
90. Id. 
91. Shell Emissions Commitment, supra note 1. 
92. Miranda Green, Shell to Enact First of Its Kind Policy Linking Executive Pay to Carbon 
Emissions, THE HILL (Dec. 3, 2018), https://thehill.com/policy/energy-environment/419450-shell-to-
enact-first-of-its-kind-policy-linking-executive-pay-to [https://perma.cc/J4BT-KADB]. This 
commitment goes beyond the company’s existing policy linking 10% of executive remuneration to 
reductions in emissions from Shell’s own operations. 
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Alongside the unveiling of Shell’s targets, a Climate Action 100+ 
representative announced that the success “demonstrates the power of 
collective global investor engagement” and that the coalition planned to 
“use the commitment to raise the bar for the oil and gas industry as a 
whole.”93 Indeed, shortly following Shell’s announcement, Climate 
Action 100+ members New York State Common Retirement Fund and the 
Church of England jointly filed a shareholder proposal for ExxonMobil’s 
2019 annual meeting requesting disclosure of emissions targets “aligned 
with the [greenhouse gas reduction] goals established by the Paris Climate 
Agreement.”94 A number of additional investors, with a combined 
$1.9 trillion under management, joined in support of the proposal, 
including CalPERS and HSBC Global Asset Management.95 Three 
additional oil majors, BP, Chevron, and Equinor, faced similar resolutions 
in the 2019 season.96 
The proposal against BP, brought by a coalition of fifty-eight investors 
owning a combined 10% of the oil company, passed with overwhelming 
support in May 2019.97 In September, BP’s CEO announced that the 
company planned to sell off some oil projects and slow down the 
development of others in order to meet shareholder demands to align BP’s 
business plan with the Paris Agreement.98 
Shareholder resolutions requesting emissions reductions targets have 
been increasing in frequency and gaining more shareholder support in 
recent years.99 In 2018, twenty-nine such proposals were filed, five were 
withdrawn prior to voting due to company adoption of shareholder 
                                                   
93. Press Release, Shell, supra note 4. 
94. Press Release, NYS Comptroller DiNapoli and Church of England Call on ExxonMobil to Set 
Targets for Lowering GHG Emissions (Dec. 17, 2018), https://www.ceres.org/news-center/press-
releases/nys-comptroller-dinapoli-and-church-england-call-exxonmobil-set-targets 
[https://perma.cc/X5LF-VPEE]. 
95. Id. 
96. Hiller & Nasralla, supra note 5.  
97. The coalition included Aviva Investors, HSBC Global, Legal & General, UBS, and Schroders. 
Michael Holder, ‘Unprecedented:’ Why BP Investors Holding Billions in Shares Are Backing a 
Climate Resolution, GREENBIZ (May 20, 2019) https://www.greenbiz.com/article/unprecedented-
why-bp-investors-holding-billions-shares-are-backing-climate-resolution  [https://perma.cc/HQN4-
PDR9]. 
98. Kelly Giblom, BP CEO Plans Sale of Some Oil Projects to Hit Climate Target, BLOOMBERG 
(Sept. 12, 2019), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2019-09-12/bp-ceo-says-he-ll-sell-oil-
projects-to-meet-climate-targets [https://perma.cc/6TUT-C4SS]. 
99. Maximilian Horster & Kosmas Papadopoulos, Climate Change and Proxy Voting in the U.S. 
and Europe, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE & FIN. REG. (Jan. 7, 2019) 
https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2019/01/07/climate-change-and-proxy-voting-in-the-u-s-and-
europe/ [https://perma.cc/A6XP-BG54]. 
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demands, and one passed with majority shareholder support.100 
Significantly, the proposal at American Electric Power, “the largest 
electric power sector emitter of GHGs in the Western Hemisphere,”101 
was withdrawn by the New York State Common Retirement Fund after 
the company agreed to adopt the goal of reducing emissions 60% by 2030 
and 80 percent by 2050.102 At Genesee & Wyoming’s annual meeting, 
57.2% of shareholders supported a request that the railroad company 
“adopt time-bound, quantitative, company-wide goals for reducing 
greenhouse gas” emissions.103 
Beyond direct investor engagement and shareholder resolutions, 
institutional investors have increasingly engaged in public-facing 
advocacy, aiming to gain broader support for their emissions reduction 
agenda. In advance of the 2018 proxy season, fifty-eight investors 
managing a combined $10.4 trillion in assets issued an open letter in the 
Financial Times urging oil and gas companies to make “concrete 
commitments to substantially reduce carbon emissions” and explain “how 
the investments they make are compatible with a pathway towards the 
Paris goal” of less than 2°C of warming.104 The signatories included BNP 
Paribas Asset Management, which manages $480 billion in assets,105 and 
AXA Investment Managers with €881 billion.106 A similar investor letter 
published in December 2018 argued that, given the economic damage 
projected to result from climate change “it is essential that we deliver on 
the Paris Agreement.”107 In service to that goal, the investors wrote, “we 
                                                   
100. Id.; CERES, Engagement Tracker, supra note 13. The companies that committed to emissions 
targets were: AK Steel Holding Company, American Electric Power, Kansas City Southern, Minerals 
Technologies, and Unites States Steel. Id.  
101. Commit to Climate, CERES, https://www.ceres.org/initiatives/commit-to-climate 
[https://perma.cc/P8DR-8388]. 
102. Robert Steyer, N.Y. State Common Withdraws Shareholder Request After AEP Sets 
Greenhouse Gas Reduction Targets, PENSIONS & INV. (Feb. 9, 2018), 
https://www.pionline.com/article/20180209/ONLINE/180209801/ny-state-common-withdraws-
shareholder-request-after-aep-sets-greenhouse-gas-reduction-targets  [https://perma.cc/3N2T-
MV88]. 
103. Genesee and Wyoming 2018 Shareholder Resolution, Adopt GHG Reduction Targets, CERES (2018), 
https://engagements.ceres.org/ceres_engagementdetailpage?recID=a0l1H00000C4a0TQAR  [https://perma.cc/
TEL2-DBX8]. 
104. Aberdeen Standard Investments et al., Oil and Gas Groups Must Do More to Support Climate 
Accord, FIN. TIMES (May 17, 2018), https://www.ft.com/content/fda63c26-5906-11e8-b8b2-
d6ceb45fa9d0 [https://perma.cc/VZ8G-4J8F]. 
105. About Us: Key Figures, BNP PARIBAS, https://www.bnpparibas-am.com/en/about-us/the-
asset-manager-for-a-changing-world/ [https://perma.cc/NSU3-URNU]. 
106. Who We Are, AXA INV. MANAGERS, https://www.axa-im.com/about-us 
[https://perma.cc/EPY6-FDS7] (reporting 808 billion euros under management). 
107. Aberdeen Standard Investments et al., Power Companies Must Accelerate Decarbonisation 
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require power companies . . . to plan for their future in a net-zero carbon 
economy . . . [and request that they] set out transition plans” consistent 
with significant emissions reductions.108 The investors outlined that they 
expected “explicit timelines and commitments for the rapid elimination of 
coal use by utilities in EU and OECD countries by no later than 2030.”109 
The letter was signed by ninety-five institutional investors controlling 
$11.5 trillion in assets and sent directly to targeted power companies.110 
In Climate Action 100+’s 2019 Progress Report, the investor coalition 
claimed credit for emissions commitments made by a large number of 
multinationals, including Nestle, Duke Energy, Southern Company, 
Maersk, Heidelberg Cement, and BHP Billiton.111 
b. Suspension of Anti-Regulation Lobbying 
Institutional investors have not just pushed directly for emissions 
reductions but have been paying increasing attention to the resources 
companies devote to political lobbying efforts aimed at thwarting carbon 
regulation. One investor letter in the Financial Times highlighted the 
expectation that companies align their political agendas with the 
achievement of “ambitious climate policy.”112 This obligation specifically 
extended to the trade associations through which companies often 
advance their political aims. Shell’s 2018 emissions target announcement 
included an acknowledgement that its membership in certain trade 
associations may be at odds with its stated support for the Paris 
Agreement.113 In 2019, the company released a review of its trade 
association memberships and withdrew from the American Fuel and 
Petrochemical Manufacturers because of the organization’s stance on 
carbon regulation.114 
                                                   
and Support Ambitious Climate Policy, FIN. TIMES (Dec. 19, 2018), 
https://www.ft.com/content/8d80c8e4-02f7-11e9-99df-6183d3002ee1 [https://perma.cc/TXM6-
ZBU7] [hereinafter Aberdeen et al., Power Companies]. 
108. Id.  
109. Id.  
110. Jennifer Thompson & Anjili Raval, Investors Push Power Companies to End Coal Use by 
2030, FIN. TIMES (Dec. 19, 2018), https://www.ft.com/content/1c65952e-03a4-11e9-99df-
6183d3002ee1 [https://perma.cc/8T4N-4TPM]. 
111. CLIMATE ACTION 100+, 2019 PROGRESS REPORT 7, 33 (2019) [hereinafter CLIMATE ACTION 100+, 
PROGRESS REPORT], https://climateaction100.files.wordpress.com/2019/10/progressreport2019.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/Q3E9-EQZX] 
112. Aberdeen et al., Power Companies, supra note 107. 
113. Shell Emissions Commitment, supra note 1.  
114. Steven Mufson, Shell Quits Trade Group Over Climate Change Positions, WASH. POST (Apr. 
2, 2019), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/energy-environment/wp/2017/05/31/exxonmobil-
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In the 2018 proxy season a coalition of seventy-four investors filed 
shareholder proposals at fourteen emissions-intensive companies seeking 
disclosure of expenditures for lobbying efforts, including payments to 
trade associations and other third-party organizations.115 The proposals 
specifically targeted companies for membership in groups devoted to 
fighting climate regulation, like the Chamber of Commerce and the 
American Legislative Exchange Council (ALEC).116 Of these, five 
proposals were withdrawn after the companies (including ConEd and 
ConocoPhillips) agreed to make disclosure commitments, and another 
two were withdrawn when the companies agreed to begin dialogues with 
investors on the issue.117 
c. Climate Risk Disclosure 
In addition to emissions reductions and cessation of lobbying, investors 
have pressed for disclosure of climate change related risks. Investor 
demand for climate risk disclosure can take several forms, but the most 
common is a request that the company assess and disclose its business 
model response to global climate regulations aimed at limited warming to 
2°C, the goal of the Paris Agreement.118 This requires the targeted 
                                                   
is-trying-to-fend-off-a-shareholder-rebellion-over-climate-change/ [https://perma.cc/LU66-N78B].  
115. Press Release, Walden Asset Mgmt., Institutional Investors Continue to Press Companies for 
Disclosure of Lobbying In 2018 (Mar. 9, 2018), https://waldenassetmgmt.com/wp-
content/uploads/2018/03/Announcement-of-2018-Lobbying-Disclosure-Resolutions-correct-
Walden-Logo.pdf [https://perma.cc/X8V5-M7NZ]. 
116. Targeted companies included Atmos Energy, Chesapeake Energy, Chevron, ConocoPhillips, 
Consolidated Edison, Devon Energy, Duke Energy, Emerson Electric, ExxonMobil, Encana, 
FirstEnergy, Ford Motor, FedEx, and Imperial Oil. See CERES, Engagement Tracker, supra note 13.  
117. Id. Commitment: ConEd, Conoco Chesapeake Atmos First Energy; Dialogue: Devon Energy, 
Duke. Failed votes still received notable shareholder support: Chevron: 31.5%, Alliant 39%, Exxon 
26.3%, Emerson Electric, 39.6%. Id. The remaining seven failed to receive majority support. See id. 
In 2017, two of the 17 resolutions filed were withdrawn with commitments to disclose their political 
spending. See id. Commitments were reached from Pinnacle West, an electric utility, and Andeavor, 
an oil producer. See id. Both Exxon and Chevron are targets of political spending resolutions in the 
upcoming 2019 proxy season. CHEVRON (CVX), 2019 RESOLUTION, REPORT ON LOBBYING (2019) 
https://engagements.ceres.org/ceres_engagementdetailpage?recID=a0l1H00000CEevKQAT 
[https://perma.cc/BYE4-KXD8]; EXXONMOBIL (XOM), 2019 RESOLUTION, REPORT ON LOBBYING 
(2019) https://engagements.ceres.org/ceres_engagementdetailpage?recID=a0l1H00000CEemhQAD 
[https://perma.cc/D7JS-VE7G]. Chevron’s 2018 vote failed with 31.5% of shareholders in favor. 
CHEVRON  (CVX),  2018  RESOLUTION,  REPORT  ON  LOBBYING 
(2018), https://engagements.ceres.org/ceres_engagementdetailpage?recID=a0l1H00000C3zXvQAJ 
[https://perma.cc/74QL-VF7M]. 
118. State Street defines a “2-degree scenario” as a future emissions path that is consistent with 
“the global consensus to limit the global average temperature increase to under 2 degrees Celsius and 
the alignment of company strategy to this global commitment.” SSGA’S PERSPECTIVES ON 
EFFECTIVE CLIMATE CHANGE DISCLOSURE, STATE STREET GLOBAL ADVISORS 1 n.2 (Aug. 2017), 
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company to construct a “2-degree scenario” analysis, modeling its 
projected capital expenditure, profits, and risk exposure given that these 
warming limits would require leaving a significant percentage of already 
proven fossil fuel reserves in the ground.119 
In the 2017 proxy season, eighteen shareholder proposals requested 
that fossil fuel and utility companies undergo and disclose two-degree 
scenario analysis.120 The proposals received an average of 41% support, 
with three passing with majority approval.121 While similar votes in 
previous years had failed, the shareholder proposal at ExxonMobil’s 
annual general meeting received 62% of total votes cast, thanks to the 
backing of investment giants like BlackRock, Vanguard, and Fidelity.122 
In the 2017 vote, BlackRock and Vanguard together controlled 13% of 
Exxon’s stock. Resolutions at Occidental Petroleum and PPL, a major 
utility that derives 60% of its power mix from coal, passed with 66% and 
57% of the vote, respectively.123 A two-degree proposal at Chevron was 
withdrawn “due to substantial implementation.”124 
In the 2018 season, twelve of the twenty shareholder proposals related 
to two-degree scenario analysis were withdrawn prior to voting due to 
board acquiescence.125 Major energy companies like Valero, FirstEnergy, 
                                                   
https://www.ssga.com/investment-topics/environmental-social-governance/2017/perspectives-on-
effective-climate-change-disclosure.pdf [https://perma.cc/W37A-JAQ6]. 
119. See, e.g., Christophe McGlade & Paul Ekins, The Geographical Distribution of Fossil Fuels 
Unused When Limiting Global Warming to 2°C, 517 NATURE 187, 187 (2015) (finding “that, globally, 
a third of oil reserves, half of gas reserves and over 80 per cent of current coal reserves should remain 
unused from 2010-2050 in order to meet the target of 2°C”).  
120. Cristina Banahan, Doubling Down on Two-Degrees: The Rise in Support for Climate Risk 
Proposals, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE & FIN. REG. (Jan. 23, 2018), 
https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2018/01/23/doubling-down-on-two-degrees-the-rise-in-support-for-
climate-risk-proposals/ [https://perma.cc/RZJ8-NDMS]. 
121. Id. 
122. Diane Cardwell, Exxon Mobil Shareholders Demand Accounting of Climate Change Policy 
Risks, N.Y. TIMES (May 31, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/05/31/business/energy-
environment/exxon-shareholders-climate-change.html [https://perma.cc/FCG7-LTP2]. 
123. Steven Mufson, Financial Firms Lead Shareholder Rebellion Against ExxonMobil Climate 
Change Policies, WASH. POST (May 31, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/energy-
environment/wp/2017/05/31/exxonmobil-is-trying-to-fend-off-a-shareholder-rebellion-over-
climate-change/?utm_term=.dc58c7af6798 [https://perma.cc/LU66-N78B]; Robert Walton, PPL 
Shareholders Pass Resolution for Climate Strategy Assessment, UTILITYDIVE (May 23, 2017), 
http://www.utilitydive.com/news/ppl-shareholders-pass-resolution-for-climate-strategy-
assessment/443319/ [https://perma.cc/QTW4-23R7].  
124. CALPERS, ANNUAL INVESTMENT REPORT 2016–17, at3 (2017) 
https://www.calpers.ca.gov/docs/forms-publications/annual-investment-report-2017.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/WUR9-55E2]. 
125. Andrew Logan, The Hidden Story of Climate Proposals in the 2018 Proxy Season, CERES 
(May 29, 2018), https://www.ceres.org/news-center/blog/hidden-story-climate-proposals-2018-
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and Dominion Energy all committed to analyzing and disclosing their 
exposure to climate risk. Of the remaining eight two-degree proposals, 
two received majority shareholder support: 59.7% at Kinder Morgan and 
53% at Anadarko Petroleum.126 
Many institutional investors have made public statements indicating 
that their advocacy of climate risk disclosure will only be gaining 
momentum in the years ahead. Vanguard’s CEO published an “open letter 
to directors of public companies worldwide” explaining that the asset 
manager’s “evolving position on climate risk” was in service to its 
underlying investors who were “significant long-term owners of many 
companies in industries vulnerable to climate risk.”127 BlackRock sent a 
letter directly to “120 of the most carbon-intensive companies” in its 
portfolio asking them to disclose climate risks in accordance with 
voluntary standards outlined by the Financial Stability Board’s Task 
Force on Climate-related Financial Disclosures (TCFD).128 
2. Legitimacy of Firm-Specific Business Purpose 
The investor activism described above targets the managers of 
individual companies in order to get them to change corporate objectives 
at the firm level. This Article argues that these objectives serve the 
purpose of maximizing long-term portfolio returns, to the detriment of 
firm-specific returns. While some investor statements directly 
acknowledge this portfolio perspective, see infra Section 2.b, most 
investors justify their advocacy as for the benefit of the firm they are 
targeting. They might do this for several reasons. While investors are 
legally permitted to vote their shares in a self-interested way, managers 
and directors are obligated to serve in the best interests of the 
                                                   
proxy-season [https://perma.cc/P45U-ET6D]. 
126. Westcott, supra, note 12; Report on 2-degree analysis and strategy (KMI, 2018 Resolution), 
CERES, https://engagements.ceres.org/ceres_engagementdetailpage?recID=a0l1H00000C4C1oQAF 
[https://perma.cc/KC9H-56M7]; Report on 2-degree analysis and strategy (APC, 2018 Resolution), 
CERES, https://engagements.ceres.org/ceres_engagementdetailpage?recID=a0l1H00000C47pKQAR 
[https://perma.cc/W9BR-FL95]. 
127. F. William McNabb, The Vanguard Group, An Open Letter to Directors of Public Companies 
Worldwide (Aug. 31, 2017), https://about.vanguard.com/investment-stewardship/governance-letter-
to-companies.pdf [https://perma.cc/ZR6Q-H9PF]. 
128. PRINCIPLES FOR RESPONSIBLE INVESTMENT (PRI), TRANSPARENCY REPORT: BLACKROCK 64 
(2018) [hereinafter PRI, TRANSPARENCY REPORT], https://wikirate.s3.amazonaws.com/files/375386 
1/14978614.pdf [https://perma.cc/C39L-43WK]; Emily Chasan, BlackRock Wields Its $6 Trillion 
Club to Combat Climate Risks, BLOOMBERG MKTS. (Dec. 8, 2017), https://www.bloomberg.com/ 
news/articles/2017-12-08/blackrock-wields-its-6-trillion-club-to-combat-climate-risks 
[https://perma.cc/D745-8DRM]. 
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corporation.129 By couching their advocacy in terms of firm-specific 
benefits, investors provide cover to managers who might otherwise be 
accused of violating their fiduciary duty to the corporation and individual 
shareholders. Further, institutional investors are under increasing scrutiny 
for their potential power to induce anti-competitive behavior on the part 
of firms within their portfolio. Admitting that they are able to influence 
firm-level objectives, in the context of limiting climate damage, 
contradicts their protestations that they are uninterested and powerless 
when it comes to product supply decisions in the anti-competitive 
context.130 
a. Assessing Outcomes 
Each of the three climate-change related outcomes identified above 
may not serve profit maximization at the targeted firm. The extent to 
which a firm-specific rational is lacking serves as further evidence 
suggesting that investor motivations are guided by net portfolio returns. 
Emissions Reduction Goals: Most investors advocating for emissions 
reduction goals argue that the fossil fuel or utility company being targeted 
is failing to adequately prepare for government regulation of greenhouse 
gases and the growth of renewable alternatives.131 By taking this position, 
institutional investors are arguing that they themselves have a better 
understanding of the growth that will be needed to meet expected demand 
than the executives who work within the energy industry. 
Most reduction commitments ask firms to reduce emissions in line with 
the goals of the Paris Agreement, enough to keep warming below 2°C.132 
But the argument that world regulators are themselves on track to meet 
this goal is a questionable one, and at odds with the assessment of many 
expert observers regarding the sufficiency of the global effort to limit 
emissions. By an October 2018 tally, just seventeen countries and the EU 
had enacted domestic laws consistent with achieving their commitments 
under the Paris Agreement.133 In the United States, President Trump 
                                                   
129. See section II.B infra.  
130. See section II.A infra. 
131. See, e.g., EXXON MOBIL, EXXON EMISSIONS TARGETS PROPOSAL 2019, 
https://www.osc.state.ny.us/press/docs/xom-resolved.pdf [https://perma.cc/PJ39-HWQ6] (arguing 
that the “transition to a low carbon economy . . . could limit returns to ExxonMobil’s investors by 
increasing the company’s operating costs or by reducing demand for its products”).  
132. See Ceres Shareholder Resolutions Database, CERES, https://www.ceres.org/shareholder-
resolutions-database [https://perma.cc/A5RJ-MKQU] (displaying all resolutions requesting 
companies to “Adopt GHG reduction targets). 
133. Michal Nachmany & Emily Mangan, Aligning National and International Climate Targets, 
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announced his intention to withdraw from the Paris Agreement entirely.134 
Consistent with this intent, the Trump Administration is in the process of 
systematically rolling back existing federal climate policy, proposing to, 
among other actions, repeal the Clean Power Plan, freeze vehicle fuel 
efficiency standards, and deregulate methane leaks.135 These actions taken 
together could increase annual emissions in 2030 by as much as California 
emitted in 2016.136 Going forward, given the Supreme Court’s 
composition shift toward skepticism of administrative powers, the 
partisan divide regarding climate legislation, the number of senate seats 
possible for Democrats to gain, and the remaining existence of the 
filibuster, it would be reasonable for a well-informed industry manager to 
conclude that the risks of imminent federal climate policy are low, even 
after Trump leaves office.137 
In urging its shareholders to vote against a climate resolution, the oil 
and gas company Noble Energy directly highlighted the Trump 
Administration’s deregulatory efforts.138 Indeed, ExxonMobil has 
                                                   
GRANTHAM RESEARCH INST. ON CLIMATE CHANGE & ENV. 1 (Oct. 2018), 
http://www.lse.ac.uk/GranthamInstitute/wp-content/uploads/2018/10/Aligning-national-and-
international-climate-targets-1.pdf [https://perma.cc/D35P-PBZ5]. 
134. Michael D. Shear, Trump Will Withdraw U.S. From Paris Climate Agreement, N.Y. TIMES 
(June 1, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/06/01/climate/trump-paris-climate-agreement.html 
[https://perma.cc/7N2U-3749]. 
135. See, e.g., Chris Mooney, Trump Withdrew From the Paris Climate Deal a Year Ago. Here’s 
What Has Changed., WASH. POST (June 1, 2018, 7:26 AM), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/energy-environment/wp/2018/06/01/trump-withdrew-from-
the-paris-climate-plan-a-year-ago-heres-what-has-changed/?utm_term=.6f30a59b392b 
[https://perma.cc/6KNS-HCVP]; Clifford Krauss, Trump’s Methane Rule Rollback Divides Oil and 
Gas Industry, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 29, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/08/29/business/energy-
environment/methane-regulation-reaction.html [https://perma.cc/4G8A-T625]. 
136. CLIMATE ACTION TRACKER, USA: 25 Oct. 2018, 
https://climateactiontracker.org/countries/usa/2018-10-25/ [https://perma.cc/KP7X-STYT]. 
137. See, e.g., Samuel Moyn & Aaron Belkin, The Roberts Court Would Likely Strike Down 
Climate Change Legislation, TAKE BACK THE COURT (Sept. 2019), 
https://static1.squarespace.com/static/5ce33e8da6bbec0001ea9543/t/5d7d429025734e4ae9c92070/1
568490130130/Supreme+Court+Will+Overturn+Climate+Legislation+FINAL.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/AKX3-SVMV] (analyzing past rulings of each justice and predicting which legal 
doctrines the court would likely use to strike down new climate related regulation and legislation); 
Nathaniel Rakich, The Senate Will Be Competitive Again In 2020, But Republicans Are Favored, 
FIVETHIRTYEIGHT (Nov. 28, 2018, 3:08 PM), https://fivethirtyeight.com/features/the-senate-will-be-
competitive-again-in-2020-but-republicans-are-favored/ [https://perma.cc/64QG-2TP9] (describing 
the odds of Democrats taking over the Senate in 2020). 
138. David Hasemyer, 3 Dozen Shareholder Climate Resolutions Target Oil, Gas and Power 
Companies, INSIDE CLIMATE NEWS (Mar. 8, 2018), 
https://insideclimatenews.org/news/07032018/shareholder-resolutions-climate-change-2-degrees-
methane-lobbying-trump-administration [https://perma.cc/DHZ7-ZRQ9]. The resolution eventually 
failed with 45.7% of shareholders in favor. Report on 2-Degree Analysis and Strategy (NBL, 2018 
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announced that by 2025 it expects its own oil and gas production to be 
25% higher than in 2017, with profits three times as large.139 As a Wall 
Street Journal columnist recently quipped, “it is at least plausible, perhaps 
likely, that there will be insufficient global effort to limit or tax carbon 
emissions. From a purely financial point of view, the best response is to 
buy stocks in companies pumping out carbon.”140 
Until very recently, Shell and BP shared this view. In a 2014 letter to 
investors Shell pushed back against claims that it was over-investing in 
exploration, explaining that the company did not “see governments taking 
the steps now that are consistent with the 2°C scenario.”141 In 2017, 
Shell’s board continued to maintain that setting emissions targets was “not 
in the best interest of the company.”142 In 2015, BP noted the International 
Energy Agency’s prediction that global emissions levels in 2035 would 
be more than double that required in order to keep warming below 2°C.143 
The oil company acknowledged that its own business model was 
consistent with an emissions pathway “well above the path recommended 
by scientists.”144 
Now, after having been the targets of aggressive investor engagement, 
both of those companies have radically changed their positions. Shell’s 
board has agreed to drastic emissions cuts.145 BP’s board now supports a 
shareholder resolution requesting similar emissions targets following 
                                                   
Resolution), CERES https://engagements.ceres.org/ceres_engagementdetailpage?recID=a0l1H00000
C3feXQAR [https://perma.cc/VB3D-MHYM]. 
139. ExxonMobil Gambles on Growth, ECONOMIST (Feb. 9, 2019), 
https://www.economist.com/briefing/2019/02/09/exxonmobil-gambles-on-growth 
[https://perma.cc/7UDW-7T3W]. 
140. James Mackintosh, What Could Go Wrong With Climate Change Investing, WALL ST. J. (Dec. 
13, 2018) https://www.wsj.com/articles/what-could-go-wrong-with-climate-change-investing-
11544716801 [https://perma.cc/7WGF-452V]. 
141. Letter from Royal Dutch Shell PLC to S’holders 6 (May 16, 2014), 
https://www.shell.com/investors/environmental-social-and-governance/esg-news-presentations-and-
annual-briefings/_jcr_content/par/tabbedcontent/tab_667142067/textimage_1262076677.stream/ 
1519763050501/cef6b2b3be9e8a6eb27c1550a70578fce52ad826/sri-web-response-climate-change-
may14.pdf [https://perma.cc/88SZ-EJ23]. 
142. Kalyeena Makortoff, Nearly 94% of Shell Shareholders Reject Emissions Reduction Target in 
Line with Paris Climate Agreement, INDEPENDENT (May 23, 2017, 3:17 PM), 
https://www.independent.co.uk/environment/shell-shareholders-94-per-cent-emissions-reduction-
target-reject-paris-agreement-climate-change-a7751681.html [https://perma.cc/G6SW-KF6A]. 
143. Greg Muttitt, BP Out of Touch on Climate and Clean Energy Technology, OIL CHANGE INT’L 
(Feb. 18, 2015), http://priceofoil.org/2015/02/18/bp-touch-climate-clean-energy-technology/ 
[https://perma.cc/E89K-GA75]. 
144. Id.  
145. Shell Emissions Commitment, supra note 1. 
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“constructive engagement” with Climate Action 100+.146 There has not 
been a significant change to the global political situation with respect to 
action on climate, and yet without any such changes both of these 
companies have reversed their position. The explanation does not seem to 
have come as a result of reassessment of the imminence of carbon 
regulation, but rather as the direct result of shareholder pressure. Indeed, 
a director of mining giant Glencore explained that shareholder protest 
votes were the cause of the company’s abrupt change in policy on its 
investment in coal.147 The Wall Street Journal called the company’s coal 
commitments “a major reversal” for a company that had recently made 
large coal mining acquisitions with a CEO “among the world’s biggest 
cheerleaders for coal.”148 
Just how these sizable emissions cuts—in Shell’s case 50%149—can be 
met without severely limiting production has not been explained. In 2018, 
EOG Resources successfully sought permission from the Securities and 
Exchange Commission to omit a shareholder proposal seeking emissions 
reductions goals from consideration at the annual meeting.150 The oil and 
gas company argued that the proposal would force management to 
prioritize “arbitrary emissions targets”151 over other factors including 
“operational considerations [and] rate-of-return economics.”152 These 
targets, it argued, were “unrelated to legal requirements”153 and would 
come at the “expense of management’s own judgment.”154 EOG explained 
                                                   
146. BP to Support Investor Group’s Call for Greater Reporting Around Paris Goals, BP (Feb. 1, 2019), 
https://www.bp.com/en/global/corporate/news-and-insights/press-releases/bp-to-support-investor-groups-call-
for-greater-reporting-around-paris-goals.html [https://perma.cc/HD77-W8MW]. 
147. Tim Wallace, Protest Votes Made Us Change Tack on Coal Mining, Says Glencore Director 
Martin Gilbert, TELEGRAPH (May 16, 2019, 3:05 PM), https://www.telegraph.co.uk/business/2019/05/16/prot
est-votes-made-us-change-tack-coal-mining-says-glencore/  [https://perma.cc/CB7S-HPBJ]. 
148. Scott Patterson & Oliver Griffin, Glencore, the King of Coal, Bows to Investor Pressure Over 
Climate, WALL ST. J. (Feb. 20, 2019, 5:08 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/glencore-once-a-big-
coal-backer-is-capping-output-11550655803 [https://perma.cc/M9KQ-YMJY]. 
149. Shell Emissions Commitment, supra note 1. 
150. SEC Dec. Letter from Att’y-Adviser William Mastrianna to EOG Res., Inc. at 2 (Feb. 26, 
2018) [hereinafter SEC Decision Letter], https://www.sec.gov/divisions/corpfin/cf-noaction/14a-
8/2018/trilliummiller022618-14a8.pdf [https://perma.cc/2WJR-3JU4]. 
151. Letter from EOG Res., Inc. Exec. Vice President Michael P. Donaldson to SEC 22 (Dec. 20, 
2017), [hereinafter 2017 Letter from EOG Resources] https://www.sec.gov/divisions/corpfin/cf-
noaction/14a-8/2018/trilliummiller022618-14a8.pdf [https://perma.cc/P5G6-RHMA]. 
152. Letter from EOG Res., Inc. Exec. Vice President Michael P. Donaldson to SEC 6 (Jan. 12, 
2018), [hereinafter 2018 Letter from EOG Resources] https://www.sec.gov/divisions/corpfin/cf-
noaction/14a-8/2018/trilliummiller022618-14a8.pdf [https://perma.cc/B3G6-WZKH].  
153. 2017 Letter from EOG Res., supra note 151, at 24.  
154. 2018 Letter from EOG Res., supra note 152, at 6. 
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that its “primary business operations are the exploration, development, 
production and marketing” of fossil fuels and that its “operational 
strategies cannot be separated from emissions management because 
drilling and production levels necessarily affect emissions levels.”155 EOG 
further took issue with the proposal’s characterization of emissions targets 
as “a sound business strategy.”156 For support, the proposal had cited to a 
study finding that companies with emissions targets enjoy a “9% better 
return on invested capital than companies without targets.”157 EOG argued 
that it was misleading to suggest that emissions targets would lead to a 
similar increase return on investment, and that it was in fact “an almost 
impossible outcome.”158 One industry observer blogged, “Shocking! The 
SEC rules that activist shareholders can’t force oil companies to stop 
being oil companies!”159 In the case of emissions targets, the business 
rationale for meeting them remains unclear. Indeed, companies 
themselves argue that their self-interest points sharply away from doing 
so. 
Disclosure of Lobbying: In one set of shareholder proposals requesting 
disclosure of anti-carbon regulation lobbying expenditures, institutional 
investors argued that they were seeking the information because 
“investors are concerned lobbying can pose reputational risks if it 
contradicts a company’s publicly stated positions.”160 This justification is 
confusing. If the investors are arguing the disclosure is necessary because 
information on spending is not already publicly available, it is unclear 
where this reputational risk would originate. If anything, disclosure would 
open the companies up to broader public sanction and targeting by 
environmentalists.161 Further, energy and fossil fuel companies are less 
                                                   
155. 2017 Letter from EOG Res., supra note 151, at 21–22. 
156. Id. at 29. 
157. “Greenhouse Gas Emissions Targets” Proposal from S’holders to EOG Res., Inc. (Nov. 13, 
2017), SEC No-Action Letter Docket at 34, https://www.sec.gov/divisions/corpfin/cf-noaction/14a-
8/2018/trilliummiller022618-14a8.pdf [https://perma.cc/X7DM-LUYH]. 
158. 2017 Letter from EOG Resources, supra note 150, at 29.  
159. David Middleton, Shocking! The SEC Rules That Activist Shareholders Can’t Force Oil 
Companies to Stop Being Oil Companies!, WATTS UP WITH THAT? (Apr. 4, 2018), 
https://wattsupwiththat.com/2018/04/04/shocking-the-sec-rules-that-activist-shareholders-cant-
force-oil-companies-to-stop-being-oil-companies/ [https://perma.cc/PU4X-555K]. 
160. Investor Coalition Files Proposals at 50-Plus Companies on Lobbying Activities, PENSIONS 
& INVS. (Mar. 9, 2018, 12:00 AM), https://www.pionline.com/article/20180309/ONLINE/18030980
6/investor-coalition-files-proposals-at-50-plus-companies-on-lobbying-activities 
[https://perma.cc/UR8C-YVDY].  
161. See, e.g., Cynthia A. Williams, The Securities and Exchange Commission and Corporate 
Social Transparency, 112 HARV. L. REV. 1197, 1212, 1294–95 (1999) (describing ways in which 
disclosure can shame managers into avoiding socially undesirable activities, and quoting Justice 
 
04 Condon.docx (Do Not Delete) 4/28/20  6:39 PM 
32 WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 95:1 
 
exposed to reputational risk than other companies that sell directly to 
consumers. Because utilities’ economies of scale make them natural 
monopolies, they are often the sole operator in certain regional markets.162 
If you live in an area serviced solely by one utility, there’s not much you 
can do to express consumer displeasure with the utility’s record on 
political spending. Fossil fuel companies are insulated from some amount 
of consumer censure because they sell to a range of intermediaries. It is 
near impossible to know what energy source powered the factory that 
made your shoes, or what gas station your local farmer refills at before 
driving to the market. 
Beyond the dubious impact of reputational risk on profits, it is 
additionally contradictory that the same investors that argue companies 
have failed to adequately prepare for impending carbon regulation are also 
asking these companies to lend support for these regulations. Institutional 
investors are simultaneously arguing both that fossil fuel companies are 
failing to respond to imminent climate regulation, and also requesting that 
they stop thwarting this regulation, so as to hasten its imminence. From 
the perspective of the boards of oil and gas companies that repeatedly 
oppose shareholder resolutions related to political spending, these 
proposals do not serve the best interests of the target companies.163 
Disclosure of Climate Risk: Shareholder demand for disclosure of 
energy companies’ exposure to climate risk is typically justified by the 
argument that these companies are inadequately prepared for the 
impending carbon-regulated future. This “transition risk” comes from a 
failure to adapt in time to a changing, less carbon-intensive economy as 
governments implement carbon regulations, and innovations in green 
technology make alternative energy cheaper.164 “Stranded assets” in the 
fossil fuel industry are a classic example of transition risk.165 Investors 
                                                   
Brandeis’s view that disclosure can serve “as a remedy for social and industrial diseases”).  
162. STEVEN STOFT, POWER SYSTEM ECONOMICS: DESIGNING MARKETS FOR ELECTRICITY 
9  (2002). 
163. See, e.g., EXXONMOBIL, EXXONMOBIL NOTICE OF 2019 ANNUAL MEETING AND PROXY 
STATEMENT 66–69 (Apr. 11, 2019), https://corporate.exxonmobil.com/-/media/Global/Files/investor-
relations/annual-meeting-materials/proxy-materials/2019-proxy-
statement.pdf  [https://perma.cc/M6G6-AXFQ] (recommending that shareholders vote against 
proposals related to disclosure of political spending and lobbying). 
164. See RISKY BUSINESS, supra note 41. 
165. McGlade & Ekins, supra note 119, at 189, table 1 (estimating that in order to keep warming 
below 2°C, approximately 35% of current oil reserves are unusable); MARK LEWIS ET AL., KEPLER 
CHEUVREUX ENERGY TRANSITION AND CLIMATE CHANGE: STRANDED ASSETS, FOSSILISED 
REVENUES 16 (2014) (calculating that if greenhouse gas are kept below 450ppm of CO2 equivalent 
in the atmosphere, the fossil fuel industry will lose $28 trillion in projected revenue through 2035, 
with the oil industry experiencing a $19.3 trillion loss). 
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argue that these risks are poorly understood by the market and have not 
been accurately incorporated into the pricing of corporate equities. They 
argue increased disclosure is necessary to remedy this overvaluation. 
Whether or not this concern is justified has been a matter of recent 
debate by corporate scholars and industry observers. Many commentators 
have expressed skepticism that the market has failed to price climate risk. 
One recent paper by corporate law experts argues, for example, that 
“[i]nformation concerning stranded assets is publicly available, and 
proponents offer no explanation for why this risk is not already reflected 
in existing stock prices.”166 The assertion that many companies are 
overvalued due to a systemic failure to assess exposure to climate risk is 
contrary to the efficient markets hypothesis (EMH), which posits that the 
price of a firm’s stock reflects all available information about the firm, 
and is therefore an unbiased estimate of the firm’s underlying value.167 
If climate risks are indeed mispriced, investor statements regarding 
climate risk disclosure remain puzzling for two reasons. First, if 
institutional investors are convinced that portfolio firms are overvalued 
due to stranded asset risk, why are they not selling off their shares? And 
second, those investors that cannot sell their shares, index funds, are not 
supposed to be motivated to devote resources to firm-specific information 
gathering. Their passive investment model involves no equity analysis at 
all. A rational response from an investor that believes a company is 
overvalued is to sell the stock, i.e. perform the “Wall Street walk.” One 
explanation for why a large institutional investor may be less inclined to 
exercise this option is because it owns such a large portion of shares that 
it would not be able to divest all of its assets before the market responded 
by lowering share price, resulting in losses for the seller.168 But this 
doesn’t seem to be the whole story, for even if they are limited in their 
ability to divest completely, institutional investors might nevertheless try 
to sell some of their shares. 
A better explanation might be that retaining control in the company 
                                                   
166. Paul Brest, Ronald Gilson, & Mark Wolfson, How Investors Can (and Can’t) Create Social 
Value 23 (Eur. Corp. Governance Inst., Working Paper No. 394/2018, 2018), 
https://ecgi.global/sites/default/files/working_papers/documents/finalbrestgilsonwolfson.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/Q4F2-7XBP]. 
167. Eugene Fama, Efficient Capital Markets: A Review of Theory and Empirical Work, 25 J. FIN. 
383 (1970); Thomas Lee, Fossil Fuel Stranded Assets: Efficient Market or Carbon Bubble?, 
WHARTON  PUB.  POL’Y  INITIATIVE  (Apr. 12, 2017), 
https://publicpolicy.wharton.upenn.edu/live/news/1807-fossil-fuel-stranded-assets-efficient-market-
or/for-students/blog/news.php [https://perma.cc/V3SA-RMDB]. 
168. Jayne Zanglein, From Wall Street Walk to Wall Street Talk: The Changing Face of Corporate 
Governance, 11 DEPAUL BUS. L.J. 43, 46 (1998).  
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provides benefits to the wider portfolio, even as the investor facilitates a 
managed decline in the company’s share price. As Luigi Zingales has 
observed, “divesting from oil stocks may have the undesirable effect of 
transferring ownership to investors who will pollute more” and thus the 
solution remaining to climate concerned investors is to “invest and 
engage.”169 Indeed, increasingly asset managers are admitting that they 
are choosing not to divest for precisely this reason. Japan’s pension fund 
has explained that divestment “would only result in a transfer of 
ownership to investors who are not as concerned about climate issues and 
thus would do little to contribute to a less carbon-intensive world.”170 The 
chief investment officer of Zurich Insurance provided a similar 
explanation for his fund’s choice to lobby for change rather than divest: 
“[Divestment] is not the solution–it does not change the physical world as 
far as emissions are concerned.”171 
Index funds, who cannot sell their shares, have been some of the most 
vocal investors in demanding disclosure of climate risk.172 This, too is a 
puzzle. Index funds are not supposed to be particularly concerned about 
firm-specific valuations or disclosure. These investment managers 
employ a passive investment strategy for the majority of their assets: they 
commit to matching and maintaining their portfolio to a meet certain stock 
index, rather than analyzing the fundamentals of any one company to 
                                                   
169. Luigi Zingales, Public Companies Should Prioritise Shareholder Welfare, Not Value, FIN. 
TIMES (Nov. 11, 2018), https://www.ft.com/content/52240e18-e412-11e8-a8a0-99b2e340ffeb (last 
visited Feb. 13, 2020). The institutional investor Schroders has explained that it believes “dialogue 
with individual companies about their plans will be more effective than divesting from the industry 
completely.” It’s Not Black and White for Fossil Fuel Investing, SCHRODERS (Dec. 12, 2017), 
https://www.schroders.com/en/insights/economics/its-not-black-and-white-for-fossil-fuel-investing/ 
[https://perma.cc/R2MN-57HA]; see also James Mackintosh, If You Want to Do Good, Expect to Do 
Badly, WALL ST. J. (June 28, 2018), https://www.wsj.com/articles/if-you-want-to-do-good-expect-to-
do-badly-1530185698 [https://perma.cc/N5VW-2VS6] (arguing that environmentally-minded 
investors’ “best chance of changing the world may be through” behind the scenes engagement with 
corporate boards rather than “making it more expensive for the corporate sinners to access 
capital  markets”). 
170. Hiro Mizuno, How Making Smart Financial Decisions Can Have a Positive Impact on Climate 
Change, TIME (Sept. 12, 2019), https://time.com/5669045/climate-change-investment/ 
[https://perma.cc/R9RL-KT77]. 
171. Tim Wallace, Protest Votes Made Us Change Tack on Coal Mining, Says Glencore Director 
Martin  Gilbert,  TELEGRAPH  (May 16, 2019, 3:05 PM), 
https://www.telegraph.co.uk/business/2019/05/16/protest-votes-made-us-change-tack-coal-mining-
says-glencore/ [https://perma.cc/X5DQ-Q86C].  
172. See, e.g., Gabriel T. Rubin, Show Us Your Climate Risks, Investors Tell Companies, WALL 
STREET J. (Feb. 28, 2019, 5:30 AM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/show-us-your-climate-risks-
investors-tell-companies-11551349800 [https://perma.cc/J8DW-HUA7] (describing BlackRock, 
Vanguard, and State Street’s demands for climate risk disclosure).  
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determine if its stock should be bought or sold.173 Passive investors leave 
the accurate pricing of equities to active traders in the market, and have 
no incentive to expend resources to obtain information about a firm’s 
individual risk exposure.174 Increased firm-level disclosure may ensure 
that the firm’s stock is more accurately priced, but this accuracy reduces 
only firm-specific, idiosyncratic, risk—risk that index funds are immune 
to through their diversification.175 Scholars have traditionally thought that 
index funds spending resources on firm-specific information gathering 
would be “irrational.”176 This understanding of index fund incentives 
regarding disclosure is at odds with the lengths some have gone to 
pressure specific companies to increase their disclosure of climate risk.177 
b. Portfolio Purpose and Retail Opposition 
Increasingly, institutional investors seem to be abandoning the pretense 
of a firm-specific business purpose entirely and admitting the portfolio-
level aims of their climate advocacy. UBS recently released a white paper 
                                                   
173. See John H. Langbein & Richard A. Posner, Market Funds and Trust-Investment Law, 1976 
AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 1, 1 (defining index investing as “creat[ing] and hold[ing] essentially 
unchanged a portfolio of securities that is designed to approximate some index of market performance 
such as the Standard & Poor’s 500”). This is in contrast to active fund managers who analyze specific 
stocks and make bets on which stocks will bring higher returns. If an active manager expects that a 
specific company’s stock price might fall, the manager can sell the stock before she accrues major 
losses. The appeal of index investing is that a passive management strategy requires less time and 
effort on the part of the fund manager, and index funds therefore charge significantly lower fees than 
actively managed equity funds. Because it is hard (or with any consistency, impossible) for an active 
fund manager to beat the overall market by a significant margin, these fee savings result in higher 
returns for the investor. 
174. Gilson & Gordon, supra note 10, at 867; Jill E. Fisch, Confronting the Circularity Problem in 
Private Securities Litigation, 2009 WIS. L. REV. 333, 346 (2009) (“Because a diversified portfolio 
largely eliminates firm-specific rewards as well, it reduces the incentive for investors to engage in 
costly information gathering. At the extreme, for the indexed investor, whose investments are 
completely independent of firm-specific information, the cost of research is wholly irrational.”). 
175. See Merritt B. Fox, Civil Liability and Mandatory Disclosure, 109 COLUM. L. REV. 237, 253 
(2009) (“Issuer disclosure may reduce risk—on average bringing price closer, on one side or the other, 
to actual value—but it reduces only unsystematic risk.” (emphasis added)). 
176. Fisch, supra note 174. 
177. BlackRock sent targeted letters to 120 high emitting companies, voted against Exxon board 
members, and reports that in the 2018 season undertook engagements with 232 companies regarding 
climate risks. BLACKROCK, BLACKROCK INVESTMENT STEWARDSHIP: 2018 ANNUAL REPORT 11 
(Aug. 30, 2018), https://www.blackrock.com/corporate/literature/publication/blk-annual-
stewardship-report-2018.pdf [https://perma.cc/WUN6-SCTY]; PRI, TRANSPARENCY REPORT, supra 
note 128, at 64; Sorkin, supra note 16. State Street voted against management on climate risk 
disclosure 80% of the time during the 2017 season and “engaged” with 108 companies regarding their 
climate risk. STATE STREET GLOBAL ADVISORS, STEWARDSHIP 2017 at 34, 37 (2017), 
https://www.ssga.com/investment-topics/environmental-social-governance/2018/07/annual-
stewardship-report-2017.pdf [https://perma.cc/5VKH-ATV6].  
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describing its climate engagements, explaining that because climate 
change is the greatest systemic risk faced by its assets, the asset manager 
uses its engagements with fossil fuel companies within its portfolio “as a 
means of addressing large negative externalities.”178 Similarly, the 
managing director of Japan’s Government Pension Investment Fund 
explained that his fund engages with high emitters, rather than divesting 
from them, because their goal is to reduce the systemic risk exposure of 
the entire portfolio of assets.179 
In a Financial Times open letter, sixty-eight institutional investors 
explained that their demand for corporate emissions commitments was 
motivated by their “fiduciary responsibility” to avoid the projected 
trillions of dollars of global economic damages.180 In October 2018, a 
group of institutional investors managing $2 trillion in assets issued 
targeted letters to fifty-five corporations highlighting concern that the 
companies’ public position on carbon regulation was at odds with their 
behind-the-scenes lobbying efforts and membership in certain trade 
groups: “Our expectation is that, when companies engage with public 
policy makers, they will support . . . [policy measures that reduce] climate 
change risks [in the service of] protecting the long-term value in our 
portfolios across all sectors and asset classes.”181 The Church of England 
explained that its motivation for joining the letter was due in part to the 
“[s]ystemic economic risks” resulting from opposition to carbon 
regulation: “Delay in the implementation of the Paris Agreement 
increases the physical risks of climate change, posing a systemic risk to 
economic stability, and introducing uncertainty and volatility into investor 
portfolios.”182 The chief investment officer of Robeco, a Dutch 
                                                   
178. Francis Condon & Valeria Piani, Collaborating for a Low-Carbon World: UBS Asset 
Management’s Climate Engagement Progress One Year In, UBS (July 2019), 
https://www.ubs.com/global/en/asset-management/insights/sustainable-and-impact-
investing/2019/climate-engagement.html [https://perma.cc/ZBP5-PNP6] (click to “[d]ownload full 
white paper”). 
179. Mizuno, supra note 170. 
180. Aberdeen Standard Investments et al., Power Companies, supra note 107 (emphasis added).  
181. SWEDISH NAT’L PENSION FUND AP7 & CHURCH OF ENGLAND PENSIONS BD., EUROPEAN 
INVESTOR EXPECTATIONS ON CORPORATE LOBBYING ON CLIMATE CHANGE (Oct. 2018), 
https://www.churchofengland.org/sites/default/files/201810/Investor.Expectations.Climate.Lobbyin
g.Oct_.2018.pdf [https://perma.cc/D259-JB63] (emphasis added). 
182.  Pension Funds Challenge Major European Emitters on Climate Lobbying, CHURCH OF ENG. 
(Oct. 28, 2018), https://www.churchofengland.org/more/media-centre/news/pension-funds-
challenge-major-european-emitters-climate-lobbying [https://perma.cc/ZEM4-Y7GP]; see also Jeff 
McMahon, Corporations Are Starting to Perform on Climate Issues, Investors Say, FORBES (June 28, 
2018, 12:01 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/jeffmcmahon/2018/06/28/corporations-are-starting-
to-perform-on-climate-issues-activist-investors-say/ [https://perma.cc/7KWS-FC8Y] (quoting 
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institutional investor managing nearly $200 billion in assets, justified his 
companies’ support of Shell’s emissions commitments by explaining, 
“When it comes to meeting the demands of the Paris Agreement on 
climate change, we believe it is necessary to strengthen partnerships 
between investors and their investee companies to accelerate progress 
towards reaching such an ambitious common goal.”183 A recent U.N. 
Principles for Responsible Investment report listed risk to “[t]he universal 
owner’s portfolio” as a motivating factor for investors to pressure 
companies into stopping climate related lobbying activities.184 
Internalization of harmful climate externalities benefit the broader 
portfolio at the expense of the externality generating firms. If these 
climate outcomes are in fact in the best interest of the company, one would 
expect concentrated shareholders, with an overweight ownership interest, 
to similarly lend their support. It appears, however, that retail shareholders 
holding shares directly, rather than through an investment intermediary, 
in fact give less support to climate-related resolutions than their 
institutional co-owners. An analysis of the seven most popular climate 
change proposals of the 2017 season showed that institutional investors 
voted 66% of their shares in favor of the resolutions, while retail investors 
only voted 13% of shares in support.185 This is partially due to the fact that 
retail shareholders are generally more likely to be unengaged and abstain 
from voting entirely—in the 2017 season an average of only 29% of all 
retail shares cast votes for proposals of all types.186 More data is needed, 
but this nevertheless suggests that concentrated shareholders are 
proportionally less likely to support climate-related goals than their 
institutional co-owners. 
                                                   
Catherine Howarth of ShareAction UK characterizing shareholder sentiments that climate risk “is a 
risk for our entire portfolio, not just for you as an individual stock, and we need to see action now”). 
183. Press Release, Shell, Leading Investors Back Shell’s Climate Targets (Dec. 3, 2018), 
https://www.shell.com/media/news-and-media-releases/2018/leading-investors-back-shells-climate-
targets.html [https://perma.cc/XE8A-QVCK]. 
184. PRINCIPLES FOR RESPONSIBLE INV. (PRI), CONVERGING ON CLIMATE LOBBYING: ALIGNING 
CORPORATE PRACTICE WITH INVESTOR EXPECTATIONS 10 (2018), https://www.unpri.org/climate-
change/converging-on-climate-lobbying-aligning-corporate-practice-with-investor-expectations-
/3174.article [https://perma.cc/QC86-K6NX].  
185. PROXYPULSE, 2017 PROXY SEASON REVIEW 3, 4 (Sept. 2017), 
https://www.broadridge.com/_assets/pdf/broadridge-2017-proxy-season-review.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/CUL9-Q4W3]. For environmental proposals in general, institutional support was 
32%, while only 10% of retail shareholders voted in favor. Id. 
186. Id. at 2. 
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3. Impact on Emissions Reductions 
Under this theory of externality-internalization, economists are 
beginning to explore whether, empirically, diversified investor ownership 
leads to emissions reductions in portfolio companies.187 Theoretically, 
each of them can be expected to lower individual company emissions. 
Emissions Goals: Of all the outcomes sought by shareholders, explicit 
emissions reductions goals have the clearest causal relationship to actual 
emissions reductions. Certainly, these goals must be genuine, not empty 
statements made for public relations. Investors are increasingly pushing 
not just for goals, but the linking of emissions reduction achievements to 
executive compensation.188 This is a significant change from status quo 
compensation incentives, many of which link executive pay directly to a 
company’s “reserve replacement” ratio, or the amount of fossil reserves 
added relative to the amount extracted that year.189 This adjustment of 
managerial incentives indicates that institutional investors are putting 
their money where their mouths are. 
Corporate Lobbying: Investors are asking companies not only to 
disclose their spending on lobbying efforts to oppose carbon regulation, 
but also to refrain from such spending, or even proactively support the 
passage of emissions limiting laws. Given the massive amounts of money 
corporations have devoted to this effort in the past (and the success reaped 
by these efforts),190 reversing course can only serve to help the 
                                                   
187. See José Azar et al., The Big Three and Corporate Carbon Emissions Around the World 
(working paper, on file with author) (finding a “strong and robust negative association between Big 
Three [BlackRock, Vanguard, StateStreet] ownership and subsequent carbon emissions”); Sophie 
Shive & Margaret Forster, Corporate Governance and Pollution Externalities of Public and Private 
Firms  (Feb. 21, 2019),  https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3339517 
[https://perma.cc/AL6V-7L5R] (finding that within public firms, there is a negative relationship 
between mutual fund ownership and emissions, concluding that “either mutual funds search for 
companies that emit less, or that mutual fund managers pressure their portfolio companies”). 
188. See, e.g., Shareholder Proposal, Pinnacle West Capital: Link GHG Emissions to Executive 
Compensation, AS YOU SOW (Dec. 21, 2018), https://www.asyousow.org/resolutions/2018/12/21/link-ghg-
emissions-to-executive-compensation [https://perma.cc/79H7-AUDH]. 
189. INST. FOR POL’Y STUDIES, MONEY TO BURN: HOW CEO PAY IS ACCELERATING CLIMATE CHANGE 13 
(Sept.  2,  2015),  https://ips-dc.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/09/EE2015-Money-To-Burn-Upd.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/GQK3-MMQS]; see also CONOCOPHILLIPS, 2017 PROXY STATEMENT 86 (2017), 
http://static.conocophillips.com/files/resources/conocophillips_2017proxystatment.pdf [https://perma.cc/69Q7-
7YV8] (citing the removal of the Reserves Replacement Ratio metric from the compensation inventive program 
as part of the company’s long term strategy for adapting to climate change). 
190. INFLUENCEMAP, HOW MUCH BIG OIL SPENDS ON OBSTRUCTIVE CLIMATE LOBBYING 2 (Apr. 2016), 
http://senate.ucsd.edu/media/206150/lobby_spend_report__april.pdf  [https://perma.cc/M28U-KESF] 
(estimating that fossil fuel companies spend $115 million annually to lobby against climate regulation; this 
figure includes direct spending ($22 million by Shell alone) as well as contributions to trade associations like 
the American Petroleum Institute).  
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implementation of regulatory measures. This will in turn lead to actual 
emissions reductions. 
Disclosure of Climate Risk: Two-degree scenario analysis enables 
comparison and tabulation of projected emissions across firms, enabling 
assessment of how much these total emissions diverge from the “carbon 
budget” necessary to meet certain warming pathways. This can lead to 
emissions reductions in two ways. First, scenario analysis exposes 
corporate projections of future emissions, potentially supporting 
arguments for the necessity of government regulation, and enabling firm-
specific targeting by environmental activists. Second, in the event that the 
market has in fact underpriced fossil fuel companies’ exposure to climate 
risk, increased disclosure can facilitate accurate pricing. This mispricing 
could occur either as a result of market-wide underassessment of climate 
risk—as argued by those who claim the existence of a “carbon 
bubble”191—or from the deliberate fraud on the part of fossil fuel company 
executives trying to mask their risk exposure.192 In either case, disclosure 
may lead to a decline in the value of fossil fuel industry stock, which in 
turn will limit present capital expenditures on the exploration and 
development of reserves. 
Incomplete disclosure of projected emissions allows companies to 
evade exposure to both regulatory action and reputational damage. One 
recent report estimates that between 40% and 50% of ExxonMobil’s 
upstream capital expenditure through 2025 will be spent on developing 
fossil resources that exceed the carbon budget allowed under a scenario 
that limits warming to 2°C.193 Forcing companies (who have the best 
access to their own production plans) to assess their carbon budget 
                                                   
191. “Carbon bubble” refers to the hypothesis that the valuations of fossil-fuel intensive companies 
(particularly oil and gas companies) do not reflect either the inevitable regulatory action to reduce 
carbon emissions or declining demand due to competition from renewables. Fiona Harvey, What is 
The Carbon Bubble and What Will Happen if it Bursts?, GUARDIAN (June 4, 2018, 11:00 AM), 
https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2018/jun/04/what-is-the-carbon-bubble-and-what-will-
happen-if-it-bursts [https://perma.cc/LZZ7-L2NU]. If these companies are overvalued, and then 
sharply adjust in unison to reflect accurate prices, the bubble could burst, with its effects rippling 
through the entire market. See, e.g., id.; Jean-Francois Mercure et al., Macroeconomic Impact of 
Stranded Fossil-Fuel Assets, 8 NATURE CLIMATE CHANGE 588, 589 (2018). 
192. See, e.g., John Schwartz, Fossil Fuels on Trial: New York’s Lawsuit Against Exxon Begins, 
N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 22, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/10/22/climate/new-york-lawsuit-
exxon.html [https://perma.cc/V4AD-AJWK] (reporting on New York Attorney General’s claim that 
Exxon failed to disclose internal assessments of carbon risk to its investors).  
193. CARBON TRACKER INITIATIVE, 2 DEGREES OF SEPARATION: TRANSITION RISK FOR OIL AND 
GAS IN A LOW CARBON WORLD 27 (2017) (predicting that Exxon is the most exposed of the world’s 
oil and gas firms to wasted capital expenditure if the atmospheric CO2 concentration is kept below 
450 ppm). 
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exceedances exposes the potential social undesirability of their business 
models. Transparent acknowledgement of the plans most at odds with 
combatting global warming enables regulators to better target their 
regulatory interventions. The Governor of the Bank of England has said 
that “[a]ny efficient market reaction to climate change risks as well as the 
technologies and policies to address them must be founded on 
transparency of information.”194 
There is a well-developed literature on “regulation by revelation,” 
showing that socially undesirable corporate practices can be reduced 
through disclosure alone.195 Corporate behavior can be influenced by 
consumer reaction and activist targeting, but knowledge of those practices 
is a prerequisite. The Toxics Release Inventory (TRI) Program has helped 
reduce toxic chemical releases by 58% through mandatory disclosure 
requirements.196 This regulatory effect operates through a number of 
channels, including continually re-establishing a baseline against which 
to compare industry laggards.197 A recent paper estimates that mandatory 
disclosure of emissions in the UK had the effect of reducing average 
company-level emissions by 15% to 18%.198 
Disclosure can also lead to decreased future emissions through limiting 
the amount of capital that is allocated to the exploration and development 
of fossil fuel reserves. Because share prices reflect the market’s 
assessment of corporate profitability, they influence managerial decisions 
to undertake contemplated investment projects. A manager will continue 
to ignore climate risk when making investment decisions if the market 
does not respond negatively to this behavior. As Merritt Fox writes, “an 
inaccurately high share price may lead to the implementation of socially 
undesirable projects.”199 Managers of oil and gas companies make internal 
decisions to pursue certain extractive projects based on an assessment of 
                                                   
194. Mark Carney, Governor, Bank of Eng. & Chairman, Fin. Stability Bd., Breaking the Tragedy 
of the Horizon: Climate Change and Financial Stability, Speech at Lloyd’s of London (Sept. 29, 
2015), https://www.bis.org/review/r151009a.pdf [https://perma.cc/8TDV-XR87]. 
195. Andrew Schatz, Note, Regulating Greenhouse Gases by Mandatory Information Disclosure, 
26 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 335, 336 (2008) (citing JAMES T. HAMILTON, REGULATION THROUGH 
REVELATION 5 (2005); David W. Case, The Law and Economics of Environmental Information as 
Regulation, 31 ENVTL. L. REP. 10773 (2001)). 
196. Id. (citing U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, EPA 260-R-07-001, 2005 TOXICS RELEASE 
INVENTORY (TRI) PUBLIC DATA RELEASE REPORT 4 (2005) (data as of March 2005)). 
197. Id. at 355. 
198. Benedikt Downar et al., Fighting Climate Change with Disclosure? The Real Effects of 
Mandatory Greenhouse Gas Emission Disclosure, DIW BERLIN DISCUSSION PAPERS (2019), 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3352390 (last visited Jan. 28, 2020). 
199. Fox, supra note 175, at 262. 
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the investment’s net present value (NPV).200 An NPV that fails to account 
for transitions risks will be over-inflated and may result in the decision to 
invest in certain projects that would not have been greenlit given proper 
risk accounting. 
However, because so much of an oil company’s valuation is based on 
its reserves, managers may have an incentive to mask their company’s 
exposure to future climate regulation in service of maintaining an 
artificially high share price.201 They may deliberately ignore climate risk 
in order to pursue projects that are not NPV-justified. Nevertheless, once 
these projects have been brought online, the expense of development will 
be a sunk cost.202 Oil and gas companies may decide to continue to process 
and sell fossil fuels at slightly above cost in order to recoup some, but not 
all, of the money spent, rather than abandoning the project entirely.203 For 
this reason, the mispricing of carbon risk in the present inefficiently 
subsidizes the future production of fossil fuels.204 
An overvalued stock may be the result of a market-wide mis-
assessment of risk, i.e. a carbon bubble,205 or it could result from 
intentional misstatements on the part of management seeking to withhold 
share-price decreasing information from the market. Disclosure of two-
                                                   
200. Marcel Kahan, Securities Laws and the Social Costs of Inaccurate Stock Prices,41 DUKE L.J. 
977, 1040 (Apr. 1992) (“Companies invest in a project if the discounted value of the cash inflows 
exceeds the discounted value of the required cash outlays, i.e., when the project has a positive net 
present value.”). 
201.  Marcel Kahan, Securities Laws and the Social Costs of Inaccurate Stock Prices, 41 DUKE L. 
J. 977, 1030–31 (1992) (describing managers’ attempts to “adapt” to a market mis-valuation by 
pursuing strategies that result in overvaluation even though “[p]ursuing business plans favored by the 
market even if they are not profitable . . . is obviously undesirable”); Roger L. Martin & Alison 
Kemper, The Overvaluation Trap, HARV. BUS. REV. 102, 107–08 (Dec. 2015) (arguing that oil 
executives overinvest in adding reserves, even though they know future climate regulation will render 
them unprofitable, to prop up an overvalued stock price) (referencing Michael C. Jensen, Agency 
Costs of Overvalued Equity, 34 FIN. MGMT. 5 (2005)). 
202. CARBON TRACKER INITIATIVE, UNDER THE MICROSCOPE: ARE COMPANIES’ CLIMATE 
SCENARIO ANALYSES MEETING INVESTORS’ REQUIREMENTS? 15 (May 2018) (“[A]lready producing 
wells have some built-in resilience to declining demand. This is due principally to sunk costs—those 
assets will continue to produce if revenues exceed operational costs — even if those projects 
ultimately fail to recover capital.”). 
203. In Chevron’s climate stress test report, the company acknowledges this fact by noting that 
certain planned projects would be able to generate cash but not earnings in a future world with 
aggressive carbon regulation. CHEVRON, CLIMATE CHANGE RESILIENCE: A FRAMEWORK FOR 
DECISION MAKING 33 (2018), https://www.chevron.com/-/media/shared-media/documents/climate-
change-resilience.pdf [https://perma.cc/Z5FW-T7BK].  
204. See Andrea Liesen, Climate Change and Financial Market Efficiency, 54 BUS. & SOC’Y 511, 
531 (2015) (explaining that the incorrect valuation of financial assets affects the allocation of 
investment capital in the real economy). 
205. See supra note 192. 
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degree scenario analyses can correct both of these sources of mispricing. 
It forces managers, who have the best information about their company’s 
exposure to climate risk, to disclose this information in a format accessible 
to the market.206 Making socially undesirable behavior readily accessible 
to investors can have a regulating effect on the behavior of the company 
doing the reporting. A mine safety disclosure requirement implemented 
under Dodd Frank resulted in a significant decline in safety citations and 
worker injuries at publicly owned mining companies as compared to their 
non-reporting private peers.207 This effect was observed even though 
safety records had always been publicly available online; the information 
simply had not been handed to investors directly through 
disclosure  filings.208 
Finally, requiring public disclosure in this way opens up managers to 
liability for fraudulent misstatements and decreases the incentives for 
managers to conceal risk exposure. In October 2018, the New York 
Attorney General filed a lawsuit against ExxonMobil claiming that the 
company had engaged in “a longstanding fraudulent scheme” to conceal 
its climate risk exposure from investors.209 Since 2007, Exxon has assured 
its investors that the company was accounting for potential future carbon 
regulations by including a “proxy cost” of greenhouse gases in its capital 
allocation decisions.210 The suit alleges, however, that investigations 
revealed that Exxon was in fact using a much lower proxy cost than it 
reported to investors.211 In some cases, it allegedly disregarded the future 
cost of greenhouse gases entirely.212 Disclosure in the form of two-degree 
scenario analysis requires the company to show how and whether it would 
be able to respond to global climate regulation, and allows investors to 
assess the likelihood of such comprehensive regulation on their own. 
                                                   
206. Fox, supra note 175, at 253 (“Disclosure does, however, enhance efficiency by improving 
corporate decisions relating to which proposed new investment projects in the economy are selected 
for implementation and how already existing projects are operated.”). 
207. Hans B. Christensen et al., The Real Effects of Mandated Information on Social Responsibility 
in Financial Reports: Evidence from Mine-Safety Records, 64 J. ACCT. & ECON. 284 (2017). 
208. Id. In another example, high-polluting companies experienced large losses in stock valuation 
following the initial publication of TRI data, and firms “whose environmental performance worsened 
over time and relative to other firms” continued to see negative stock reactions when their TRI data 
was released. Madhu Khanna et al., Toxics Release Information: A Policy Tool for Environmental 
Protection, 36 J. ENVTL. ECON. & MGMT. 243, 245 (1998). 
209. Complaint at 1, New York v. Exxon, No. 452044 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. Cnty. Oct. 24, 2018).  
210. Id. 
211. Id. at 2. 
212. Id. 
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D. Internalization of Climate Externalities: Cost-Benefit Analysis of 
Climate Intervention 
One objection to the arguments advanced thus far might be skepticism 
as to how much impact firm-by-firm targeting of emissions reductions can 
really have on a single investor’s portfolio. Whether or not it is worthwhile 
for an institutional investor to expend resources on climate activism 
depends on many factors, including: the magnitude of climate damages to 
future portfolio value, the extent to which firm-specific emissions 
reductions contribute to net global reductions, how much portfolio value 
is lost by forgoing fossil fuel profits, and by how much climate damages 
are diminished by a marginal reduction in greenhouse gas emissions. 
Predicting economy-wide costs of climate change is extremely 
challenging due to uncertainty about what policies governments will 
implement to reduce emissions, how energy markets and technologies will 
develop, just how much the earth will warm, and how that warming will 
affect the earth’s natural systems. In the absence of aggressive 
government action to regulate greenhouse gases, business as usual (BAU) 
emissions pathways are projected to lead to warming 4.1°C–4.8°C above 
industrial levels by the end of the century.213 Even if governments fully 
implement their commitments under the Paris Agreement, and continue 
these policies throughout the century with comparable action, the world 
is nevertheless likely to warm 2.9°C–3.4°C by 2100.214 As it stands, it 
appears unlikely that countries will fully meet their Paris commitments. 
Top-down economy-wide estimations of the impact of this warming 
have been attempted, though the long-term impacts are difficult to predict 
as they touch every aspect of the economy and each assumption comes 
with a great deal of uncertainty. A 2015 study in Nature analyzed only the 
predicted impacts of temperature change (it did not include, for instance, 
sea-level rise and increased incidents of storms) and found that average 
global incomes would be reduced 23% by 2100.215 A more recent study 
                                                   
213. CLIMATE ACTION TRACKER, TEMPERATURES: ADDRESSING GLOBAL WARMING (Dec. 2019), 
https://climateactiontracker.org/global/temperatures/ [https://perma.cc/UD5F-FZRN]; Patrick T. 
Brown & Ken Caldeira, Greater Future Global Warming Inferred From Earth’s Recent Energy 
Budget, 552 NATURE 45, 47 (2017) (calculating a 93% chance of reaching 4°C under a “business as 
usual” emissions pathway). 
214. UNITED NATIONS ENV’T PROGRAMME, THE EMISSIONS GAP REPORT 2017 18 (2017); Adrian 
Raftery et al., Less than 2 °C Warming by 2100 Unlikely, 7 NATURE CLIMATE CHANGE 637 (2017) 
(projecting that under current emissions pathways, including mitigation regulation, there is a 90% 
chance that by 2100 the earth will have warmed between 2 and 4.9 °C, with a median of  3.2°C). 
215. Marshall Burke, Solomon M. Hsiang & Edward Miguel, Global Non-Linear Effect of 
Temperature on Economic Production, 527 NATURE 235, 235 (2015).  
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in Science estimated the economic cost of climate change in the United 
States, incorporating predicted changes in agriculture, crime, coastal 
storms, energy, human mortality, and labor (but neglecting sea level rise 
and many other costs).216 The authors found that for every one degree rise 
in average temperature roughly 1.2% of gross domestic product is lost 
per.217 With a 4°C rise, that’s a 4.8% decline. For comparison, in the 
recession in 2008 and 2009, U.S. GDP declined 0.1% 
and  2.5%,  respectively.218 
A meta-analysis of forty-nine different climate damage studies 
summarized that “non-catastrophic damages are likely between 7 and 8% 
of GDP for a 3°C increase . . . and are between 9 and 10% when factoring 
in catastrophic risks.”219 These damage estimates reflect future GDP 
losses as contrasted to growth projections without climate change. One 
recent paper estimates that 4°C of warming will result in losses of $23 
trillion—nearly one-third of current global GDP—and around 7% of 
projected GDP in the year 2100 without warming.220 The lead author 
noted that these estimates did not include the impact of extreme weather 
events, and that initial modeling suggested their incorporation would more 
than double the damage estimate.221 
A full review of the expert consensus on predicted economic impacts 
of climate change is beyond the scope of this Article. What matters, 
however, is how institutional investors themselves perceive the risks that 
threaten their long-term portfolio health. The asset management company 
Schroders maintains a “Climate Progress Dashboard,” which it updates 
                                                   
216. Solomon Hsiang et al., Estimating Economic Damage From Climate Change in the United 
States, 356 SCIENCE 1362, 1365 (2017) (explaining that uncertainty in prediction economic impacts 
increases as potential average temperatures increase, therefore the “very likely” range of losses at 4°C 
of warming is 1.5 to 5.6% of GDP while at 8°C warming it is 6.4 to 15.7% of GDP annually). 
217. Id. at 1362. 
218. Table 1.1.2. Contributions to Percent Change in Real Gross Domestic Product, National 
Data, National Income and Product Accounts, BUREAU OF ECON. ANALYSIS (Feb. 27, 
2020),  https://apps.bea.gov/iTable/iTable.cfm?reqid=19&step=2#reqid=19&step=2&isuri=1&1921
=survey (last visited Mar. 17, 2020).  
219. Peter H. Howard & Thomas Sterner, Few and Not So Far Between: A Meta-Analysis of 
Climate Damage Estimates, 68 ENVTL. & RESOURCE ECON. 197, 222 (2017). 
220. Tom Kompas et al., The Effects of Climate Change on GDP by Country and the Global 
Economic Gains From Complying With the Paris Climate Accord, 6 EARTH’S FUTURE 1153, 1160 
(2018); see also Matthew E. Kahn et al., Long-Term Macroeconomic Effects of Climate Change: A 
Cross-Country Analysis 5 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 26167, 2019) (finding 
that “business as usual” warming will result in a 10.52% loss in U.S. GDP by 2100).  
221. Tom Kompas, U.S. $23 Trillion Will Be Lost If Temperatures Rise Four Degrees by 2100, 
PHYS.ORG (Aug. 15, 2018), https://phys.org/news/2018-08-trillion-lost-temperatures-degrees.html 
[https://perma.cc/LRR2-UYRC]. 
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quarterly to reflect global progress on fighting climate change.222 The 
October 2018 assessment predicts that we are headed to a world of 4°C of 
warming and that “[g]lobal economic losses could build to $23 trillion 
over the next 80 years; equal to permanent damage three or four times the 
scale of the 2008 Global Financial Crisis, and continuing to escalate.”223 
For an investor broadly diversified across the economy, climate damages’ 
negative impact on the economy’s future GDP will results in proportional 
impacts to institutional investor’s portfolio cash flows.224 
Here, a hypothetical proposed intervention is considered in order to 
demonstrate the relationship between firm-level emissions decisions that 
can be influenced by an investor, and the mitigation in expected damages 
to that investor’s portfolio. Consider the analysis BlackRock makes when 
weighing whether or not to intervene to take a measure to curtail 
production at two firms, Chevron and Exxon. Assume this investor 
intervention forces each company to reduce its emissions by 40%, and this 
commitment results in that company’s share price falling by 20%.225 
In 2015, Exxon released 577 million metric tons of CO2-equivalent 
greenhouse gases into the atmosphere,226 making it responsible for 1.2% 
of global emissions.227 Out of all oil majors, Exxon has the largest share 
of resource reserves it claims will continue to be profitable despite climate 
regulation,228 and its BAU path indicates that the company plans to emit 
                                                   
222. SCHRODERS, supra note 21. 
223. Id. 
224. UNEP FIN. INITIATIVE & PRINCIPLES FOR RESPONSIBLE INV., UNIVERSAL OWNERSHIP: WHY 
ENVIRONMENTAL EXTERNALITIES MATTER TO INSTITUTIONAL INVESTORS (2011); see also Simon 
Dietz et al., ‘Climate Value at Risk’ of Global Financial Assets, 6 NATURE CLIMATE CHANGE 676, 
678 (applying this same proportional relationship between percent damages to global GDP and 
percent damages to investor portfolio when using DICE modelling outputs).  
225. This rough estimate is based on the fact that more than half of oil and gas companies’ valuation 
is based on anticipated cash flows more than ten years in the future. If 40% of their projected reserves 
are unable to be sold, half of 40% is 20%. CARBON TRUST, CLIMATE CHANGE – A BUSINESS 
REVOLUTION? 13 (2008). In 2004, Shell downwardly adjusted its estimated proven reserves by 20%, 
and one of the company’s two stocks fell 10%. John Carey, Shell: The Case of the Missing Oil, 
BLOOMBERG  BUSINESSWEEK  (Jan. 25, 2004, 9:00 PM), 
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2004-01-25/shell-the-case-of-the-missing-
oil  [https://perma.cc/A8ES-5DEP]. 
226. CDP REPORT, supra note 38, at 15. 
227. 2015 Global Emissions: 48.9 GtCO2-eq. J.G.J. OLIVIER ET AL., TRENDS IN GLOBAL CO2 AND 
TOTAL GREENHOUSE GAS EMISSIONS: 2017 REPORT 46 tbl.B.1 (2017), 
https://www.pbl.nl/sites/default/files/downloads/pbl-2017-trends-in-global-co2-and-total-
greenhouse-gas-emissons-2017-report_2674.pdf [https://perma.cc/J5B7-PPPV]. 
228. CARBON TRACKER INITIATIVE, 2 DEGREES OF SEPARATION: COMPANY LEVEL TRANSITION 
RISK JULY 2018 UPDATE (2018), https://www.carbontracker.org/reports/2-degrees-of-separation-
update/ [https://perma.cc/BB6Y-U8RS] (predicting that Exxon is the most exposed of major public 
oil and gas firms to wasted capital expenditure if the atmospheric CO2 concentration is kept below 
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a greater relative share of emissions in the future.229 Together, Chevron 
and Exxon are responsible for about 2% of annual global emissions.230 
BlackRock owns 6.65%231 of Exxon’s total market capitalization of 
$260.1 billion, or $17.3 billion, and 6.89%232 of Chevron’s total market 
capitalization of $206 billion, or roughly $14.2 billion.233 If it loses 20% 
of the value of each of these assets, it will lose $6.3 billion total. 
In order to estimate the mitigated damage impacts to BlackRock’s 
portfolio, this emissions reduction was modeled using William 
Nordhaus’s Dynamic Integrated Climate Economy Model (DICE).234 This 
model “is the most widely used” and cited235 macroeconomic model of 
the costs of climate change and models results using a wide range of 
temperature predictions. For present purposes, the BAU pathway was 
modeled, first as a baseline, and then again, removing 1% of industrial 
emissions each year through 2100. The difference in the value of damages 
between these two model runs was compared, aggregated over 100 years, 
and then discounted using a private sector discount rate of 7%.236 Through 
this method, DICE predicts that by intervening to reduce 1% of annual 
industrial emissions each year, BlackRock could avoid damages to its 
portfolio with a net present value of $9.7 billion.237 
                                                   
450 ppm); CARBON TRACKER INITIATIVE, 2 DEGREES OF SEPARATION AT A GLANCE (July 2018), 
https://www.carbontracker.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/11/2degrees-separation-
infographic_horiz_Update-01.png [https://perma.cc/F99J-V96M]. 
229. Ken Crowley, Exxon Doubles Down on Oil, BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK (June 15, 2018, 
2:00 AM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-06-15/exxon-doubles-down-on-oil 
[https://perma.cc/K7HH-UPYY] (reporting Exxon’s newly announced plan to increase its oil output 
25% by 2025). 
230. Exxon emits 1.2% annually and Chevron emits 0.8% annually. Exxon emits 577 MtCO2-eq, 
Chevron emits 377 MtCO2-eq, see CDP REPORT, supra note 38, out of 48.9 GtCO2-eq, see OLIVIER 
ET AL., supra note 227. 
231. See MORNINGSTAR, supra note 38. 
232. Chevron  Corp  CVX,  MORNINGSTAR  (Feb. 3, 2020), 
https://www.morningstar.com/stocks/xnys/cvx/ownership (last visited Feb. 16, 2020). 
233. Chevron  Corporation  (CVX),  YAHOO!  FINANCE, 
https://finance.yahoo.com/quote/CVX?p=CVX&.tsrc=fin-srch (last visited Feb. 23, 2020). 
234. The modeling was done using the 2016 version of DICE, available in GAMS code as well as an Excel 
version on William Nordhaus’s website: Scientific and Economic Background on DICE model , WILLIAM D. 
NORDHAUS (Feb. 3, 2020), https://sites.google.com/site/williamdnordhaus/dice-rice [https://perma.cc/3JFL-
K8AT]. The damage modeling was conducted in GAMS and the aggregation, discounting, and application to 
specific asset managers was done in Excel. Modeling documentation on file with author. 
235.  See WEBDICE, http://webdice.rdcep.org/ [https://perma.cc/B2DK-WRSY]. 
236. DICE itself models growth and costs of abatement using a public sector discount rate of around 
5%, declining over time.  
237. BlackRock has $7.43 trillion in assets under management. See Christine Williamson, 
BlackRock’s AUM Hits New Record of $7.43 Trillion, PENSIONS & INVS. (Jan. 15, 2020, 12:19 PM), 
https://www.pionline.com/money-management/blackrocks-aum-hits-new-record-743-trillion 
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Because this value of mitigated damages outweighs the loss of share 
value from diminished expected fossil fuel profits by $3.4 billion, it would 
be in BlackRock’s rational economic interest to pursue this intervention 
and internalize the intra-portfolio climate externalities. 
This cost benefit analysis is of course an extreme oversimplification of 
the trade-offs an investor must analyze in making a decision to support 
emissions reduction. It ignores, for example, leakage effects. A forced 
decline in Exxon’s production will push up the price of oil, rendering a 
competitor’s more expensive production processes viable in order to meet 
the demand. However, higher oil prices also discourage overall 
consumption, and render renewable energy sources more competitive.238 
Further, many of the present governmental actions to combat emissions 
focus on demand reduction (like making power plants and vehicles more 
efficient), which decreases the price of fossil fuels, similarly generating 
leakage effects in the other direction.239 Effective climate policy must 
address both supply and demand,240 and supply-side regulation is 
presently lacking. In a world where massive investors limit the production 
of all publicly traded firms, this leakage effect would be especially muted. 
Of the total greenhouse gas emissions generated by the world’s 224 fossil 
                                                   
[https://perma.cc/46WW-YZ8G]. For a 1% decrease in all future industrial emissions, DICE predicts 
the net present value of the reduction in global climate damages over a 100-year time period to be 
$385 billion (or $1 trillion over 200 years). If we assume the value of damage reduction to 
BlackRock’s portfolio is in proportion to BlackRock’s share of the global economy, the value of 
damage reduction to BlackRock is $38 billion. Again, this number dwarfs the $6.3 billion in losses 
from Exxon and Chevron stock decline. The 2016 DICE model employs a discount rate that reflects 
both the capital discount rate and the observed consumption discount rate, and declines from a rate of 
about 5% to about 2%. An imperfect adjustment of these rates to the commonly employed capital 
discount rate of 7% (the rate more likely to be used in asset valuation), results in damage reductions 
to BlackRock’s portfolio valued at $9.7 billion.  
Unlike a related paper that assessed the financial risks of climate change, Dietz et al., supra note 
224, this approach makes no amendments to the underlying damage function itself. Under Dietz’s 
model, the BAU pathway reaches only 2.5oC of warming by 2100, which is drastically out of step 
with current consensus projections of BAU warming, and suggests that their approach in fact greatly 
underestimates the portfolio risk of climate change.  
238. The U.S. Energy Information Administration found that for the U.S. market, a 1% increase in 
the price of petroleum leads to a 1.26% decrease in demand. U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., FUEL 
COMPETITION IN POWER GENERATION AND ELASTICITIES OF SUBSTITUTION 12 (June 2012). 
239. OIL CHANGE INT’L, THE SKY’S LIMIT: NORWAY 15 (Aug. 2017), 
http://priceofoil.org/content/uploads/2017/08/The-Skys-Limit-Norway-1.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/HHZ5-4GNK] (“The key question is on which side climate action leaks more . . . if 
demand is more elastic than supply, leakage will be greater for demand policies, and vice-versa.”); 
see also Michael Lazarus, Peter Erickson & Kevin Tempest, Supply-Side Climate Policy: The Road 
Less Taken 13–15 (Stockholm Env’t Inst., Working Paper No. 2015-13, 2015). 
240. The most efficient way for a government to do this would be to affect the price directly through 
a carbon tax (or trading scheme).  
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fuel companies, (30.6 GtCO2e), 30% are public investor owned.241 
Further, institutional investors target not just suppliers but also large 
consumers of fossil fuels.242 By tackling both supply and demand at once 
they can reduce the overall quantity of carbon sold while depressing the 
price fluctuations that create leakage effects Climate Action 100+’s target 
list of 100 companies responsible for two-thirds of industrial emissions 
includes large carbon consumers like auto manufacturers and mining 
companies. A full understanding of the supply and demand effects of firm-
specific targeting requires economic modeling which is beyond the scope 
of this Article. This simplified cost-benefit analysis is meant primarily to 
demonstrate the scale of the impact investors can have economy-wide. 
II. ABILITY AND INCENTIVES OF COMMON OWNERS 
The consideration of the externality-internalizing incentives of 
institutional investors grows out of the growing body of scholarship on 
the distortionary effects of common ownership. The actions documented 
supra provide further evidence of the power of institutional investors to 
influence corporate behavior down to the product level.243 While investors 
deny their ability to influence inter-firm competition, they are less hesitant 
to advertise their power to pressure firms into reducing emissions. One 
                                                   
241. CDP REPORT, supra note 38, at 10. This percentage would increase significantly if the world’s 
largest emitter of GHGs, Saudi Aramco, follows through on its long-awaited IPO. Saudi Aramco is 
responsible for 4.6% of annual global emissions. Id. at 15.  
242. Both Daimler and Volkswagen made carbon-neutral commitments in 2019 in response to shareholder 
pressure. CLIMATE ACTION 100+, supra note 111, at 38. Hermes Investment Management made public requests 
including at the companies’ AGMs, that the companies align their business plans with the Paris Agreement. 
HERMES EOS, PUBLIC ENGAGEMENT REPORT 23 (2019), https://isif.ie/uploads/publications/public-engagement-
report-q2-2019.pdf [https://perma.cc/YZ4K-WE2Q]; Hans-Christoph Hirt, Hermes EOS to Raise Questions with 
German Automotive Manufacturers on Climate Change Related Risks, FEDERATED HERMES (May 14, 2019), 
https://www.hermes-investment.com/uki/press-centre/eos/hermes-eos-raise-questions-german-automotive-
manufacturers-climate-change-related-risks/ [https://perma.cc/YSA5-3MQC]. In 2018, several proposals asked 
U.S. car companies—including Ford and GM—to ignore the Trump administration’s rollback of car emissions 
standards. See, e.g., Report on Fleet GHG Emissions and Regulation (F, 2018 
Resolution),  CERES  (2018),  https://engagements.ceres.org/ceres_engagementdetailpage?recID=a0l1H00000C4
DhQQAV  [https://perma.cc/SQK9-R2KY]. One year later, four companies, including Ford, announced in an 
agreement with the state of California that they intended to voluntarily comply with emissions standards, despite the 
federal regulatory rollback. See Timothy Puko & Ben Foldy, Justice Department Launches Antitrust Probe into 
Four Auto Makers, WALL STREET J. (Sept. 6, 2019, 5:55 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/justice-department-
launches-antitrust-probe-into-four-auto-makers-11567778958 (last visited Jan. 28, 2020).  
243. Cf. Lucian Bebchuk & Scott Hirst, The Misguided Attack on Common Ownership, 
Presentation to the Federal Trade Commission on Competition and Consumer Protection in the 21st 
Century 5 (Harvard Public Law Working Paper No. 19-10, 2018), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3298983 
(last visited Mar. 17, 2020) (arguing that “active intervention in business strategy decisions [by 
institutional investors] is implausible and inconsistent with the evidence”).  
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investor consortium threatened companies in the pages of the Financial 
Times: “If necessary, we will deploy all the tools available to us as 
shareholders to require” power companies to decarbonize in line with the 
goals of the Paris Agreement.244 Of course, for those companies whose 
sole profit comes from the sale of fossil fuels, emissions levels are 
inextricably linked to product sales, and significant emissions reductions 
can only be achieved through reduced sales of their product. In the broader 
debate over common ownership, skeptics have doubted the power of 
institutional investors to alter the profit-motivated behavior of corporate 
management. Corporate executives are not legally bound to do what 
shareholders ask of them, so why would they direct their firm away from 
a profit-maximizing objective, particularly when they have their own 
incentives to want to increase share value? In Section A of this Part, each 
of the “shareholder tools” that enable investors to pressure managers into 
diverting from a profit maximizing objective is examined. 
Managers and directors have a fiduciary duty to undertake actions in 
the best interest of their company, and common ownership skeptics have 
additionally suggested this legal requirement inhibits their deviation from 
profit maximizing objectives.245 Further, asset managers themselves may 
be in violation of their own fiduciary duties to underlying beneficiaries—
an objection as yet unraised in the common ownership literature. 
Section B considers these fiduciary duty arguments and explains how the 
law as applied in practice may not hinder investors’ ability to promote 
portfolio-maximizing behavior. 
In addition to providing evidence of their ability to intervene, the 
internalization of portfolio externalities provides institutional investors 
with an incentive to intervene. The corporate governance literature has 
traditionally described institutional investors as poor monitors of 
corporate behavior, rendered powerless by their small relative ownership 
stakes and limited resources for oversight in the face of collective action 
problems. This model, however, has neglected to consider that 
engagements with individual firms can reap benefits at the portfolio level, 
as in the case of externalities. Further, this traditional account of 
institutional investor monitoring additionally omits that investors can 
coordinate amongst one another, sharing the costs of engagements among 
all owners receiving portfolio benefits. Section C amends this model of 
institutional investor “rational reticence.”246 
                                                   
244. Aberdeen et al., Power Companies, supra note 107.  
245. Thomas A. Lambert & Michael E. Sykuta, Calm Down About Common Ownership, 41 
REGULATION 28, 31 (2018); O’Brien & Waehrer, supra note 28, at 765–66. 
246. Gilson & Gordon, supra note 10, at 867. 
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A. Mechanisms for Influencing Managers 
The literature on common ownership’s anticompetitive effects has 
forced institutional investors to adopt a narrow and internally incoherent 
line of argument. Investor representatives proudly highlight their power 
to direct companies to adopt socially desirable objectives, but 
simultaneously insist that there is no plausible mechanism for their 
influence on product pricing.247 For example, at a recent Federal Trade 
Commission (FTC) hearing on common ownership’s anti-competitive 
effects, BlackRock co-founder Barbara Novick discussed corporate 
engagements related to women’s representation on boards, the opioid 
epidemic, and climate change, but emphasized that discussions were 
“never about product pricing.”248 A representative from the AFL-CIO 
similarly insisted its engagements were limited to “acceptable topics” like 
environmental issues, never “about product pricing.”249 The argument 
presented here demonstrates that these “social” objectives of investor 
activism can in fact affect product supply, and therefore pricing. 
Many skeptics doubt the power of institutional investors to alter the 
profit-motivated behavior of corporate management.250 They caution that 
an antitrust response would be premature given the lack of proof 
establishing the causal mechanism that ties common ownership to 
decreased competition.251 However, Einer Elhauge and others have 
identified several pathways by which investors could influence managers 
to undertake portfolio maximizing behavior, including through board 
                                                   
247. See, e.g., Comments from Kenneth A. Bertsch, supra note 25, at 4 (arguing there is “no 
convincing evidence yet on a mechanism by which ‘common ownership’ promotes anti-competitive 
behavior”); BLACKROCK, INDEX INVESTING AND COMMON OWNERSHIP THEORIES (Mar. 2017), 
https://www.blackrock.com/corporate/en-tw/literature/whitepaper/viewpoint-index-investing-and-
common-ownership-theories-eng-march.pdf [https://perma.cc/6DKW-E465] (denying that any 
“plausible causal link between common ownership and higher prices for consumers” had 
been  provided). 
248. Transcript of Competition and Consumer Protection in the 21st Century at 115, U.S. Fed. 
Trade Comm’n (Dec. 6, 2018) [hereinafter Transcript, Competition and Consumer Protection] 
https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/public_events/1422929/ftc_hearings_session_8_transcr
ipt_12-6-18_0.pdf [https://perma.cc/EG6M-D8XN]. 
249. Id. at 91. 
250. Noah Joshua Phillips, Commissioner, Fed. Trade Comm’n, Address at the Global Antitrust 
Economics Conference: Taking Stock: Assessing Common Ownership (June 1, 2018); Edward B. 
Rock & Daniel L. Rubinfeld, Antitrust for Institutional Investors, 82 ANTITRUST L.J. 221, 239 (2018). 
251. Note by the United States to OECD, Hearing on Common Ownership by Institutional 
Investors and Its Impact on Competition, 7–9 (Dec. 6, 2017); Douglas H. Ginsburg & Keith Klovers, 
Common Sense About Common Ownership, CONCURRENCES REV. N° 2-2018 (May 2018) (arguing 
that common ownership claims “simply assume a causal relationship” and that “the mechanism of 
harm is unknown”); Phillips, supra note 250, at 5–6. 
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elections, direct communication, and compensation decisions.252 In recent 
years, each of these three pathways were utilized by institutional investors 
in bringing about their desired climate change related objectives. 
Additionally, shareholder proposals and public statements, which have 
thus far remained undiscussed in the common ownership literature, are 
two more pathways by which investors can exert influence at the 
product  level. 
Board Elections: Some commentators have expressed doubt that 
director elections are a feasible pathway for shareholders to influence 
corporate behavior.253 But this goes against what institutional investors 
themselves have said about director elections. BlackRock’s Larry Fink 
has said that the ability to vote against management serves as an “implicit 
sanction” in the event that a company is not responsive to shareholder 
demands, and that this power has led to “serious” corporate changes.254 
Indeed, after BlackRock voted against two Exxon board members because 
the board had maintained a policy that precluded them from discussing 
climate change risks, the policy was changed, despite the board members 
receiving enough overall shareholder votes to retain their positions.255 In 
advance of the 2019 proxy season, one asset manager publicly advocated, 
through an op-ed in the Financial Times, that peer investors “should fire 
directors who fail to act on climate change.”256 Legal and General, with 
more than $1 trillion in assets under management, has publicly committed 
to vote against the board chairs of a list of companies it has identified as 
climate laggards.257 
At a recent FTC hearing on common ownership, a BlackRock 
representative emphasized that the investor’s engagement focus is on 
                                                   
252. Elhauge, supra note 56, at 33–42. 
253. Rock & Rubinfeld, supra note 250, at 239–40; Hemphill & Kahan, supra note 29, at 30. 
254. Tim Wallace, Index Funds Must Use Their Huge Power Over Companies, Says BlackRock 
Chief Larry Fink, TELEGRAPH (Apr. 29, 2018, 8:43 PM), 
https://www.telegraph.co.uk/business/2018/04/29/index-funds-must-use-huge-power-companies-
says-blackrock-chief/ (last visited Jan. 28, 2020). A State Street governance representative explained: 
“The option of exercising our substantial voting rights in opposition to management provides us with 
sufficient leverage and ensures our views and client interests are given due consideration.” Mike 
Scott, Passive Investment, Active Ownership, FIN. TIMES (Apr. 6, 2014), 
https://www.ft.com/content/7c5f8d60-ba91-11e3-b391-00144feabdc0 (last visited Jan. 27, 2020). 
255. Sorkin, supra note 16. 
256. Natasha Landell-Mills, Investors Should Fire Directors Who Fail to Act on Climate Change, 
FIN. TIMES (Jan. 28, 2019), https://www.ft.com/content/8403fb3a-22df-11e9-b20d-5376ca5216eb 
(last visited Jan. 27, 2020). 
257. Press Release, Legal & General Investment Management Takes Action on Climate Change 
Risks (June 11, 2018) http://www.lgim.com/uk/en/press/2018/legal—-general-investment-
management-takes-action-on-climate-change-risks.html (last visited Jan. 28, 2020). 
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“higher level things,” like the board, governance, and risk management, 
rather than product pricing.258 But power over directorship positions can 
influence product-level decisions. The placement of a climate scientist on 
a fossil fuel company board, for example, might impact production 
decision responses to climate risk. After three years of opposing 
shareholder resolutions requesting the company appoint an “Independent 
Director with Climate Change Expertise,” ExxonMobil announced its 
newest board member would be an atmospheric scientist with just such 
qualifications.259 Investors have argued that the appointment of directors 
“supportive on climate issues” would make it “much easier to rally 
management behind a shareholder resolution that explicitly committed the 
company” to reducing emissions in line with the Paris Agreement.260 
Further, a director seeking to retain her board position might consider that 
the majority of her votes in favor must come from broadly diversified 
shareholders with portfolio-wide interests.261 This consideration might 
naturally encourage the director to pursue corporate objectives more 
aligned with the goals of externality-internalization rather than 
profit  maximization. 
Compensation: Common ownership skeptics have pointed out that 
managers should rationally be reluctant to sacrifice firm profits for 
portfolio returns because their compensation is often tied to corporate 
performance measures.262 However, in the oil and gas industry, executive 
compensation is tied just as tightly to oil prices as it is to relative firm 
valuation.263 In the broader common ownership debate, several studies 
have found that managerial compensation is less likely to be tied to 
relative firm performance when the firm shares more common owners 
with industry competitors.264 As recent climate activism has shown, 
                                                   
258. Transcript, Competition and Consumer Protection, supra note 248, at 115. 
259. Press Release from Interfaith Center on Corporate Responsibility, Shareholders Welcome 
Appointment of Climate Expert to ExxonMobil Board (Jan. 26, 2017), 
https://www.iccr.org/shareholders-welcome-appointment-climate-expert-exxonmobil-board 
[https://perma.cc/4T8N-5JR3].  
260. Landell-Mills, supra note 256. 
261. See, e.g., Azar, supra note 56, at 12–14 (providing theoretical argument that managers seeking 
to maximize vote share for re-election should seek to maximize weighted average of shareholder 
profits from all portfolio companies). 
262. See, e.g., O’Brien & Waehrer, supra note 28, at 733. 
263. Lucas Davis & Catherine Hausman, Are Energy Executives Rewarded for Luck? 1 (Nat’l 
Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 25391, 2018), https://www.nber.org/papers/w25391 
(last visited Mar. 17, 2020). 
264. Miguel Antón et al., Common Ownership, Competition, and Top Management Incentives 2–3 
(Ctr. for Econ. Stud. & Info Inst., Working Paper No. 6178, 2018), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2802332 
(last visited Jan. 28, 2020). The authors point out that managerial wealth is a better measure than 
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investors are capable of directly amending compensation plans to align 
with their objectives. In response to investor pressure Shell announced 
that it planned to link its emissions reductions targets directly with 
executive compensation.265 The remuneration of 1,200 senior employees 
could be affected by this incentive structure.266 BP has announced its 
intention to link the bonuses of 36,000 employees to the achievement of 
emissions reductions.267 BHP, the world’s largest mining company, 
announced that it planned to make concrete reduction targets for its 
“Scope 3” emissions—emissions from the sales of its products.268 The 
achievements of these targets will be tied directly to executive pay. 
Compensation incentives also play a role in Xcel Energy’s emissions 
goals. In 2018, Xcel became the first major U.S. utility to announce a 
commitment to reduce its production of greenhouse gases to zero—setting 
goals of 80% emissions reduction by 2030, and 100% by 2050.269 
Achievement of these targets determines 30% of Xcel executive pay.270 
Like Shell, Xcel has been a target of shareholder engagement through the 
Climate Action 100+ investor initiative.271 
Direct Communications: Institutional investors regularly communicate 
with corporate management on climate related issues, either in face to face 
meetings or through correspondence. BlackRock has argued that 
“meetings behind closed doors can go further than votes against 
                                                   
“flow” pay as it more accurately captures managers’ economic incentives. Applying to the climate 
case study, this suggests that compensation schemes incentivizing externality internalization might 
have to increase annual flow pay to compensate for lost wealth. See also Lantian Liang, Common 
Ownership and Executive Compensation 1 (U. Tex. Dallas, Working Paper, 2016), 
https://acfr.aut.ac.nz/__data/assets/pdf_file/0008/58085/43082-L-Liang-
Common_ownership_V2.pdf [https://perma.cc/2WB7-V7W4]. 
265. Anjli Raval et al., Shell Yields to Investors by Setting Target on Carbon Footprint, FIN. TIMES 
(Dec. 2, 2018), https://www.ft.com/content/de658f94-f616-11e8-af46-2022a0b02a6c (last visited 
Jan. 27, 2020). 
266. Id.  
267. Ivana Kottasová, BP will link bonuses for 36,000 workers to climate targets, CNN BUS. (Feb. 1, 2019), 
https://www.cnn.com/2019/02/01/business/bp-shareholders-paris/index.html [https://perma.cc/E78Y-ZHBP].  
268. Neil Hume, BHP to set targets for reducing customers’ carbon emissions, FIN. TIMES (July 22, 2019), 
https://www.ft.com/content/90b8fdd0-ac87-11e9-8030-530adfa879c2 [https://perma.cc/MBE2-FSDX]. 
269. Press Release, Xcel Energy, Xcel Energy aims for zero-carbon electricity by 2050 (Dec. 4, 2018), 
https://www.xcelenergy.com/company/media_room/news_releases/xcel_energy_aims_for_zero-
carbon_electricity_by_2050 [https://perma.cc/49HM-EE7Q]. 
270. Xcel Energy Executive Compensation Program Aims to Foster Environmental Sustainability, 
CERES, https://www.ceres.org/node/1537 [https://perma.cc/C6S2-KDZ2]. 
271. Tim Sandle, Q&A: How Any Energy Company Can Deliver Zero Carbon Emissions, 
DIGITAL J. (Dec. 9, 2018), http://www.digitaljournal.com/news/environment/q-a-how-any-energy-
company-can-deliver-zero-carbon-emissions/article/538621 [https://perma.cc/3FGY-5L4S]. 
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management.”272 Climate Action 100+ announced its intent to seek 
emissions reduction commitments seeking “private, not public 
proposals.”273 The emissions commitments at Shell were reached through 
discussions directly with management, and were achieved despite being 
rejected by a majority of shareholder votes just months before.274 Asset 
Manager, Legal and General, sent letters to eighty-four companies it 
considered “pivotal” for meeting the Paris Agreement, and met directly 
with more than fifty of them.275 HSBC indicates it undertook hundreds of 
corporate engagements related to the environment in 2018, including 
“long-term decarbonisation plans.”276 
These communications do not always have to be private. Diversified 
investors can also broadcast their desires to companies through public 
statements. In his 2018 letter to CEOs, BlackRock’s Larry Fink told 
companies that he expects their long-term growth strategy to consider “the 
societal impact of your business as well as the ways that broad, structural 
trends [including] climate change” affect growth potential.277 Investor 
members of Climate Action 100+ have penned numerous op-eds in 
financial news publications that clearly state their intentions to require 
industry-wide decarbonization. 
Given that these investors exercise large voting blocks on issues such 
as compensation package approvals and board member elections, it is not 
difficult to see how corporate management would be eager to keep 
investors happy, and investors can indicate their desires directly through 
private and public communications. 
Shareholder Proposals: Shareholder resolutions have thus far escaped 
                                                   
272. Sarah Krouse et al., Meet the New Corporate Power Brokers: Passive Investors, WALL 
STREET J. (Oct. 24, 2016), https://www.wsj.com/articles/the-new-corporate-power-brokers-passive-
investors-1477320101 (last visited Jan. 28, 2020); see also Joseph McCahery et al., Behind the 
Scenes: The Corporate Governance Preferences of Institutional Investors, 71 J. FIN. 2905, 2905 
(2016) (conducting a survey of 143 large institutional investors regarding their corporate engagements 
in the past five years (across all topic areas) and finding that 63% had direct discussions with 
management and 45% had private discussions with a company’s board without management present). 
273. Braham, supra note 89.  
274. Kelly Gilblom, Shell Changes Stance on Carbon as Investors Push for Disclosures, 
BLOOMBERG (Dec. 3, 2018), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-12-03/shell-changes-
stance-on-carbon-as-investors-push-for-disclosures (last visited Jan. 28, 2020). 
275. Press Release, Legal & Investment Management, Legal & General Investment Management Takes Action 
on Climate Change Risks (June 11, 2018), https://www.legalandgeneralgroup.com/media/2511/11062018-lgim-
climate-impact-pledge-final-2.pdf (last visited Jan. 28, 2020). 
276. HSBC GLOBAL ASSET MANAGEMENT, 2018 STEWARDSHIP REPORT 12–13 (2018). 
277. Larry Fink, Larry Fink’s 2018 Letter to CEOs: A Sense of Purpose, BLACKROCK (2018) 
[hereinafter Larry Fink’s 2018 Letter], https://www.blackrock.com/corporate/investor-
relations/2018-larry-fink-ceo-letter [https://perma.cc/W7QK-NDBC].  
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attention in the common ownership literature. First, it is unlikely that an 
institutional investor would ask a company to raise prices and reduce 
supply in a public forum if the intent could be interpreted as collusive and 
oligopolistic. Second, companies are allowed to exclude shareholder 
proposals that micromanage managerial business decisions like product 
pricing. However, emissions reductions proposals at their core seek these 
same outcomes. Indeed, EOG Resources successfully petitioned the SEC 
for permission to exclude an emissions proposal because its core business 
operations, to develop and sell fossil fuels, “cannot be separate from 
emissions,”278 and such commitments would come at the “expense of 
management’s own judgment.”279 The success of institutional investors’ 
climate activism can be seen in the number of shareholder proposals that 
were withdrawn prior to being brought to a vote in recent years: thirty-
eight in 2017 and thirty-nine in 2019.280 Because withdrawn proposals 
signify that the investor has been appeased, they are “one of the best 
indicators of activists’ success.”281 
In the broader common ownership debate, two pathways of 
institutional investor influence for promoting anti-competitive behavior 
have been proposed. The first is that investors actively work to encourage 
management to make monopoly-like decisions, using the shareholder 
tools described above.282 The second is that they do nothing at all, but this 
inaction overwhelms the corrective oversight of active shareholders.283 
Proponents of the latter theory argue that largely passive investors might 
fail to police corporate “laziness,” siding with management by default 
rather than with an activist hedge fund attempting to drive out 
management pursuing insufficiently competitive policies.284 While some 
of the observed anti-competitive effects of common ownership could 
result from a failure to monitor on the part of lazy owner-overseers, the 
                                                   
278. SEC Decision Letter, supra note 150, at 22. 
279. Id. at 6. 
280. See CERES, Engagement Tracker, supra note 13 and accompanying text (providing data from 
Ceres Engagement Tracker).  
281. Virginia Harper Ho, Risk-Related Activism: The Business Case for Monitoring Nonfinancial 
Risk, 41 J. CORP. L. 647, 689 (2016). 
282. See, e.g., Martin C. Schmalz, Common-Ownership Concentration and Corporate Conduct, 10 
ANN. REV. FIN. ECON. 413, 434 (2018) (summarizing the two proposed pathways for observed anti-
competitive effects). 
283. Id. (explaining that common owners might harm competition by “doing nothing” and that 
“investors can be lazy owners . . . and harm competition at the same time”).  
284. Azar Schmalz, & Tecu, supra note 18, at 1552 (“Lazy investors” may not insist on the 
implementation of such expansion strategies and instead let managers get away with the “quiet life 
that comes with choosing suboptimal quantities.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
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portfolio-maximizing account of the recent climate agenda requires 
affirmative action on the part of institutional investors. Rather than casting 
proxy votes that side with the board’s position by default and 
inadvertently rewarding poor management,285 emissions reduction 
advocacy requires voting against corporate boards, and proactive 
engagement on the part of the investor. This account of common owner 
incentives is consistent with Scott Hemphill and Marcel Kahan’s 
argument that the empirical common ownership studies are in fact only 
measuring a common owner’s power to influence management to take 
actions that are firm value decreasing.286 They argue that all empirical 
common ownership studies employ a methodology that tests for changes 
in firm behavior that are in the interest of common owners but contrary to 
the interests of concentrated shareholders.287 Investor pressure to decrease 
emissions beyond the level required by market and regulatory pressures 
is precisely this type of behavior. 
B. Liability for Violation of Fiduciary Duty 
A further proposed limitation to institutional investors’ ability to 
influence firm-specific objectives for the benefit of their portfolio (and the 
detriment of the firm) arises out of fiduciary duties. While shareholders 
are under no legal obligation to vote their shares in the best interest of the 
corporation, and as a general rule owe no fiduciary duties to fellow 
shareholders when exercising their votes,288 asset managers have a duty to 
                                                   
285. See Einer Elhauge, New Evidence, Proofs, and Legal Theories on Horizontal Shareholding 
(Jan. 2018), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3096812 (last visited Jan. 28, 
2020); Dorothy Shapiro Lund, The Case Against Passive Shareholder Voting, 43 J. CORP. L. 101, 
118  (2018). 
286. They argue that, contrary to many of its interpretations, the common ownership economic 
literature is actually only measuring the impact of common owners that have a conflict with non-
common owners of the same firm. Each of these studies use the Modified Herfindahl-Hirshman Index 
(MHHI) as the metric for representing ownership overlap between competing firms, or more 
precisely, MHHI∆ (MHHI Delta). MHHI∆ increases as common ownership increases. The AST study 
found a statistical relationship between increases in MHHI∆ and increase in airline fares. As Hemphill 
and Kahan point out, many have overlooked that the MHHI∆ metric also decreases with the presence 
of non-common owners (NCOs), i.e., concentrated holders in a given firm that hold no ownership 
stakes in that firm’s competitors. What the MHHI∆ metric is actually testing for, they argue, is 
whether the price change outcome results from the power of concentrated common owners (CCOs) 
relative to that of the concentrated owners. The fact that MHHI∆ “increases as CCO ownership goes 
up but decreases as NCO ownership rises” reflects a conflict of interest between CCOs and NCOs. 
Hemphill & Kahan, supra note 29, at 14. 
287. Id.  
288. See, e.g., Tanzer v. Int’l Gen. Indus., Inc., 379 A.2d 1121, 1124 (Del. 1977) (“At a 
stockholders’ meeting, each stockholder represents himself and his own interests solely and in no 
sense acts as a trustee or representative of others . . . .” (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
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their underlying beneficiaries, individual retail investors.289 Further, 
managers and directors have a fiduciary duty to undertake actions in the 
best interest of their company, and sacrificing profits in the service of 
diversified investors likely violates that duty.290 In practice, however, 
these violations of duty may go unpunished by courts and regulators. Each 
case is considered in turn. 
1. Investor Duty to Underlying Beneficiaries 
The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) mandates that 
investment managers have a fiduciary duty of good faith to vote in the 
best interests of their beneficiaries.291 The theory that institutional 
investors vote in the interests of their entire portfolio may not be 
consistent with this duty. Individual beneficiaries whose assets are 
managed by large institutional investors do not necessarily share the same 
portfolio diversity or asset allocation as the institution in charge of voting 
their shares. A voting strategy that minimizes portfolio-wide negative 
externalities is likely not in the best interests of an individual investor 
whose assets are concentrated in the industry generating the externality. 
An individual that has chosen to invest in the Vanguard Energy ETF, for 
example, 20% of which is Exxon stock, might not agree with the climate 
voting strategies desired by an investor in an S&P500 Index Fund, where 
Exxon makes up 1.4%. 
The Department of Labor’s 1994 Interpretive Bulletin provides that 
under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act, which governs the 
management of employee retirement plans, investment managers have a 
duty to split their proxy votes if two different plans have conflicting proxy 
voting policies.292 However, investors typically exercise their votes in 
blocks, rarely splitting their power between funds. In 2014, only 0.04% of 
funds reported making split votes.293 BlackRock individually exhibited 
                                                   
289. See, e.g., Ann M. Lipton, Family Loyalty: Mutual Fund Voting and Fiduciary Obligation, 19 
TENN. J. BUS. L. 175 (2017).  
290. Lambert & Sykuta., supra note 245, at 31; O’Brien & Waehrer, supra note 28, at 765–66. 
291. Disclosure of Proxy Voting Policies and Proxy Voting Records by Registered Management 
Investment Companies, 17 C.F.R. pts. 239, 249, 270, 274 (2003) (“The investment adviser to a mutual 
fund is a fiduciary that owes the fund a duty of . . . good faith . . . . This fiduciary duty extends 
to . . . the voting of proxies relating to the fund’s portfolio securities.”). 
292. See Interpretive Bulletin Relating to Written Statements of Investment Policy, Including Proxy 
Voting Policy or Guidelines, 59 Fed. Reg. 38,860, 38,862 (July 29, 1994) (codified at 29 
C.F.R.  § 2509.94-2). 
293. Scott Hirst, Social Responsibility Resolutions, 43 J. CORP. L 217, 225 n.18 (2018) (citing ISS’s 
Voting Analytics database, which is based on the data released by mutual funds on Form N-PX). 
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split votes 0.018% of the time, Vanguard 0.006%, and StateStreet 0.2% 
of the time.294 A mutual fund found to be voting all of its proxies in service 
to its overall portfolio maximizing objective may be violating its duties to 
beneficiaries of individual funds, but it may be difficult to prove its 
underlying intent, especially given that the practice of voting all funds in 
the same way is customary. 
In 2009, the SEC ruled that an asset manager had violated its duties by 
adopting a pro-labor proxy voting policy across all its funds, including 
those that had not indicated pro-labor preferences, in the hopes of 
attracting future business from union affiliates.295 The agency reasoned 
that while the fund was permitted to adopt a “predetermined voting 
policy,” that policy must be “designed to further the interests of clients 
rather than the adviser.”296 This is the only such enforcement action 
punishing conflicted proxy voting practices, and it hinged upon available 
evidence of the mutual fund’s underlying intention.297 If institutional 
investors are able to provide plausible business-purpose cover for the 
voting strategy, or carry out their objectives behind the scenes and outside 
of the proxy process, their true intentions may go undetected 
and  unpunished. 
Many institutional investors do not face this intra-beneficiary conflict, 
however, because of their investment mandate. Pension funds like 
CalPERS pay out to all plan participants from one giant fund, they do not 
allow beneficiaries to select between asset classes, so each beneficiary’s 
level of diversification is the same. Insurance companies, sovereign 
wealth funds, foundations, and university endowments are similarly 
managed with the singular mandate of maximizing portfolio-wide returns. 
For this category of investors, it is arguable that their fiduciary duties in 
fact require them to use their power to internalize firm-generating 
externalities in order to maximize portfolio returns for their beneficiaries. 
This insight is at odds with a recent spate of criticism from corporate 
commentators arguing that trustee climate activism violates their fiduciary 
duty to avoid using “other people’s money to pursue collateral benefits to 
                                                   
294. Jan Fichtner et al., Hidden Power of the Big Three? Passive Index Funds, Re-concentration 
of Corporate Ownership, and New Financial Risk, 19 BUS. & POL. 298, 316–17 (2017). 
295. INTECH Inv. Mgmt., Admin. Proc. File No. 3-13463 (May 7, 2009), 
https://www.sec.gov/litigation/admin/2009/ia-2872.pdf [https://perma.cc/3JDL-2UEM]. 
296. Id. at 5 (internal quotation marks omitted) (footnote omitted). 
297. Keith Johnson & Cynthia Williams, Fiduciary Duty Guidance for Proxy Voting Reform: SEC 
Roundtable Submission, SEC.GOV (Nov. 15, 2018), https://www.sec.gov/comments/4-725/4725-
4650533-176476.pdf [https://perma.cc/8XVT-S9KK].  
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third parties.”298 
That only certain types of institutional investors face this internal 
conflict of fiduciary duties may explain their varying levels of climate 
engagement. The “Big Three” asset managers, BlackRock, Vanguard, and 
State Street, are not members of ClimateAction 100+, and while they have 
supported some climate related proposals, they have been far less active 
in the space than their peer European funds, pension funds, and insurance 
companies. This may be because, given that these funds tend to vote their 
proxies as a family, and make decisions about engagements at the fund 
family level, they are cautious about using their power to support a certain 
subset of their clientele over another. Of course, one could argue that this 
intentional passivity breaches their duties to those clients that invest 
broadly in a market-mirroring portfolio. 
2. Fiduciary Duties of Managers 
A firm manager is typically said to have a fiduciary duty to manage in 
the best interests of “the corporation and its shareholders.”299 What 
happens when the interest of the corporation and its shareholders diverge? 
Or when different shareholder groups have divergent interests? The 
externality-internalizing measures examined here present a unique 
situation: the majority of (minority) shareholders desire the directors to 
adopt a business strategy that would be share-price decreasing, but 
shareholder portfolio-value maximizing given their diversification. 
The business judgment rule (BJR) protects managers from liability for 
decisions made under “any rational business purpose.”300 Under the BJR, 
a court “begins with the presumption that in making a business decision 
the directors of a corporation acted on an informed basis, in good faith 
and in the honest belief that the action taken was in the best interests of 
the company.”301 Given the BJR’s extreme deference to managers, fossil 
fuel company directors need only supply a reasonable argument for why 
their emissions-reducing decisions ultimately serve the long-term profit-
making interests of the corporation. The increasing acquiescence to 
shareholder demand for climate risk disclosure easily satisfies this 
                                                   
298. Max M. Schanzenbach & Robert H. Sitkoff, ‘Investing for Good’ Meets the Law, WALL ST. 
J. (Dec. 9, 2018), https://www.wsj.com/articles/investing-for-good-meets-the-law-1544396424 (last 
visited Jan. 27, 2020); see also Mackintosh, supra note 140. 
299. N. Am. Cath. Educ. Programming Found., Inc. v. Gheewalla, 930 A.2d 92, 99 (Del. 2007); 
Mills Acquisition Co. v. Macmillan, Inc., 559 A.2d 1261, 1280 (Del. 1989).  
300. Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 954 (Del. 1985). 
301. eBay Domestic Holdings, Inc. v. Newmark, 16 A.3d 1, 36 (Del. Ch. 2010) (quoting Unitrin, 
Inc. v. Am. Gen. Corp., 651 A.2d 1361, 1373 (Del. 1995)). 
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standard: providing shareholders the information they demand guards 
against disgruntled stock sell-offs and assures future access to equity 
financing. Concrete emissions reduction targets, in order to receive BJR 
protection, would similarly need to be justified in market terms. 
Companies may argue that they anticipate aggressive carbon regulation 
and that such targets enable their business model to be an industry leader 
in adapting to these limits. Shell’s announcement of emissions targets 
explained that they were in line with the company’s “strategic ambition” 
to “thrive through the energy transition.”302 A concentrated shareholder 
could attempt to argue that these targets are too excessive, and that in the 
absence of evidence of the imminence of such regulation they amount to 
an unjustified sacrificing of profits. In order to assess this claim, however, 
a court would need to evaluate the reasonableness of directors’ stated 
beliefs about the probability of global greenhouse gas regulations. This is 
precisely the type of judgment substitution that courts are meant to avoid 
under the BJR.303 Whether or not a court could be persuaded to probe more 
deeply given public investor statements suggesting emissions goals are in 
service to their broader portfolio is an open question.304 
C. Incentive to Intervene: Amending Model of Rational Reticence 
The increasing climate activism of institutional investors defies the 
traditional conception of their limited role in corporate governance. 
Broadly diversified investors have been typically described as poor 
monitors of corporate behavior, lacking the incentive and capacity to 
exercise their shareholder power to discipline management.305 Because 
engagement is costly and they own only a small share of each company, 
                                                   
302. Shell Emissions Commitment, supra note 1. 
303. See Bernard S. Sharfman, The Importance of the Business Judgment Rule, 14 N.Y.U. J.L. & 
BUS. 27, 45–47 (2017) (summarizing rationales behind judicial reluctance to second guess 
managerial  expertise).  
304. See Elhauge, supra note 36, at 746 (arguing that the BJR’s protections are limited by the fact 
that “if managers attempted to sacrifice huge amounts of profit, it would be difficult to make even a 
strained argument that their conduct might increase profits in the long run”); Sean Griffith, Opt-In 
Stewardship: Toward an Optimal Delegation of Mutual Fund Voting Authority, 31 n.189 (European 
Corp. Governance Inst. -Law, Working Paper No. 463, 2019), 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3404298 (last visited Mar. 17, 2020) 
(suggesting that a court could treat “the intentional imposition of harm [through externality 
internalization] as the equivalent of waste, which, because it cannot be ratified except by unanimous 
shareholder consent” would make the action illegal if not supported by shareholder unanimity) (citing 
Michelson v. Duncan, 407 A.2d 211 (Del. 1979)). 
305. Bebchuk et al., supra note 9, at 102; Rock, Institutional Investors in Corporate Governance, 
supra note 9, at 12; Rock, The Logic and (Uncertain) Significance, supra note 9. 
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they are “rationally reticent” and decline to spend resources on 
interventions that produce only small returns to their portion of 
ownership, opting instead to assess proposals brought by hedge funds with 
concentrated stakes.306 This traditional model, however, neglects to 
consider that a firm-specific engagement can reap wider portfolio-wide 
returns, justifying the monitoring resources spent. Further, in emphasizing 
the costs of engagement, scholars have neglected to observe that 
institutional investors are able to coordinate action among large coalitions. 
In this way, they spread engagement expenses, like the cost of filing a 
resolution, among the wider group of beneficiaries. Seen from this 
perspective, institutional investor climate action is an example of firm-
level interventions whose returns overcome the collective action 
disincentive to play a monitoring role. 
As institutional investors grew in size through the 1980s and 90s, 
corporate governance scholars began to predict that they might develop 
into a solution to the classic Berle and Means’s problem of the separation 
of ownership from control.307 Because dispersed retail investors’ 
ownership stakes were now concentrated under the oversight of fund 
managers, this large ownership share might justify spending resources on 
firm monitoring in order to seek out higher returns.308 More recently, 
however, scholars agree that these predictions have not been borne out. 
Ronald Gilson and Jeffrey Gordon, noting the scholarship predicting that 
institutional investors would serve as effective monitors of management, 
conclude that, in actuality, they have “continually failed to play this 
role.”309 Justice Strine has written that “the segment of the investment 
community that is best positioned to vote with an eye toward sustainable 
value creation is the least active in exercising voice and judgment in 
American corporate governance.” 310 
                                                   
306. Gislon & Gordon, supra note 10, at 867 (describing institutional investors’ governance 
approach as “rationally reticent”). 
307. Berle, supra note 30, at 81 (identifying the growing crisis of managerial accountability and 
identifying the “rational apathy” problem, wherein each individual investor owns too small a share of 
a given company to justify spending effort supervising management). The costs spent by one investor 
in exercising control (usually in the form of researching and casting a proxy vote) are greater than 
any eventual benefits she could receive from her share of higher corporate returns. Id. 
308. See, e.g., Bernard Black, The Value of Institutional Investor Monitoring: The Empirical 
Evidence, 39 UCLA L. REV. 895 (1992); Alfred Conard, Beyond Managerialism: Investor 
Capitalism?, 22. U. MICH. J. L. REFORM 117 (1988). 
309. Gilson & Gordon, supra note 10, at 888, 878 n.46 (noting that literature in the 1970s 
recognized the increasing ownership concentration of pension funds but “greatly overestimated how 
active pension funds would be in corporate governance”). 
310. Leo E. Strine, Jr., Can We Do Better by Ordinary Investors? A Pragmatic Reaction to the 
Dueling Ideological Mythologists of Corporate Law, 114 COLUM. L. REV. 449, 477–78 (2014). 
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The explanation given for why institutional investors have failed to 
serve as corporate stewards is that, despite their size, they nevertheless 
lack the capacity and the incentive to intervene. All funds incur costs by 
becoming informed on issues raised in a proxy vote, and these costs are 
passed on to underlying beneficiaries in the form of higher fees. As funds 
compete with one another to attract investors, there is pressure to keep 
fees, and thus personnel, at a minimum.311 Dorothy Lund argues that the 
teams devoted to corporate engagement and proxy voting at the largest 
index funds are “understaffed” and could not possibly research each of 
tens of thousands of proxy votes that they cast each year.312 Critics suggest 
the limited resources institutional investors devote to governance 
initiatives necessarily implies that they employ a lazy default voting 
strategy, or blindly follow the recommendation of a hired shareholder 
advisory service.313 
Further, much like the individual stockholders they have replaced, 
institutional investors face their own collective action problems. While 
investment funds may own a large amount of stock relative to other 
shareholders, they rarely own more than 10% of any one company.314 This 
leads to two related incentive problems: the “free-rider dilemma” wherein 
one investor must spend substantial resources to research, support, or 
advocate a certain position in a proxy fight, but the eventual gains made 
from that engagement accrue to other investors;315 and the “rational 
apathy” problem, wherein the costs spent by one institution in undertaking 
a governance intervention or proxy fight are greater than the eventual 
benefits it receives.316 
Gilson and Gordon present a cost benefits analysis meant to 
demonstrate why institutional investors decline to make interventions in 
the companies they own: 
Assume a major position by the fund, 3% of total assets, that 
represents a 5% ownership interest in the portfolio company, and 
                                                   
311. Lucian A. Bebchuk & Scott Hirst, Index Funds and the Future of Corporate Governance: 
Theory, Evidence, and Policy 12 (European Corp. Governance Inst., Working Paper Series in Law 
No. 433, 2018). 
312. Lund, supra note 285, at 124. 
313. Id. 
314. Gilson & Gordon, supra note 10, at 868–69. 
315. Roberta Romano, Institutional Shareholders and Corporate Governance in the U.S., in 
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN THE U.S. AND EUROPE: WHERE ARE WE NOW? 52, 55 (Geoffrey Owen 
et al. eds., 2006); Robert C. Pozen, The Role of Institutional Investors in Curbing Corporate Short-
Termism, FIN. ANALYSTS J., at 10 (Sept./Oct. 2015). 
316. Lisa M. Fairfax, The Future of Shareholder Democracy, 84 IND. L. REV. 1259, 1268–69 
(2009); Rock, Significance of Institutional Shareholder Activism, supra note 9. 
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an intervention that results in a 10% gain in the portfolio 
company’s stock price. The gain in the fund’s assets will be 0.3% 
(a 10% increase in a 3% position); 95% of the benefit from the 
fund’s actions goes to others, yet the fund may pay 100% of the 
costs, which will reduce its 0.3% gain.317 
Under their proposed model, governance is “split between specialists”: 
activist investors that specialize in monitoring company strategy and 
presenting alternatives to institutional investors, and institutional 
investors that specialize in “portfolio management” and in “evaluating 
proposals presented by activist investors.”318 Some have argued that even 
the assumption that institutional investors rationally evaluate activist 
proposals gives them too much credit. Lund argues that the broad 
diversification of large passive investors renders them especially unlikely 
to improve performance in a single portfolio company.319 
Institutional investors do face collective action problems when 
weighing the costs and benefits of becoming informed enough to 
effectively engage on a given firm-specific issue. However, any accurate 
model of the agency costs of institutional investors must account for the 
investors’ motivations at the portfolio level, rather than the firm level. 
Gilson and Gordon’s model fails to consider that while an activist with a 
concentrated stake in a specific firm will measure the benefits of an 
intervention in terms of the returns to that firm, a diversified investor will 
observe impacts at the portfolio level. 
Gilson and Gordon’s cost-benefit analysis of governance intervention 
must be adapted. Consider the following hypothetical: 
This fund has the same major position, 3% of total assets, 
representing a 5% ownership interest in the portfolio company, 
and considers an intervention that results in a 20% loss in the 
portfolio company’s stock price. The loss in the fund’s assets will 
be 0.6% (a 20% decrease in a 3% position). But, assume further 
that this intervention results in a 5% increase in 50% of the funds’ 
portfolio assets –the gain to the fund’s assets will be 2.5% (a 3% 
increase in a 50% position). If the cost of the intervention is less 
than 1.9% of the fund’s total assets, the fund will proceed with 
the intervention. Of course, 95% of the loss from the fund’s 
actions accrues to the other shareholders, so it will be unlikely to 
pass, unless there are other large blockholders whose portfolio 
assets will benefit from the intervention. 
                                                   
317. Gilson & Gordon, supra note 10, at 892 n.102. 
318. Id. at 897. 
319. Lund, supra note 285, at 119. 
04 Condon.docx (Do Not Delete) 4/28/20  6:39 PM 
64 WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 95:1 
 
Diversified investors are unlikely to invest resources in many firm-
specific interventions because the cost of the intervention does not justify 
the benefits at a portfolio-level. Researching a particular vote that 
increases the competitive edge of a given firm will likely just eat into the 
profits of that firm’s competitor. The portfolio-wide impacts will be 
neutral, or even negative, as increased competition leads to diminished 
overall profits. In certain cases, however, the cost of firm-specific 
intervention may be overcome by benefits accruing to the wider portfolio. 
Because institutional investors increasingly hold portfolios that mirror 
one another’s asset diversification,320 they share similar portfolio-wide 
optimization incentives. Firm-level interventions that benefit the broader 
portfolio are in their common interest. This is especially true of 
interventions that require a coordinated effort across firms, as in the case 
of limiting fossil fuel production. In order to reduce leakage effects, 
reduction in supply only results in lower emissions if it is undertaken over 
a large enough portion of the industry (or accompanied simultaneously 
with reductions in demand from fuel consumers). For this reason, 
investors have an incentive to coordinate their efforts in engaging with 
firms across their portfolio in order to share the cost of their interventions. 
There is evidence that institutional investors are doing just this type of 
coordination through coalitions like Climate Action 100+.321 Individual 
members are tasked with specific firms to target, dividing up leadership 
on the issue, with certain investors focusing on certain regions and 
industries.322 UBS, for example, is “directly involved in 30 coalitions of 
investors within Climate Action 100+ and leads five of the company 
dialogues across regions.”323 
                                                   
320. See Backus et al., supra note 55. 
321. See, e.g., Press Release, Ceres, Nearly 400 Investors with $32 Trillion in Assets Step Up 
Action on Climate Change (Sept. 14, 2018), https://www.ceres.org/news-center/press-
releases/nearly-400-investors-32-trillion-assets-step-action-climate-change [https://perma.cc/BGZ4-
UZ29] (quoting Manulife’s CIO, “The Investor Agenda provides a powerful framework for us to 
collaborate with our peers to reduce the absolute risk in the capital markets from climate change”). 
322.  Braham, supra note 89; HERMES EOS, 2017 ANNUAL VOTING AND ENGAGEMENT REPORT 
10 (2017), https://www.hermes-investment.com/ukw/wp-content/uploads/sites/80/2018/03/annual-
report-2017.pdf [https://perma.cc/7355-PHLE] (one fund indicated that it “volunteered to lead the 
dialogue with several high carbon-emitting companies” as part of its participation in the initiative); 
Frequently Asked Questions, CLIMATE ACTION 100+, supra note 86 (explaining that investors 
“nominate which companies they would like to engage” and they are assigned to target certain 
companies based on “consideration of previous history of engagement . . . geographic proximity, 
investor capacity and stock holding over the term of the initiative”); see also HSBC Global Asset 
Management, supra note 276, at 5 (noting HSBC is tasked with leading Climate Action 100+ initiative 
in four regions). 
323. Condon & Piani, supra note 178. 
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III. IMPLICATIONS OF DIVERSIFIED SHAREHOLDER 
OBJECTIVES 
Thus far, this Article has provided a positive account of institutional 
investors’ portfolio perspectives, explaining just how and why investors 
seek emissions reductions. The Article now turns to considering the 
broader implications of this portfolio-level incentive and power, in the 
service of developing a normative response to the phenomenon of 
common ownership. 
The externality-internalizing objective of diversified investors presents 
a challenge to the assumption that shareholders uniformly desire share 
price maximization. This assumption underlies the theoretical economic 
rationales for why managers should serve shareholder interests and why 
shareholders hold sole voting powers in the corporation. In cases where 
the existing literature has recognized a divergence between the interests 
of diversified and undiversified shareholders, most scholars have argued 
that the goals of diversified shareholders are more closely aligned with 
that of society, and so should be prioritized. This claim may not hold true 
once the inter-firm effects of diversified ownership are accounted for. 
While common ownership internalization of negative externalities is a 
positive welfare effect when considered in isolation, there are reasons to 
be cautious about embracing this phenomenon as socially desirable. First, 
the net welfare effects of common ownership are yet to be fully considered 
and debated. Its positive effects, such as pollution reduction and 
innovation generation, must be weighed against its negative effects, like 
a dampening of competition and monopsony pricing in the labor market. 
Further, the ability of asset managers to “self-regulate” suggests this 
concentration of power can function as a form of private governance, 
raising important questions regarding democratic accountability and the 
potential to displace the role of “traditional” government. Sections A and 
B consider the net welfare effects of common ownership and the private 
governance implications of market power. Section C turns to explaining 
how newfound consideration of diversified investor incentives challenges 
“the normative foundation for corporate law theory.”324 
A. Welfare Effects 
While there is a growing understanding of the economic distortions that 
can result from the centralization of corporate control brought about by 
common ownership, further empirical and theoretical work is needed in 
order to accurately assess the phenomenon’s net welfare effects. The anti-
                                                   
324. Hayden & Bodie, supra note 34, at 1218 n.1 (referring to shareholder primacy). 
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competitive supply and pricing decisions brought about by diversified 
investors acting as “one large superfirm”—undesirable from a societal 
perspective—has received the most scholarly attention, but further study 
is needed in a broader array of industries.325 This Article outlines one 
positive welfare effect that can occur: the internalization of negative 
externalities. Miguel Anton and co-authors have proposed an additional 
“bright side” of common ownership: greater investment in innovation.326 
Research and development spending that results in innovation spillovers 
are positive externalities, desirable for an economy-wide owner.327 
Similarly, one might expect that common owners would encourage 
companies to invest more in employee training as there is no loss, from a 
portfolio perspective, if the employee departs to work at another firm.328 
In their paper advocating for legal limitations on common ownership, 
Eric Posner, Glen Weyl, and Fiona Scott Morton concede that their 
proposed policy to break up large funds would deprive society of some of 
the benefits of investment diversification.329 They argue, nevertheless, 
that this cost would be outweighed by the benefit of decreasing the 
societal deadweight loss of anti-competitive pricing. Their (admittedly 
rough) cost-benefit analysis neglects to consider a variety of other costs 
and benefits that stem from the rise of common ownership. Posner et al.’s 
proposal “conservative[ly]” generates $60 billion in annual benefits.330 
However, publicly traded companies generate two-thirds of all the 
emissions that contribute to the potential trillions of dollars of climate 
damage expected in the coming decades. Thwarting the ability of 
institutional investors to maximize portfolio returns may have the effect 
of abandoning these benefits of the internalization of climate externalities. 
Robert Monks and Nell Minow first coined the term “universal owner” 
to describe investors that are significantly diversified across the entire 
economy such that they have a long-term interest in the health of the 
economy as a whole, as opposed to the relative performance of one firm 
                                                   
325. Azar, supra note 56, at 30. 
326. Antón et al., supra note 24. 
327. Id.; see also López & Vives, supra note 24. 
328. A decrease in production coordination failures might be an additional positive effect. 
Competing firms have an incentive to hide their production plans from other producers and in the 
absence of this information individual producers might collectively under or over produce relative to 
demand. Common owners suffer from this inefficient loss and have an incentive to increase 
information sharing and coordination among competing producers. JOSEPH STIGLITZ, WHITHER 
SOCIALISM? 91 (1994). 
329. Posner et al., supra note 17, at 717–21. 
330. Id. at 730. 
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over another.331 Minow and Monks explained that the holdings of 
universal owners: 
are so diversified that they have the incentive to represent the 
ownership sector (and the economy) generally rather than any 
specific industries or companies. This endows them with a 
breadth of concern that naturally aligns with the public interest. 
For example, pension funds can be concerned with vocational 
education, pollution, and retraining, whereas an owner with a 
perspective limited to a particular company or industry would 
consider these to be unacceptable expenses because of 
competitiveness problems.332 
Of course, the world’s largest investors are not “universal owners” of the 
entire economy; they are “universal owners” of investment assets, which 
is not the same thing. They care about how externalized costs affect their 
portfolio, not how they affect consumers, or employees, or subsistence 
farmers on the other side of the world.333 Indeed, the executive director of 
the Council of Institutional Investors (CII), Ken Bertsch, neglected this 
fact when arguing to the FTC that investors’ status as “universal owners” 
would make their encouragement of collusion irrational. Because his 
members own “the whole publicly listed economy,” he argued, their 
interest is “in the prospering of the economy broadly.”334 Therefore, he 
concluded, “it does not stand to reason that a universal owner would 
encourage anticompetitive behavior in certain industries (e.g., airlines and 
banks) at the expense of other companies in their portfolios and to the 
economy more generally.”335 His position neglects to acknowledge that 
firms acting in concert can use their market power to shift surplus away 
from consumers and labor and toward portfolio capital. 
While the world’s largest investors may have an economic incentive to 
                                                   
331. MONKS & MINOW, supra note 22. 
332. Id. 
333. At base this boils down to a division of interests between those who hold capital and those 
who do not (i.e., labor). Indeed, Einer Elhauge, Eric Posner, and Glen Weyl all argue that the rise of 
horizontal shareholding has contributed to America’s growing wealth inequality crises. Elhauge, 
supra note 17, at 1291–1301; Eric Posner & E. Glen Weyl, Mutual Funds’ Dark Side, SLATE (Apr. 
16, 2015), https://slate.com/news-and-politics/2015/04/mutual-funds-make-air-travel-more-
expensive-institutional-investors-reduce-competition.html [https://perma.cc/K829-K5H5]. A recent 
paper attempts to model the labor effects of oligopolistic industries combined with common 
ownership. The authors conclude that the net labor effects depend on the “relative levels of the 
elasticities of labor supply and product substitution.” JOSÉ AZAR & XAVIER VIVES, OLIGOPOLY, 
MACROECONOMIC PERFORMANCE, AND COMPETITION POLICY 3 (2018), 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3177079 (last visited Jan. 28, 2020). 
334. Transcript, Competition and Consumer Protection, supra note 248, at 149. 
335. Bertsch, supra note 25, at 5. 
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mitigate the harms climate change impose on their portfolios, this 
incentive is not aligned with the socially optimal level of emissions 
reduction. Many of the most extreme costs of climate change will be borne 
by those that do not participate in the global economy, and certainly not 
the economy that is reflected in asset valuation. This division can be 
illustrated by considering the divergence between BlackRock’s monetary 
incentive for emissions reduction, the reduced harms to its portfolio which 
was calculated to be $8.2 billion, supra, and the social value of these same 
emissions reductions as determined by the U.S. Interagency Working 
Group (IWG) on Social Cost of Greenhouse Gases under the Obama 
Administration. Based on the IWG’s social cost of carbon, valued at $36 
per ton (and increasing with time), the net present value of a 0.77% 
permanent annual reduction in emission is worth $913 billion.336 This 
$906 billion divergence between how the global population and the 
massive asset manager value the externality reduction serves as an 
indication that investor action to combat climate change will most 
certainly not be “enough” from the perspective of the global population. 
What about externalities beyond climate change? Localized pollutants? 
Or gun sales? Or reductions in employee training? Asset owners care 
about some externalities more than others, and it all depends on the 
aggregate impact on their portfolio of investments. Indeed, that is why 
common ownership can result in both the socially desirable internalization 
of climate externalities and the socially undesirable collusion to raise 
prices, resulting in deadweight welfare loss. 
Beyond the fact that the ideal level of externality reduction is less for 
capital owners than the general population, institutional investors face 
many barriers to implementing their own interests in externality 
internalization. There are massive information gathering costs as well as 
methodological impediments to determining the “ideal” allocation of 
resources from the viewpoint of an economy-wide monopolist. While a 
monopolist may want to exercise its monopsony power to exploit labor, 
for example, it only wants to do this at the level that does not diminish 
consumer demand to the point of cutting into profits.337 Optimal 
performance would require a general equilibrium model, which can 
                                                   
336. INTERAGENCY WORKING GROUP ON SOCIAL COST OF GREENHOUSE GASES, UNITED STATES 
GOVERNMENT, TECHNICAL SUPPORT DOCUMENT: TECHNICAL UPDATE OF THE SOCIAL COST OF 
CARBON FOR REGULATORY IMPACT ANALYSIS UNDER EXECUTIVE ORDER 12,866 (2016). 
337. See, e.g., AZAR & VIVES, supra note 333, at 2 (modeling the macroeconomic employment 
effects that result from oligopoly and common ownership and referring to the feedback effect of 
diminishing consumer wealth leading to declining demand as a “Ford effect” like Henry’s 
commitment to paying his workers enough to afford the cars they built).  
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simultaneously solve for all outcomes in the market, but does not exist in 
a perfect form.338 Indeed, federal agencies face this same challenge when 
attempting to determine the economy-wide costs and benefits of a 
proposed regulation. Regulatory impact analyses often consider only first-
order effects of regulations on a given industry, and ignore secondary or 
tertiary spill-over effects to other markets when they are assumed to be 
small, or impossible to determine.339 The small staff size of some 
institutional investors’ corporate governance teams does not imply that 
they cannot consider portfolio-wide impacts when voting shares, but it 
might mean that they are not very good at it.340 
                                                   
338. See, e.g., FRANK M. MACHOVEC, PERFECT COMPETITION AND THE TRANSFORMATION OF 
ECONOMICS 40 (1995) (“The idea of achieving the socially-optimal bliss point of Walrasian general 
equilibrium requires the analyst to abstract himself into a world of perfect information.”); Letter from 
the Sci. Advisory Bd. (SAB), to E. Scott Pruitt, Admin., U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency 1 (Sept. 
29,  2017)  [hereinafter  Letter  from  SAB],  https://yosemite.epa.gov/sab/sabproduct.nsf/0/4B3BA
F6C9EA6F503852581AA0057D565/$File/EPA-SAB-17-012.pdf [https://perma.cc/PN4E-B7A7] 
(“The ideal [GE] model would include fine-grained treatment of: (1) industries and products; (2) 
production processes; (3) geographic regions; (4) skills and occupations of workers; and (5) other 
demographic characteristics. No such model currently exists, nor are adequate data available to build 
one.”). 
339. NAT’L CTR. FOR ENVTL. ECON. OFFICE OF POLICY U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, GUIDELINES 
FOR PREPARING ECONOMIC ANALYSES 8-2–8-6 (2014) (comparing the use of partial equilibrium 
analysis of effects in one market with general equilibrium (GE) analysis of economy-wide multi-
market effects); Letter from SAB, supra note 338 (recommending against the use of GE modeling in 
the regulatory impact analyses of air regulations). 
340. By this I mean to engage with objections, such as those made by Ed Rock, that institutional 
investors would not rationally encourage collusion in the airline industry because they also own the 
many companies that purchase airline tickets, who would be hurt by higher prices. See Vito J. 
Racanelli, Don’t Tread on Big Investors, BARRON’S (Sept. 7, 2018), 
https://www.barrons.com/articles/dont-tread-on-big-investors-1536340556 [https://perma.cc/VFY9-
H6PS] (summarizing Rock’s position); Lambert & Sykuta, supra note 245 at 31–32 (raising similar 
inter-industry diversification argument). While Rock is correct that portfolio-wide anti-competitive 
effects would generate deadweight losses that would take away from portfolio maximization, so long 
as those companies are able to pass some of their costs on to consumers, and the overall net result is 
that portfolio companies on average generate higher profits, institutional investors would still find 
collusion desirable. An omniscient portfolio manager desires any intervention whose net secondary, 
tertiary, quaternary, etc., effects result in capital’s share of income increasing over labor’s share. But 
the portfolio manager doesn’t need to be actually omniscient to pursue this agenda in an imprecise 
manner. Like federal agencies, the manager can calculate first order effects and assume (or hope) the 
economy-wide reverberations are net positive to capital.  
The debate over the implications of the Azar et al. study has prompted some commentators to claim 
that index funds are one step away from socialism. Matt Bruenig writes that arguments against the 
Azar findings are “proof of concept” that a single institution can own the entire economy without a 
breakdown in the allocative efficiency of markets—a “simulated competition scheme[]” like Oskar 
Lange. Matt Bruenig, Index Funds Are a Proof of Concept for Market Socialism, PEOPLE’S POLICY 
PROJECT (Aug. 17, 2017), https://www.peoplespolicyproject.org/2017/08/17/index-funds-are-a-
proof-of-concept-for-market-socialism/ [https://perma.cc/68RG-X8Z9]; see also RUDOLF 
HILFERDING, FINANCE CAPITAL: A STUDY OF THE LATEST PHASE OF CAPITALIST DEVELOPMENT 367 
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B. Market Concentration and Investor as Regulator 
By facilitating a coordinated decline in the supply of fossil fuel 
company products, institutional investors are encouraging a rise in the 
price of those products, through much the same mechanism they employ 
to encourage anticompetitive pricing. Zephyr Teachout and Lina Khan 
have analogized monopoly pricing to the levying of a tax: both generate 
deadweight loss, and both transfer value away from the consumer/citizen 
into the hands of the monopolist/regulator.341 In addition to collecting 
revenue, governments use taxes in order to adjust for the deadweight loss 
generated by negative externalities: in this case, the tax adds the social 
marginal cost to the price of the good and brings the market back into 
efficiency.342 From this view, institutional investors’ imposition of 
emissions goals at the producer level can be analogized to a carbon tax, 
except the increased costs paid by consumers from the higher price are 
collected as corporate profits rather than revenue for the government. 
Producers incur their own losses in both scenarios—some portion of a 
carbon tax is borne by suppliers, how much depends on the elasticities of 
the supply and demand curves.343 Under the coordinated decrease in 
supply, suppliers sell fewer products, but at a higher price. The net effect 
on profits depends, again, on the elasticity of the demand curve. Overall, 
the same desired outcome may be achieved (the socially optimal 
production of fossil fuels), but by organizing a supply-side restriction this 
outcome is reached without having to lose any revenue to taxes. 
 
 
                                                   
(1981 Routledge & Kegan Paul) (arguing that finance’s gradual consolidation of the entire economy 
into the control of a few actors “facilitates enormously the task of overcoming capitalism”); Arjun 
Jayadev et al., The Political Economic of Financialization in the United States, Europe and India, 49 
DEV. & CHANGE 353, 357 (2018) (“If professional managers can reliably administer corporation in 
the interests of shareholders in general, it is only a small step further to suggest they could administer 
them in the interest of society as a whole.”). No less than Berle and Means, perhaps surprisingly to 
those who cite them in arguments in support of shareholder maximization theory, conclude The 
Modern Corporation with the prediction that “[i]t is conceivable,—indeed it seems almost essential 
if the corporate system is to survive,— that the ‘control’ of the great corporations should develop into 
a purely neutral technocracy, balancing a variety of claims by various groups in the community and 
assigning to each a portion of the income stream on the basis of public policy rather than private 
cupidity.” BERLE & MEANS, supra note 30, at 312 (emphasis added); cf. STIGLITZ, supra note 328 
(explaining the impossibility of functional market socialism as proposed by Lange and others). 
341. Teachout & Khan, supra note 30, at 56 (citing Arnold Kling, The Problem of Monopoly, 
ARNOLDKLING.COM, http://arnoldkling.com/econ/markets/monopoly.html  
[https://perma.cc/2AG2-9JAW]). 
342. See, e.g., Steven Shavell, Corrective Taxation versus Liability as a Solution to the Problem of 
Harmful Externalities, 54 J.L. & ECON. S249, S249 (2011). 
343. Michael Waggoner, Why and How to Tax Carbon, 20 COLO. J. INT’L ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 1, 5  (2008). 
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Figure 1: 
Government Imposed Pigouvian Tax 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2: 
Investor-Imposed Supply-Side Restriction 
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The power to “self-regulate” is the power to play a government-like 
role without the government’s accountability to a democratic electorate.344 
While this self-regulation may serve socially desirable ends, it necessarily 
implies the power to do much more. Larry Fink’s 2019 annual letter to 
CEOs explained that stakeholders, like BlackRock, “are pushing 
companies to wade into sensitive social and political issues – especially 
as they see governments failing to do so effectively.”345 However, the 
insight that self-regulation of externalities through market power can cost 
less, from a portfolio perspective, than implementation of a Pigouvian tax, 
suggests that investors may in fact have an incentive to preempt 
government action. 
This Article makes a new contribution to the literature on voluntary 
corporate reduction of environmental harm, what Michael Vandenbergh 
calls “private environmental governance.”346 Vandenbergh has observed 
that “[p]rivate-private interactions now generate many of the 
environmental requirements that affect corporate . . . behavior, and 
ultimately environmental quality.”347 He and others have thoroughly 
documented the growing number of examples of private environmental 
governance, noting the environmental provisions in certification and 
labeling programs, lending standards, supply chain contracts, credit 
agreements, and industry association membership requirements.348 
Several explanations have been advanced for the existence of these private 
                                                   
344. Teachout & Khan, supra note 30, at 55 (“We are saying that when you have one company or 
small group of dominant companies making decisions that effectively set standards for the rest of the 
industry, those outcomes take on the character of governance. The crucial difference, of course, is 
that corporations, unlike government, are not accountable to the public.”). 
345. Letter from Larry Fink, Chairman and Chief Exec. Officer, BlackRock, to CEOs (2019), 
https://www.blackrock.com/corporate/investor-relations/2019-larry-fink-ceo-
letter  [https://perma.cc/J6EM-TQVC]. 
346. Michael P. Vandenbergh, Private Environmental Governance, 99 CORNELL L. REV. 129, 174 
(2013) (“When private parties manage common pool resources, supply environmental public goods, 
or reduce negative externalities by playing the standard-setting, implementing, monitoring, and 
enforcing functions traditionally reserved for the government, these private activities are worthy of 
attention by public law scholars.”). 
347. Id. at 133. 
348. Michael P. Vandenbergh, The Private Life of Public Law, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 2029 (2005) 
[hereinafter Vandenberg, The Private Life]; Michael P. Vandenbergh, The New Wal-Mart Effect: The 
Role of Private Contracting in Global Governance, 54 UCLA L. REV. 913 (2007).  
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governance schemes. First, many of these initiatives exist in complement 
to, or in the shadow of, public law.349 They exist, for example, in order to 
preemptively avoid liability imposed by an environmental statute. Or they 
are an appeal to consumer preference for environmentally friendly 
products. Or, relatedly, they are a reaction to environmental activist 
campaigns and motivated by the desire to avoid bad publicity. 
Commentators have largely neglected to consider an additional 
explanatory incentive for this trend: the influence of diversified investor 
self-interest. Under this explanation, private investors respond to the 
absence of government regulation, rather than its presence. Further, this 
explanation is consistent with traditional theories of utility-maximizing 
market actors.350 
Externalities have typically been seen as classic example of market 
failure, requiring government intervention.351 No one market actor has the 
authority or incentive to internalize the costs of an externality, and so the 
state must regulate to fix the market failure. However, in the current 
political climate, the present administration has signaled that it intends to 
take no such action to address either the systematic lack of risk 
accounting,352 or the harms that arise from climate-related damages. 
Instead, the world’s largest asset managers, each controlling assets 
equivalent to that of major developed economies, have begun to serve as 
“surrogate regulators.”353 Their unprecedented size and breadth enables 
                                                   
349. Vandenbergh, The Private Life, supra note 348, at 2030 (citing Robert H. Mnookin & Lewis 
Kornhauser, Bargaining the Shadow of the Law: The Case of Divorce, 88 YALE L. J. 950, 952–56 
(1979)); see also Eric W. Orts, Reflexive Environmental Law, 89 NW. U. L. REV. 1227, 1231–
32  (1995). 
350. As opposed to the explanations, like consumer preference for environmental protection, that 
are arguably more driven by social norms, like guilt or duty, and “distinct from the typical market 
behavior studied by private law scholars.” Vandenbergh, supra note 346, at 181–82 (noting that while 
these norms could be included in a model of market behavior “doing so takes economics a long way 
from standard applications of models involving rational actors seeking to maximize  utility”). 
351. RICHARD N. L. ANDREWS, MANAGING THE ENVIRONMENT, MANAGING OURSELVES: A 
HISTORY OF AMERICAN ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY 2 (1999) (“[G]overnment involvement in 
environmental issues is both necessary and inevitable . . . .”). 
352. SEC Commissioner Robert Jackson recently admitted that the SEC was not adequately 
handling the financial risks of climate change, but that the issue was not high on the current SEC 
commissioner’s agenda. Benjamin Hulac, SEC commissioner wants to prioritize climate disclosure, 
E&E CLIMATE WIRE (June 1, 2018), https://www.eenews.net/climatewire/2018/06/01/stories/10600
83177 (last visited Jan. 28, 2020). 
353. Cf. Davis Hess, Public Pensions and the Promise of Shareholder Activism for the Next 
Frontier of Corporate Governance: Sustainable Economic Development, 2 VA. L. & BUS. REV. 221, 
235 (2007) (“Why Harness Public Pension Funds as Surrogate Regulators?” (quoting Neil 
Gunningham et al., Harnessing Third Parties as Surrogate Regulators: Achieving Environmental 
Outcomes by Alternative Means, 8 BUS. STRATEGY & ENV’T 211, 212–19 (1999))). BlackRock’s 
portfolio alone, presently larger than the GDP of Japan, is projected to grow by 2025 to $16 trillion, 
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them to serve this role in a way never before observed. 
 
 
While we may celebrate the ability of institutional investors to combat 
climate change, or hope that they might address other social ills,354 we 
should question the desirability of a democratically unaccountable 
financial behemoth making centralized resource allocation decisions. 
Several commentators have likened the growth of asset managers to the 
power wielded by trusts in the Gilded Age.355 Justice Douglas, in a 1948 
dissent from the Supreme Court’s decision to allow a steel industry 
merger, argued that the case was at heart about how much power steel 
executives should be permitted to wield, rather than the immediate 
economic impacts of the merger: “That power . . . can be benign or it can 
be dangerous . . . . [A]ll power tends to develop into a government in 
itself. Power that controls the economy should be in the hands of elected 
representatives of the people, not in the hands of an 
industrial  oligarchy.”356 
It may be possible to design a legal regime that encourages the positive 
effects of common ownership, like the diminution of systemic risks, while 
simultaneously preventing harmful anti-competitive behavior. The design 
of such a scheme is beyond the scope of this Article. The tension in 
separating what is undesirable anti-competitive behavior from the 
desirable internalization of externalities is well illustrated in a recent 
example. In 2019, the state of California reached an agreement with four 
major auto manufacturers, in which the car companies pledged to 
voluntarily comply with stricter vehicle emissions standards than those 
required under Federal law.357 In response, the Department of Justice 
                                                   
just shy of the current GDP of the European Union. Rachel Evan et al., BlackRock and Vanguard Are 
Less Than a Decade Away From Managing $20 Trillion, BLOOMBERG (Dec. 4, 2017), 
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/features/2017-12-04/blackrock-and-vanguard-s-20-trillion-
future-is-closer-than-you-think [https://perma.cc/5T2R-CQHZ]. 
354. See, e.g., Nathan Atkinson, If Not the Index Funds, Then Who?, BERKELEY BUS. L. J. 
(forthcoming), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3341620&download=yes/ (last 
visited Jan. 28, 2020). 
355. Krouse et al., supra note 272; Eric Posner & Glen Weyl, Opinion, The Real Villain Behind 
Our  New  Gilded  Age,  N.Y.  TIMES  (May  1,  2018),  https://www.nytimes.com/2018/05/01/opini
on/monopoly-power-new-gilded-age.html  [https://perma.cc/CD6B-S6QN].  
356. United States v. Columbia Steel Co., 334 U.S. 495, 536 (1948) (Douglas, J., dissenting); see 
also Lina M. Khan, The Ideological Roots of America’s Market Power Problem, 127 YALE L.J.F. 960 
(2017–2018) (arguing that antitrust laws were formulated under classical economic theories of 
entrepreneurship and the competitive process rather than the neoclassical emphasis on outcomes like 
deadweight loss).  
357. Puko & Foldy, supra note 242.  
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announced that it was opening up an antitrust investigation of the 
agreement, arguing that the compact limited consumer choice and was 
potentially anticompetitive.358 Many environmentalists and lawmakers 
denounced the investigation as politically-motivated harassment on the 
part of the Trump administration, which had rolled back tighter emissions 
standards promulgated under the previous administration. Nevertheless, it 
is true that several of these companies had been subject to pressure from 
institutional investors to voluntarily comply with the Obama-era limits.359 
Climate Action 100+ investors had directly asked the companies “to 
negotiate an alternative compliance pathway with California,”360 and a 
shareholder proposal requesting this action from General Motors received 
nearly 30% support in the 2018 proxy season.361 These facts, combined 
with recent common ownership debates, could potentially fuel 
accusations of unlawful collusive behavior. 
C. Shareholder Primacy and Efficiency Framing 
Much of the theory behind corporate law norms rests on the assumption 
that shareholders’ rational self-interest drives them to exercise their 
governance rights with the singular goal of maximizing corporate value.362 
The norm of shareholder primacy363 and the theoretical justification for 
shareholders alone holding voting rights364 are both founded on the 
premise that shareholders homogenously desire firm value 
maximization.365 The newfound consideration of common owner 
                                                   
358. Id. 
359. See, e.g., Report on Fleet Emissions and Regulation (F, 2018 Resolution) (2018), CERES, 
https://engagements.ceres.org/ceres_engagementdetailpage?recID=a0l1H00000C4DhQQAV 
[https://perma.cc/H984-FKHP]. 
360. CLIMATE ACTION 100+, supra note 111, at 70  
361. See AS YOU SOW, GENERAL MOTORS COMPANY: REQUESTS FOR REPORT ON GHG EMISSIONS 
AND CAFE STANDARDS (2018), https://www.asyousow.org/resolutions/2018/01/31/general-motors-
company-request-for-report-on-ghg-emissions-and-cafe-standards [https://perma.cc/KDC9-H7XE]. 
In addition, investors sent public letters to GM seeking the same. CLIMATE ACTION 100+, PROGRESS 
REPORT, supra note 111, at 70. 
362. See, e.g., Romano, supra note 6, at 961 (arguing “profit maximization is the only goal for 
which we can at least theoretically posit shareholder unanimity”).  
363. Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 6, at 439 (“There is no longer any serious competitor to 
the view that corporate law should principally strive to increase long-term shareholder value.”). 
364. Easterbrook & Ficshel, Voting in Corporate Law, supra note 33, at 403 (arguing that 
shareholders, as “the residual claimants to the firm’s income” have the best incentives to direct the 
firm toward maximizing profits). 
365. See, e.g., RICHARD A. BREALEY, STEWART C. MYERS & FRANKLIN ALLEN, PRINCIPLES OF 
CORPORATE FINANCE 7 (11th ed. 2013) (arguing that shareholders “differ in age, tastes, wealth, time 
horizon, risk tolerance, and investment strategy” but agree that the firms objective should be 
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incentives, however, challenges these core assumptions by showing that 
diversified shareholder interests can diverge from both the interests of 
concentrated shareholders and the objective of maximizing share price.366 
The legal norm of shareholder primacy generally holds that managers 
face no conflict when choosing between serving the interests of the 
corporation, of maximizing share price, or obeying shareholder 
interests—these three objectives are in fact the same.367 Similarly, the 
principle that shareholders alone hold governance rights is theoretically 
justified by courts with the reasoning that shareholders, as share-owners, 
can rationally be expected to vote with the “economic self-interest 
arguably common to all shareholders.”368 The Supreme Court of Delaware 
has explained that “[w]hat legitimizes the stockholder vote as a decision-
making mechanism is the premise that stockholders with economic 
ownership are expressing their collective view as to whether a particular 
course of action serves the corporate goal of stockholder 
wealth  maximization.”369 
In questioning the assumption of homogenous shareholder interest in 
profit maximization, this Article compels the reassessment of a substantial 
body of scholarship and jurisprudence. The observation that a divergence 
of interest might exist between a diversified and a concentrated 
shareholder is not a new one,370 but most scholarly discussion of this split 
has concluded that managers should prioritize diversified shareholder 
interests because they are better aligned with the maximization of social 
welfare. This conclusion, however, neglects the inter-firm market-power 
distortions such a maxim would enable. The ambiguous net welfare effect 
of common ownership calls this duty to diversified shareholders 
                                                   
“[m]aximiz[ing] the current market value of [their] investment in the firm”). 
366. See Elhauge, supra note 36; cf. Hart & Zingales, supra note 36 (similarly arguing that 
shareholder welfare is not adequately measured by share price, but based on shareholder’s altruistic 
desires as members of society, not due to unaccounted harms made to their investments by negative 
externalities).  
367. See, e.g., In re Trados Inc. Shareholder Litig., 73 A.3d 17, 36–37 (Del. Ch. 2013) (describing 
fiduciary duties to the corporation and its shareholders together as a “foundational relationship in 
which directors owe duties to the corporation for the ultimate benefit of the entity’s residual 
claimants”). 
368. Kurz v. Holbrook, 989 A.2d 140, 178 (Del. Ch. 2010) (quoting In re IXC Comm’s, Inc. 
Shareholders Litig., 1999 WL 1009174, at *8 (Del. Ch. Oct. 27, 1999)), aff’d in part, rev’d in part 
sub nom. Crown EMAK Partners, LLC v. Kurz, 992 A.2d 377 (Del. 2010). 
369. Crown EMAK Partners, 992 A.2d at 388 (quoting In re IXC Comm’s, Inc. S’holders Litig., 
1999 WL 1009174, at *8 (Del. Ch. Oct. 27, 1999)). 
370. See, e.g., Anabtawi, supra note 35, at 583–85 (describing how the interests of diversified and 
undiversified shareholders may diverge in two ways: they may be willing to take on different levels 
of firm-specific risk, and they may be willing to generate different amount of externalities).  
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into  question. 
It has long been acknowledged that the interests of diversified and 
concentrated shareholders diverge in their preferences for how much risk 
a corporate manager should take on. Concentrated stockholders prefer a 
smaller amount of idiosyncratic risk than diversified stockholders, who 
have immunized their exposure to firm-specific risk.371 In noting this 
divergence, most scholars advocate that firm managers should serve the 
objectives of the diversified over the concentrated holder because this goal 
more closely conforms to the socially desired optimum—portfolio 
expected value is maximized by managers ignoring individual 
risk  aversion.372 
Because idiosyncratic risk does not (theoretically) affect share price, 
this deference to diversified shareholders over concentrated ones does not 
implicate a deviation from the mandate of share price maximization.373 
There are other instances, however, where the literature has noted intra-
shareholder conflicts that force a choice that could, or clearly does, affect 
share price. In these cases, though, scholars have also generally argued 
that managers should prioritize diversified shareholder interests because 
they better represent the interests of society. 
Thomas Smith, for example, has focused on the divergence of interests 
between bondholders and shareholders in advocating for the interpretation 
that directors owe a fiduciary duty to the corporation itself, rather than to 
the objective of maximizing share price.374 His reasoning is that the typical 
rational investor is diversified, meaning, at least from the perspective of 
corporate law theory, a rational stockholder is also a bondholder. 
Therefore, Smith argues, shareholders actually desire managers to 
maximize the value of the corporation as a whole, rather than share price 
alone.375 Rational investors, he argues “will agree on a simple rule: 
managers should make the choice that will maximize the value of rational 
investors’ diversified portfolios.”376 
Smith’s framework focuses on investor diversification across asset 
                                                   
371. Booth, supra note 35, at 434. 
372. Id. (citing EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 6, at 25–30, 339–40; POSNER, supra note 35, 
at 370–71, 380, 407–11, 417, 420, 549; Hu, supra note 35). 
373. Under the Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM), all investors are assumed to be diversified 
and thus idiosyncratic risk does not affect the market price of a firm’s stock. STEPHEN ROSS ET AL., 
CORPORATE FINANCE 363–67 (10th ed. 2013).  
374. Thomas A. Smith, The Efficient Norm for Corporate Law: A Neotraditional Interpretation of 
Fiduciary Duty, 98 MICH. L. REV. 214, 242 (1999).  
375. Id. 
376. Id.  
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classes but ignores diversification across firms. In discussing the optimal 
amount of risk for a manager to take on, John Armour and Jeffrey Gordon 
extend this consideration of diversified investor preferences to inter-firm 
effects.377 They observe that while conventional wisdom holds that a 
diversified investor typically desires an individual firm to take on more, 
rather than less, risk as compared to a concentrated shareholder, this is not 
the case when it comes to firms that generate systemic risks, in which case 
the diversified shareholder desires the firm to take on less risk.378 They 
argue that in this situation, loyalty to diversified investors is socially 
desirable, but at odds with the goal of shareholder value maximization, as 
measured by the share price.379 They advocate, in the case of systemically 
important firms, for the imposition of director liabilities that explicitly 
prioritize diversified shareholder welfare over share 
price  maximization.380 
While “most scholars” advocate that “management should manage 
with the interests of diversified stockholders in mind,”381 these arguments 
generally ignore the perverse inter-firm production effects this mandate 
would bring about. Frank Easterbrook and Daniel Fischel, advocates of a 
                                                   
377. John Armour & Jeffrey N. Gordon, Systemic Harms and Shareholder Value, 6 J. LEGAL 
ANALYSIS 35 (2014). 
378. Id. 
379. Id. at 39 (“[S]hare price maximization can in the presence of systemic externalities lead to 
reduced portfolio returns for investors.”). 
380. Id. 
381. Booth, supra note 35, at 434. This argument of the alignment of diversified investor interest 
with the social welfare maximizing objective also appears in discussions of the positive externalities 
generated by disclosure. Increased disclosure from an individual firm provides information to the 
firm’s industry competitors, suppliers, and customers that weakens the firm’s competitive advantage 
and bargaining position. Merritt Fox describes these disclosure costs as “interfirm costs.” Merritt B. 
Fox, Retaining Mandatory Securities Disclosure: Why Issuer Choice Is Not Investor Empowerment, 
85 VA. L. REV. 1335, 1345 (1999). Because “interfirm costs” are imposed only on the disclosing firm, 
while generating benefits for other firms, the socially optimal level of disclosure, Fox argues, exceeds 
the level that would be chosen under private ordering. Id. at 1344–45. Roberta Romano argues that 
the solution to this problem does not require government regulation because diversified shareholders 
will pressure the firm into releasing the socially optimal level of disclosure, thereby internalizing the 
externality. Roberta Romano, Empowering Investors: A Market Approach to Securities Regulation, 
107 YALE L.J. 2359, 2368 (1998) (“[Investors] will desire a regime requiring the information’s 
disclosure because, by definition of a positive externality, the expected gain on their shares in 
competitors will offset the loss on their shares in the issuer.”) (citing Ronald A. Dye, Mandatory 
Versus Voluntary Disclosures: The Cases of Financial and Real Externalities, 65 ACCT. REV. 1, 15–
16, 18–19 (1990)); Fox argues that Romano is incorrect in this assertion because (writing in 1999) 
most diversified investors do not hold shares of all relevant firms. He notes, “[o]nly an investor that 
holds a portfolio consisting of the same percentage of all stocks available in the market—an index 
fund—would privately experience costs and benefits from disclosure that parallel its social costs and 
benefits. Yet index funds are notoriously passive concerning corporate governance.” Fox, supra, 
at  1353 n.30. 
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fiduciary duty to diversified shareholders, note these shareholders have 
“an investment in the economy as a whole and therefore want[] whatever 
social or private governance rules maximize the value of all firms put 
together[; they are] not interested in maximizing one firm’s value if that 
comes out of the hide of some other corporation.”382 While they describe 
a portfolio perspective that is consistent with the arguments of this Article, 
they somehow neglect to consider that this interest, combined with control 
over individual firm’s production pathways, would lead to inter-firm 
distortions at odds with the assumption of firm specific profit-
maximization that forms the theoretical basis for shareholder primacy. 
Economy-wide diversification means that investors become common 
owners of firms that compete and impose costs on one another. If the 
“overall objective of corporate law . . . [is] to serve the interests of society 
as a whole,”383 how should corporate law respond to this reassessment of 
diversified investor behavior? Proponents of shareholder primacy argue 
that requiring managerial devotion to shareholder interests is the best way 
to maximize aggregate social welfare.384 This argument assumes that 
while externalities exist, and impose societal costs, individual firms lack 
market power to internalize them directly without ceding market share to 
competitors willing to externalize their costs.385 This Article, however, 
provides evidence that diversified investors can, in fact, implement 
externality internalization. In this case, deviation from share price 
maximization can improve portfolio efficiency. However, diversified 
institutional investor market power to internalize externalities comes 
along with the power to influence other inter-firm behaviors, like 
encouraging monopoly pricing and monopsony purchasing. The net 
welfare effects of common ownership require further study, but intuition 
                                                   
382. EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 6, at 29. 
383. John Armour et al., What is Corporate Law?, in THE ANATOMY OF CORPORATE LAW: A 
COMPARATIVE AND FUNCTIONAL APPROACH 22 (Reiner Kraakman et al. eds., 2009) (arguing that 
corporate law should be concerned with advancing the “aggregate welfare of all who are affected by 
a firm’s activities”). 
384. Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 6, at 441 (“[T]here is convergence on a consensus that 
the best means to this end (that is, the pursuit of aggregate social welfare) is to make corporate 
managers strongly accountable to shareholder interests and, at least in direct terms, only to those 
interests.”). While advocates for shareholder primacy acknowledge that the generation of externalities 
is an exception to this socially desirable outcome, the regulation of externalities lies solely in the 
domain of the government, and for companies to address them directly would be infeasible and 
inefficient. See Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 6, at 442; Jensen, supra note 7, at 16; cf. Hart & 
Zingales, supra note 36 (arguing that because shareholder welfare and market value diverge, fiduciary 
duties should be re-interpreted to require allegiance to shareholder interests over share price 
maximization and failing to address the competitive effects such an amendment might  encourage). 
385. See, e.g., Jensen, supra note 7, at 16. 
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suggests this behavior is not aligned with aggregate social welfare.386 
The portfolio-maximizing objective of common owners suggests that 
the advocates of managerial duty to diversified shareholders have not fully 
considered the perverse effects such a duty could create.387 Beyond the 
market distortions that such a duty might enable, it is unclear how a 
manager could be expected to meet it. Richard Booth argues that 
diversified shareholder utility maximization would be so impractical and 
so challenging to determine, that diversified stockholders themselves 
would prefer management to manage “as if for the benefit of undiversified 
owners simply because such a system is the best that can be devised.”388 
Indeed, shareholder value maximization as a theory of corporate purpose 
rests, in part, on the simplicity of measuring managerial success through 
a single metric.389 
CONCLUSION 
BlackRock CEO Larry Fink’s 2018 annual letter to CEOs, entitled “A 
Sense of Purpose,” cautioned that because “many governments [are] 
failing to prepare for the future,” it fell to the private sector to “respond to 
broader societal challenges.”390 Some responded to his letter with ridicule: 
“Fink’s social purpose has no grounding in economics,” argued one asset 
manager.391 But there is a rational economic grounding: Fink’s interest in 
preventing harm to BlackRock’s economy-mirroring portfolio of assets. 
Global climate change is one “societal challenge” that governments are 
                                                   
386. See discussion of net welfare effects, supra section III.A. 
387. See, e.g., Henry T. C. Hu, New Financial Products, the Modern Process of Financial 
Innovation, and the Puzzle of Shareholder Welfare, 69 TEX. L. REV. 1273, 1282 (1991) (noting that 
diversified shareholders might logically desire a firm in a dying industry to simply liquidate its assets, 
ceding market share to its competitors). 
388. Booth, supra note 35, at 454; id. at 447 (“That is, management would need to consider the 
wealth effect of business decisions in terms of their fit with all other stocks in the portfolio”.). This 
observation mirrors the discussion in section III.B. regarding the impossibility of optimal portfolio 
management from the perspective of the central allocator of resources. 
389. See, e.g., Robert J. Rhee, A Legal Theory of Shareholder Primacy, 102 MINN. L. REV. 1951, 
2008 n.249 (2018) (“Coordination to a single objective is consistent with agency cost theory of the 
firm, which says that an agent must be given a single objective, lest the agent will pursue his own 
interest and agency cost will in-crease.”). 
390. Larry Fink’s 2018 Letter, supra note 277. He made much the same message in his 2019 letter: 
“Stakeholders are pushing companies to wade into sensitive social and political issues – especially as 
they see governments failing to do so effectively.” Larry Fink, Larry Fink’s 2019 Letter to CEOs: 
Purposes and Profit, BLACKROCK (2019), https://www.blackrock.com/corporate/investor-
relations/2019-larry-fink-ceo-letter [https://perma.cc/J6EM-TQVC]. 
391. Vito J. Racanelli, Did BlackRock’s Larry Fink Go Too Far?, BARRON’S (Jan. 20, 2018), 
https://www.barrons.com/articles/did-blackrocks-larry-fink-go-too-far-1516418347 
[https://perma.cc/235X-ZAJF]. 
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failing to meet. Institutional investors have the economic incentive to 
function as “surrogate regulators,” sacrificing individual firm profits for 
the benefit of the broader portfolio. This explanation of why institutional 
investors pressure firms to voluntarily reduce emissions has challenged 
the widespread assumption that shareholders uniformly seek to maximize 
share value. Further, investors have the ability to carry out their portfolio-
maximizing agenda through their power over both the market and 
managers. This explanation of how institutional investors are able to 
pressure firms into deviating from a profit maximizing objective 
challenges the traditional view of diversified investor passivity. 
Thus far, discussion of the appropriate legal response to common 
ownership has focused on the law of antitrust. The arguments outlined in 
this Article show that corporate law must also respond given its present 
failure to account for the behavior and influence of diversified investors. 
 
